Hundt v. Berryhill

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 10, 2020
• Docket: 2:18-cv-02011
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 EVELYN J. HUNDT, Case No. 2:18-cv-02011-DJA 7 Plaintiff, 8 ORDER v. 9 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 1 Commissioner of 10 Social Security,

11 Defendant.

12 13 This matter involves the review of an administrative action by the Commissioner of Social 14 Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Evelyn J. Hundt’s (“Plaintiff”) applications for 15 disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security 16 income under Title XVI of the Act. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal or to 17 Remand (ECF No. 18), filed on February 8, 2019, and the Commissioner’s Response and Cross- 18 Motion to Affirm (ECF Nos. 19, 21), filed on March 8 and 11, 2019. Plaintiff filed a Reply (ECF 19 No. 22) on March 28, 2019. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 1. Procedural History 22 On January 17, 2015, Plaintiff protectively applied for disability insurance benefits, and 23 supplemental security income, alleging an amended onset date of April 1, 2015. AR2 394-95 and 24 396-402. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially, and on reconsideration. AR 263-66 and 269-73. 25 A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on August 14, 2017. AR 167- 26

27 1 Andrew Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security and substituted as a party. 1 204. On October 18, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. AR 126-53. The 2 ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied 3 review on August 21, 2018. AR 1-4. On October 18, 2018 Plaintiff commenced this action for 4 judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). (See Motion/Application for Leave to Proceed in 5 forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1).) 6 2. The ALJ Decision 7 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 8 404.1520, 416.920.3 AR 129-147. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 9 substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of April 1, 2015 through the date of the 10 decision. AR 131. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had medically determinable “severe” 11 impairments of affective/mood disorder, anxiety related disorder, and asthma. Id. at 131-32. He 12 also found Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia to be non-severe and considered her obesity in accordance 13 with SSR 02-01p. Id. at 132. 14 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 15 impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 16 Appendix 1. Id. at 133. He rated the paragraph B criteria as mild, moderate, moderate, and mild. 17 Id. at 133-34. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to 18 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that she must avoid 19 concentrated exposure to chemicals and pulmonary irritants such as smoke, dust, fumes, odors, 20 gases and poorly ventilated areas, avoid even moderate exposure to hazardous machinery, 21 unprotected heights and operational control of moving machinery, must never operate a motor 22 vehicle, and is limited to simple tasks, typical of unskilled occupations with no production rate 23 pace work, only occasional interaction with coworkers, and no interaction with the public. Id. at 24 134-35. 25 26 27 3 The regulations relevant to Title II and Title XVI claims are almost identical; the Court will only 1 The ALJ found that Plaintiff is not capable of performing any past relevant work. AR 2 144-45. At step five, the ALJ found Plaintiff to be a younger individual age 18-49 on the alleged 3 disability onset date, have at least a high school education, able to communicate in English, and 4 transferability of job skills not material, and there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 5 national economy that she can perform. Id. at 145. The ALJ considered the Medical-Vocational 6 Rule 202.21 along with the erosion of the unskilled light occupational base due to the additional 7 RFC limitations and relied on vocational expert testimony to find the following jobs were capable 8 of being performed: at the light exertional level - mail clerk, stock checker, and routing clerk and 9 at the sedentary exertional level – document preparer, jewelry preparer, and lens inserter. Id. at 10 146. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time from 11 April 1, 2015 through the date of the decision. Id. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 1. Standard of Review 14 Administrative decisions in social security disability benefits cases are reviewed under 42 15 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 405(g) 16 states: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made 17 after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a 18 review of such decision by a civil action . . . brought in the district court of the United States for 19 the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides.” The court may enter “upon the pleadings and 20 transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 21 Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. The 22 Ninth Circuit reviews a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the 23 Commissioner de novo. See Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 24 The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 25 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the 26 Commissioner’s findings may be set aside if they are based on legal error or not supported by 27 substantial evidence. See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1 substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 2 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 3 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 4 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are 5 supported by substantial evidence, the court “must review the administrative record as a whole, 6 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 7 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 8 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 9 Under the substantial evidence test, findings must be upheld if supported by inferences 10 reasonably drawn from the record. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. When the evidence will support 11 more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation. 12 See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health and Human 13 Serv., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Consequently, the issue before the court is not whether 14 the Commissioner could reasonably have reached a different conclusion, but whether the final 15 decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is incumbent on the ALJ to make specific 16 findings so that the court does not speculate as to the basis of the findings when determining if the 17 Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Mere cursory findings of fact 18 without explicit statements as to what portions of the evidence were accepted or rejected are not 19 sufficient. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1981). The ALJ’s findings “should 20 be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible, and where appropriate, should include a statement 21 of subordinate factual foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based.” Id. 22 2. Disability Evaluation Process 23 The individual seeking disability benefits has the initial burden of proving disability. 24 Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir 1995). To meet this burden, the individual must 25 demonstrate the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 26 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous 27 period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the individual 1 404.1514. If the individual establishes an inability to perform his/her prior work, then the burden 2 shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual can perform other substantial gainful work 3 that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 4 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether an 5 individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If 6 at any step the ALJ determines that he/she can make a finding of disability or nondisability, a 7 determination will be made and no further evaluation is required. See 20 C.F.R. § 8 404.1520(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003). Step one requires the ALJ to 9 determine whether the individual is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520(b). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful; it involves 11 doing significant physical or mental activities usually for pay or profit. Id. § 404.1572(a)-(b). If 12 the individual is engaged in SGA, then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual is not 13 engaged in SGA, then the analysis proceeds to the step two. Step two addresses whether the 14 individual has a medically determinable impairment that is severe or a combination of 15 impairments that significantly limits her from performing basic work activities. Id. § 16 404.1520(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe when medical and 17 other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that 18 would have no more than a minimal effect on the individual’s ability to work. Id. § 404.1521; see 19 also Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) 85-28, 96-3p, and 96-4p.4 If the individual does not have a 20 severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then a finding of not 21 disabled is made. If the individual has a severe medically determinable impairment or 22 combination of impairments, then the analysis proceeds to step three. 23 Step three requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual’s impairments or 24 combination of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 25

26 4 SSRs constitute the SSA’s official interpretation of the statute and regulations. See Bray v. 27 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). They are entitled to some deference as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act and 1 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. If 2 the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal the criteria of a listing 3 and the duration requirement (20 C.F.R. § 404.1509), then a finding of disabled is made. 20 4 C.F.R. § 404.1520(h). If the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments does not 5 meet or equal the criteria of a listing or meet the duration requirement, then the analysis proceeds 6 to step four. 7 Before moving to step four, however, the ALJ must first determine the individual’s 8 residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is a function-by-function assessment of the 9 individual’s ability to do physical and mental work-related activities on a sustained basis despite 10 limitations from impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also SSR 96-8p. In making this 11 finding, the ALJ must consider all the relevant evidence, such as all symptoms and the extent to 12 which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical 13 evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also SSRs 96-4p and 16-3p. To the 14 extent that statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or 15 other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must evaluate the 16 individual’s statements based on a consideration of the entire case record. The ALJ must also 17 consider opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 18 SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p, and 06-3p. 19 Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual has the RFC to perform 20 his/her past relevant work (“PRW”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). PRW means work performed 21 either as the individual actually performed it or as it is generally performed in the national 22 economy within the last 15 years or 15 years before the date that disability must be established. 23 In addition, the work must have lasted long enough for the individual to learn the job and 24 performed at SGA. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b) and 404.1565. If the individual has the RFC to 25 perform his past work, then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual is unable to 26 perform any PRW or does not have any PRW, then the analysis proceeds to step five. 27 The fifth and final step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual is able to do 1 404.1520(g). If he/she is able to do other work, then a finding of not disabled is made. Although 2 the individual generally continues to have the burden of proving disability at this step, a limited 3 burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Commissioner. The Commissioner is 4 responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers 5 in the national economy that the individual can do. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42. 6 3. Analysis 7 a. Whether the ALJ’s RFC Limitations Are Supported In Light of the 8 Opinion Evidence 9 Plaintiff contends that the RFC limitations to simple tasks, typical of unskilled 10 occupations with no production rate pace work, only occasional interaction with coworkers, and 11 no interaction with the public was not restrictive enough given Dr. Newman’s and Dr. Eckert’s 12 opinions. (ECF No. 16, 11-12). She argues that because the representative jobs listed in the 13 ALJ’s step five finding are not classified as reasoning level 1 and she should have been limited to 14 very short instructions with a marked limitation in performing detailed, then remand is warranted. 15 (Id. at 12). Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s rejection of state agency consultants’ opinions 16 that Plaintiff is limited to six hours of standing/walking and six hours of sitting in an eight-hour 17 work day, which would limit her to sedentary work, is not supported. (Id. at 12-16). 18 The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff has failed to show a conflict between the jobs 19 cited at step five and the assigned RFC mental limitations set forth by the ALJ. (ECF No. 21, 4- 20 6). Furthermore, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ does not rely on DOT reasoning 21 levels, but rather, considers if the work is unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled. (Id. at 5). Because 22 the evidence shows that Plaintiff is able to perform at the unskilled work level, then the 23 Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s step five jobs are supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 24 6). Also, the Commissioner claims that the medical opinions from the State agency consultants 25 Dr. Roth and Dr. Reed do not conflict with the RFC limitation to light work as SSR 83-10 defines 26 light work as stand/walk six hours and sit six hours. (Id.). 27 Plaintiff replies that the Commissioner relies on outdated law and fails to address her 1 limitations in the RFC. (ECF No. 22). She also contends that she is unable to perform the jobs 2 listed in the ALJ’s step five finding due to the reasoning level being higher than 1. (Id. at 5). 3 Finally, Plaintiff contends that SSR 83-10 does not save the ALJ’s error in crafting the RFC 4 limitations regarding sitting, standing, and walking. (Id. at 6). 5 The Court finds that ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence is supported by substantial 6 evidence. In deciding how much weight to give a medical opinion, the ALJ considers factors 7 including, e.g., the treating or examining relationship of the opinion’s source and the claimant; 8 how well the opinion is supported; and how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole. 9 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). In evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ must provide “clear and 10 convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of 11 an examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831 (9th Cir. 1995). 12 Here, the ALJ assigned the physical consultative examiner’s opinion and the State agency 13 medical consultants’ opinions some weight while noting he gave greater weight to the light 14 exertional level and irritants findings that he adopted in the assigned RFC. AR 143. The ALJ 15 evaluated the mental consultative examiner’s opinion from Dr. Eckert and that State agency 16 psychological consultant’s opinion and assigned some weight; again, the ALJ noted that he 17 assigned greater weight to the moderate social functioning and moderate concentration, 18 persistence and pace limitations that he found consistent with the record. AR 144. Further, the 19 ALJ assigned partial weight to Dr. Malone’s opinion with great weight to Plaintiff’s activities as 20 opposed to Plaintiff’s limitations. Id. 21 In reviewing the ALJ’s opinion evidence assessment, the Court is not persuaded by 22 Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ was required to assign more weight to the opinions than he did 23 nor that the ALJ was required to further limit the mental RFC limitations assigned to Plaintiff. 24 The ALJ provided clear reasons based on his overall review of the record, the examination 25 findings, and Plaintiff’s self-reports as the basis for the weight assigned. AR 143-144. 26 Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges that weight assigned to the opinions and the 27 assigned RFC limitations, under these circumstances, the ALJ’s findings are entitled to deference. 1 See Lewis v. Astruethe, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f evidence is susceptible of more 2 than one rational interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld.”). 3 Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges the three jobs cited at step five as not 4 conforming with the mental RFC limitations assigned by the ALJ, the Court finds that argument 5 meritless. The Ninth Circuit has found that the DOT is the rebuttable presumptive authority on 6 job classifications. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). As such, ALJs 7 routinely rely on the DOT “in evaluating whether the claimant is able to perform other work in 8 the national economy.” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted); 9 see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (DOT is source of reliable job information). Accordingly, an 10 ALJ may not rely on a vocational expert’s testimony regarding the requirements of a particular 11 job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts with the DOT, and if so, the reasons 12 therefore. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–53. Failure to inquire is a harmless error 13 when there is no apparent conflict or the vocational expert provides sufficient support to justify 14 deviation from the DOT. Id. at 1154 n. 19. Evidence sufficient to permit such a deviation may be 15 either specific findings of fact regarding the claimant’s residual functionality or inferences drawn 16 from the context of the vocational expert’s testimony. See Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 17 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997) (as amended) (citations omitted). 18 Here, the Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert to pose a 19 hypothetical question containing the assigned RFC limitations, the jobs cited have a SVP of 2, 20 and the light and sedentary options appropriately accommodate the sitting, standing, and walking 21 limitations included in the assigned RFC. AR 201. The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 22 whether a RFC limitation to simple tasks is compatible with a GED reasoning level 3 job in 23 Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015).1 There the Ninth Circuit found that because the 24 ALJ failed to recognize an inconsistency and did not ask the expert to explain why a person with 25 1 The Ninth Circuit joined the Tenth Circuit’s position that found an apparent conflict between a 26 job requiring reasoning level 3 and a RFC limitation to simple tasks. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005). In contrast, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have found no 27 apparent conflict between a job requiring reasoning level 3 and a RFC limitation to simple work. See Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009); Renfrow v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 918, 921 (8th 1 the plaintiff’s limitation could meet the demands of level 3 reasoning it was not a harmless error. 2 Id. The Court finds that the Zavalin case is not comparable to the situation here. Id. The ALJ 3 was able to infer from the entirety of the record and his observations of her during the hearing 4 that she could perform unskilled jobs, such as those cited at step five. Similarly, the Court is able 5 to infer from the AR and the hearing transcript that Plaintiff is capable of performing unskilled 6 jobs based on her education, past relevant work, and vocational expert testimony. Even if the 7 ALJ was required to give an explanation in his decision of the specific mental RFC limitations 8 assigned and how they accommodate level two reasoning jobs, the Court finds it is a harmless 9 error. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC and step five findings are supported by 10 substantial evidence. 11 b. Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony 12 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for 13 rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of symptoms and limitations. (ECF No. 16, 16-21). 14 She argues that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence in the record to support the assigned RFC and 15 reject Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. (Id. at 20). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s 16 evaluation of Plaintiff’s complaints is supported based on the medical record not corroborating 17 the extreme degree of limitations described by Plaintiff, her inconsistent statements, her activities 18 of daily living showing she could function at a higher level, and Plaintiff’s demonstrated 19 capabilities during the hearing. (ECF No. 21, 7-9). Also, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ 20 did not take isolated excerpts from the medical evidence to support his evaluation, but rather, 21 highlighted some of the evidence that contradicted Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff 22 replies that the ALJ’s reliance on observations of Plaintiff’s mental state during the hearing is 23 misplaced and the Commissioner’s summary of the medical record as symptom free is untrue. 24 (ECF No. 22, 7). 25 While an ALJ must consider a plaintiff’s representations about her symptoms and 26 limitations, her statements about her “pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that” she is 27 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). In fact, an “ALJ cannot be required to believe every 1 plainly contrary to [the Act].” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). However, 2 absent affirmative evidence that the claimant is malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the 3 claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 4 (9th Cir. 2014). Specifically, the ALJ must state why the testimony is unpersuasive and point to 5 what testimony or evidence undermines the claimant’s testimony. See, e.g., Parra v. Astrue, 481 6 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding ALJ’s credibility determination when he pointed out 7 numerous lab results that contradicted his subjective complaints); see also Robbins v. Social Sec. 8 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ required to provide a “narrative discussion” 9 and state specific evidence in the record supporting an adverse credibility finding). 10 The ALJ “may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of 11 medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. This 12 is because the lack of an objective medical basis is just one factor in evaluating the credibility of a 13 claimant’s testimony and complaints. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) 14 (en banc). Moreover, the Court notes that SSR 16-3 clarified that ALJ no longer has to make 15 credibility findings, but rather, evaluate the extent to which the alleged functional limitations and 16 restrictions due to pain and other symptoms are consistent with the other evidence. If “evidence 17 can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision,” the Court may not substitute its 18 judgment for that of the ALJ’s. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 19 Here, the Court finds that the ALJ properly articulated clear and convincing reasons for 20 rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. He noted the medical treatment in the record that conflicts with 21 Plaintiff’s claim of disabling level pain and symptoms. AR 135-142. Specifically, he highlighted 22 that Plaintiff’s course of treatment has been conservative and she has not required pain 23 management by a specialist. AR 142. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) 24 (pain complaints properly rejected where the ALJ “reasonably noted” evidence that pain had 25 come under control). 26 The ALJ also noted that the record did not contain any opinion evidence from treating or 27 examining physicians that indicated greater physical RFC limitations. AR 143. As such, the 1 with the overall record. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) 2 (medical source reports support the ALJ’s determination). He also compared the opinion 3 evidence to Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living, which alleged a disabling level of 4 symptoms. AR 143. Moreover, the ALJ highlighted Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements that 5 undermined the credibility of her claims. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 6 2012) (“ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the 7 testimony and the claimant’s conduct.”); see also Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 8 2009) (ALJ properly found claimant “demonstrated better abilities than he acknowledged in his 9 written statements and testimony”). After a careful review of the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s 10 alleged limitations and pain and other symptoms, the Court finds that she complied with SR 16-3 11 and the Ninth Circuit standard such that it may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ’s. 12 See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported 13 by substantial evidence and free from reversible legal error. 14 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 16 16) is denied. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion to Affirm (ECF No. 18 19) is granted. 19 The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 20 DATED: February 10, 2020 21 22 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27