Humphreys v. United States

43 Cust. Ct. 103, 177 F. Supp. 259, 11 Oil & Gas Rep. 711, 1959 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 24
United States Customs Court·Decided September 4, 1959·No. C.D. 2112·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

Mollisou, Judge:

The plaintiff in these cases imported into the United States a commodity described on the invoices as “Liquified Petroleum Gas” upon which duty was assessed at the rate of % cent per gallon under the provision in section 4521(1), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as modified by the Presidential proclamation relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 51802, for “all • liquid derivatives of crude petroleum, except lubricating oil and gasoline or other motor fuel,”

[105] The protest in each case claims that the merchandise consists of propane, butane, and similar gases, and that as such gases they are not subject to the tax on liquid derivatives of crude petroleum provided for in section 4521, supra.

There appears to be no dispute but that at ordinary temperatures and at atmospheric pressure propane, butane, and mixtures of the two are in a gaseous state, and that when such commodities are compressed under certain conditions they pass from the gaseous form into the liquid form. The merchandise at bar was imported in pressurized tank cars and was approximately 90 percent in a liquid state and approximately 10 percent in a gaseous state.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the gases were compressed into liquid state solely as a means of facilitating and economizing transportation; that they are not liquids within the common meaning of the term “liquid derivatives of crude petroleum”; and that Congress did not intend them to be classified with the other products enumerated in section 4521, supra.

The defendant’s position is that it is the condition of the merchandise at the time of its importation which governs its classification; that, as -imported, the propane, butane, and mixture at bar were liquids and come within the wording of the statute, which it contends, is unambiguous.

According to the record, propane and butane may be obtained from several sources. They may be obtained directly from the ground, apparently in association with natural gas; they may be separated at the refinery from crude petroleum; and they may be removed from natural gasoline by evaporation. Although the record indicates that when butane is taken from the ground under pressure it may be to some degree in a liquid state, it appears that both propane and butane are normally obtained and known as gases.

The gases may be distributed as gases in pipelines, in which case they appear to be sold by the cubic foot or on a therm basis, one therm equaling 1,000 British thermal units. As it was in tire case of the merchandise at bar, the gases may also be compressed by standard types of industrial compressors, and at certain pressures and temperatures they become liquid and may be stored and transported in various types of containers, such as pressurized tank cars, cylinders, or other pressure vessels. In such cases, they are sold by the gallon, or liquid measure.

The liquefied gases at bar were sold for use in a test program for application as a motor fuel, and for use in industrial and domestic heating applications. In some of the latter applications, the merchandise was distributed to the ultimate consumer in the form of a gas, while in others, particularly to individual domestic users, it was distributed in pressurized containers in liquid form.

[106] Before it can be used, however, it appears that the liquid is transformed into the gaseous state by reducing the pressure, and that it is used as a gas, rather than as a liquid.

Plaintiff urges that the fact that both in origin and in use the liquefied petroleum gases at bar are in gaseous form demonstrates that the conversion of the original gases into liquid form was done solely for facility and convenience in transportation and did not affect their essential character and nature as gases. Plaintiff cites a number of decisions of this and other courts as holding that processes to which certain commodities had been subjected prior to importation for the purpose of effectuating safety, facility, or economy in transportation, and which processes did not alter the essential characteristics of the commodities, were not considered to have taken those commodities out of the tariff classification to which the original commodities belonged.

Among the cited cases are Fleming-Joffe, Ltd. v. United States, 25 Cust. Ct. 56, C.D. 1263 (treatment to preserve raw snakeskins and permit their safe transportation, but which was insufficient to convert them into leather), J. T. Williams & Son v. United States, 5 Treas. Dec. 584, T.D. 23874, and J. H. Dieckmann, Jr., et al. v. United States, 41 Treas. Dec. 505, Abstract 44689 (walnut and cedar logs sawed in such a manner as to facilitate transportation but held not sufficient to convert them from logs into sawed lumber or timber), and United States v. Aetna Explosives Co., 256 U.S. 402 (addition of sulphuric acid to nitric acid, solely for the purpose of rendering the transportation of the nitric acid safe, but which did not result is a usable mixture of acids).

Counsel for the defendant, in the brief filed in its behalf, has pointed out that in each of the cases cited, the ruling did not rest upon any principle or rule that the results of processes effectuated solely for safety, facility, or economy in transportation were to be disregarded in determining the tariff classification of imported merchandise, but, rather, upon a finding in each case that the processes did not actually result in the conversion of the original commodity into another commodity having a tariff classification separate and distinct from that of the original commodity.

We think that counsel for the defendant has correctly stated the ratio decidendi of the cited cases, as well as the cases of United States v. Rockhill & Vietor et al., 10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 112, T.D. 38374, and Bush & Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. Appls. 246, T.D. 39076, also cited by counsel for the plaintiff. In the latter cases, certain oils hardened by a hydrogenation process were held, notwithstanding a change in form and in some properties, to be properly classifiable under the tariff provisions applicable to the original oils. [107] Moreover, in tliose cases the competition between tariff provisions was not comparable to that in the case at bar.

Counsel for the parties differ in their concepts of the meaning to be given to the term “all liquid derivatives of crude petroleum,” as found in section 4521, supra. Counsel for the defendant urges that the commodities at bar, which it is unquestioned are derivatives of crude petroleum, are liquids in their imported form, and that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous as covering all derivatives of crude petroleum which are in the liquid state.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Humphreys v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 103, 177 F. Supp. 259, 11 Oil & Gas Rep. 711, 1959 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 24 (cusc 1959).

43 Cust. Ct. 103 (Humphreys v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

CJ Van Houten & Zoon v. United States
664 F. Supp. 514 (Court of International Trade, 1987)
Wood v. United States
49 Cust. Ct. 202 (U.S. Customs Court, 1962)
Humphreys v. United States
45 Cust. Ct. 259 (U.S. Customs Court, 1960)
Border Brokerage Co. v. United States
45 Cust. Ct. 259 (U.S. Customs Court, 1960)
American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co. v. United States
45 Cust. Ct. 1 (U.S. Customs Court, 1960)
Ladwig v. United States
44 Cust. Ct. 487 (U.S. Customs Court, 1960)