F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 19 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JAMES C. HUMPHREYS; JILL M. HUMPHREYS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 99-5232 (D.C. No. 96-CV-942-E) JOHNYNE FUSELIER, individually; (N.D. Okla.) JAMES ARTHUR SPARGUR, individually, dba, Specialty Builders,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiffs James and Jill Humphreys brought this diversity action asserting a
claim against defendants for wrongful destruction of timber on plaintiffs’
residential lot in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and seeking damages pursuant to
Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 72. At the pretrial conference, the district court determined
that the appropriate measure of damages to plaintiffs’ property was diminution
of value and that plaintiffs could not show any damages under this theory.
It therefore dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm in part and reverse
in part.
According to plaintiffs, defendant Johnyne Fuselier owned property
abutting plaintiffs’ lot, and defendant James Spargur was constructing a house for
her on her property. Under Spargur’s direction, defendant Bret Barnhart was
clearing trees with a bulldozer on Fuselier’s property along the common property
line. Near the back of the two lots, he pushed the trees uprooted from Fuselier’s
property onto plaintiffs’ property, and in the process, bulldozed 5,320 square feet
of plaintiffs’ property, allegedly destroying hundreds of trees.
The district court initially dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint on jurisdictional
grounds based on its determination that the amount in controversy did not exceed
the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On appeal, we
reversed, holding that under the damage multiplier and attorney fee provisions
of Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 72, it was not certain plaintiffs could not meet the
-2- jurisdictional amount. Humphreys v. Fuselier , No. 97-5019, 1997 WL 579185
(10th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997) (unpublished). Following our remand, the district court
appointed a certified real estate appraiser to determine the fair market value of
plaintiffs’ property before and after the trees were destroyed. Defendant Barnhart
settled for $30,000, leaving defendants Fuselier and Spargur, who have never
filed answers to plaintiffs’ complaint. On September 9, 1999, the court ordered
the pretrial order, trial briefs, and requested jury instructions to be filed by
October 27, 1999, and it set the trial for December 6, 1999. Plaintiffs filed their
trial brief, requested jury instructions, and proposed pretrial order by the deadline.
On November 3, the district court held a pretrial conference at which
plaintiffs appeared through counsel and Spargur appeared pro se. By this time,
the district court had the real estate appraiser’s report, which indicated that the
value of plaintiffs’ property, $127,500, had not been diminished by the
destruction of the trees. Although plaintiffs had argued in their pretrial brief that
damages should be determined by the “replacement value” of the destroyed trees,
the district court determined at the conference that under Oklahoma law, the
appropriate measure of damages was diminution in value of their property.
Noting that under this measure of damages, the certified appraiser had determined
that plaintiffs suffered no damages, the court inquired of plaintiffs what evidence
they had to show damages under this theory. Plaintiffs offered only the testimony
-3- of a real estate agent, but the court rejected this evidence because the agent was
not a certified appraiser. The court alternatively determined that even if the agent
testified that the value of the property had been diminished by $10,000, based on
the selling price of the property over a year after the incident, plaintiffs would not
be able to show actual detriment in light of the $30,000 they had received from
Barnhart. Because plaintiffs could not show damages, the district court dismissed
the case.
On appeal, plaintiffs’ contend that the district court effectively granted
summary judgment sua sponte at the pretrial conference and that this was
improper because the court failed to give them adequate notice. They also argue
that the appropriate measure of damages is replacement value, that plaintiffs,
as owners of the property, could testify as to its value before and after the trees
were destroyed, and that the settlement proceeds should not have been used to
reduce damages.
Plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the district court violated
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by sua sponte determining at the pretrial conference both
(1) the appropriate measure of damages and (2) whether they could show
damages without giving them adequate notice. Turning first to the measure of
damages, this is a legal question, Bingham v. Zolt , 66 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir.
1995); Gayle Mfg. Co. v. FSLIC , 910 F.2d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 1990), and we see
-4- no error in the court’s determining this matter at the pretrial conference. The
court obviously had to decide this issue before trial, and plaintiffs had fully
briefed it in their trial brief. (Their argument on appeal that the court incorrectly
determined the measure of damages is substantially the same as the argument
contained in their trial brief.) To the extent Rule 56 applies, plaintiffs cite no
authority supporting their contention that it requires notice of a court’s legal
determinations. The cases they cite support, at most, only their contention that
they were entitled to notice of the court’s determination that their case was
factually deficient. Rogan v. Menino , 175 F.3d 75, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1999);
Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc. , 89 F.3d 24, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc. , 131 F.3d 874,
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 19 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JAMES C. HUMPHREYS; JILL M. HUMPHREYS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 99-5232 (D.C. No. 96-CV-942-E) JOHNYNE FUSELIER, individually; (N.D. Okla.) JAMES ARTHUR SPARGUR, individually, dba, Specialty Builders,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiffs James and Jill Humphreys brought this diversity action asserting a
claim against defendants for wrongful destruction of timber on plaintiffs’
residential lot in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and seeking damages pursuant to
Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 72. At the pretrial conference, the district court determined
that the appropriate measure of damages to plaintiffs’ property was diminution
of value and that plaintiffs could not show any damages under this theory.
It therefore dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm in part and reverse
in part.
According to plaintiffs, defendant Johnyne Fuselier owned property
abutting plaintiffs’ lot, and defendant James Spargur was constructing a house for
her on her property. Under Spargur’s direction, defendant Bret Barnhart was
clearing trees with a bulldozer on Fuselier’s property along the common property
line. Near the back of the two lots, he pushed the trees uprooted from Fuselier’s
property onto plaintiffs’ property, and in the process, bulldozed 5,320 square feet
of plaintiffs’ property, allegedly destroying hundreds of trees.
The district court initially dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint on jurisdictional
grounds based on its determination that the amount in controversy did not exceed
the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On appeal, we
reversed, holding that under the damage multiplier and attorney fee provisions
of Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 72, it was not certain plaintiffs could not meet the
-2- jurisdictional amount. Humphreys v. Fuselier , No. 97-5019, 1997 WL 579185
(10th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997) (unpublished). Following our remand, the district court
appointed a certified real estate appraiser to determine the fair market value of
plaintiffs’ property before and after the trees were destroyed. Defendant Barnhart
settled for $30,000, leaving defendants Fuselier and Spargur, who have never
filed answers to plaintiffs’ complaint. On September 9, 1999, the court ordered
the pretrial order, trial briefs, and requested jury instructions to be filed by
October 27, 1999, and it set the trial for December 6, 1999. Plaintiffs filed their
trial brief, requested jury instructions, and proposed pretrial order by the deadline.
On November 3, the district court held a pretrial conference at which
plaintiffs appeared through counsel and Spargur appeared pro se. By this time,
the district court had the real estate appraiser’s report, which indicated that the
value of plaintiffs’ property, $127,500, had not been diminished by the
destruction of the trees. Although plaintiffs had argued in their pretrial brief that
damages should be determined by the “replacement value” of the destroyed trees,
the district court determined at the conference that under Oklahoma law, the
appropriate measure of damages was diminution in value of their property.
Noting that under this measure of damages, the certified appraiser had determined
that plaintiffs suffered no damages, the court inquired of plaintiffs what evidence
they had to show damages under this theory. Plaintiffs offered only the testimony
-3- of a real estate agent, but the court rejected this evidence because the agent was
not a certified appraiser. The court alternatively determined that even if the agent
testified that the value of the property had been diminished by $10,000, based on
the selling price of the property over a year after the incident, plaintiffs would not
be able to show actual detriment in light of the $30,000 they had received from
Barnhart. Because plaintiffs could not show damages, the district court dismissed
the case.
On appeal, plaintiffs’ contend that the district court effectively granted
summary judgment sua sponte at the pretrial conference and that this was
improper because the court failed to give them adequate notice. They also argue
that the appropriate measure of damages is replacement value, that plaintiffs,
as owners of the property, could testify as to its value before and after the trees
were destroyed, and that the settlement proceeds should not have been used to
reduce damages.
Plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the district court violated
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by sua sponte determining at the pretrial conference both
(1) the appropriate measure of damages and (2) whether they could show
damages without giving them adequate notice. Turning first to the measure of
damages, this is a legal question, Bingham v. Zolt , 66 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir.
1995); Gayle Mfg. Co. v. FSLIC , 910 F.2d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 1990), and we see
-4- no error in the court’s determining this matter at the pretrial conference. The
court obviously had to decide this issue before trial, and plaintiffs had fully
briefed it in their trial brief. (Their argument on appeal that the court incorrectly
determined the measure of damages is substantially the same as the argument
contained in their trial brief.) To the extent Rule 56 applies, plaintiffs cite no
authority supporting their contention that it requires notice of a court’s legal
determinations. The cases they cite support, at most, only their contention that
they were entitled to notice of the court’s determination that their case was
factually deficient. Rogan v. Menino , 175 F.3d 75, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1999);
Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc. , 89 F.3d 24, 29-31 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc. , 131 F.3d 874,
892 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourt may grant summary judgment sua sponte ‘so long
as the losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with all of [its]
evidence.’”) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)).
We also conclude that the district court correctly chose diminution in the
value of plaintiffs’ property as the appropriate measure of damages. Because this
is a legal issue, our review is de novo. Bingham , 66 F.3d at 563. As the district
court stated and plaintiffs concede, the general rule for measuring damages for
injury to real property is diminution in value. Short v. Jones , 613 P.2d 452, 457
(Okla. 1980); Pace v. Ott , 115 P.2d 253, 255 (Okla. 1941). We find unpersuasive
-5- plaintiffs’ argument that damages should be determined by “replacement value,”
a theory not applied in any Oklahoma cases. As the district court noted, plaintiffs
did not live on the property at the time the trees were destroyed and subsequently
sold the property without attempting to replace the trees.
Turning next to plaintiffs’ contention that the court erred in finding their
case factually deficient, and their related contention that property owners may
testify regarding the value of their property, we conclude that the district court
erred in granting judgment against plaintiffs without providing them adequate
notice. As noted above, a court may sua sponte grant summary judgment if the
losing party was on notice that it had to come forward with all of its evidence.
Sports Racing Servs. , 131 F.3d at 892. The district court did not give plaintiffs
any notice it was considering dismissing the case. Additionally, in their proposed
pretrial order, plaintiffs had designated themselves to testify regarding the value
of their property, and an owner is competent to give such testimony. See Minick
v. Rhoades Oil Co. , 533 P.2d 598, 600 (Okla. 1975); Bingham v. Bridges ,
613 F.2d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Oklahoma law). We note that at
the pretrial conference, plaintiffs argued only for more time to find an appraiser
qualified to testify about value, not that plaintiffs could testify, and the court
indicated plaintiffs should have had its witnesses lined up already. While we
agree with the court that plaintiffs should have been better prepared at that point,
-6- since the case had been pending for over three years, we nonetheless conclude the
court got ahead of itself by dismissing the case without giving plaintiffs adequate
notice.
Because the issue of whether settlement proceeds should have been used to
reduce damages was not briefed or addressed in the district court, we decline to
consider it on appeal. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part,
REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with
this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-7-