Humphreys v. 201 Marine Avenue, LLC

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Humphreys v. 201 Marine Avenue, LLC

17 A.D.3d 532, 793 N.Y.S.2d 159, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4105

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 18, 2005

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 17 A.D.3d 532 (Humphreys v. 201 Marine Avenue, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Humphreys v. 201 Marine Avenue, LLC, 17 A.D.3d 532, 793 N.Y.S.2d 159, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4105 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005).

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Opinion

In an action to re[533]*533cover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated August 13, 2004, which granted the plaintiffs motion to strike its second affirmative defense alleging that the Workers’ Compensation Law is the plaintiffs sole remedy, and denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on that affirmative defense.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiffs motion and substituting therefor a provision denying that motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant’s second affirmative defense asserting that the Workers’ Compensation Law is her sole remedy is without merit as a matter of law (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Kronos Films v Insurance Co. of State of Pa., 86 AD2d 888 [1982]). Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff (along with her husband) was employed by the defendant on the date of her fall in the basement of the defendant’s building. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing the second affirmative defense.

Moreover, the proof adduced by the defendant upon its cross motion for summary judgment predicated upon the second affirmative defense reflected the presence of triable factual issues as to the plaintiffs employment which precluded the grant of summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on that affirmative defense (see Mojica v Ulrim Realty Corp., 193 NYS2d 524 [1959], affd 10 AD2d 827 [I960]). H. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.

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In an action to re[533]*533cover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated August 13, 2004, which granted the plaintiffs motion to strike its second affirmative defense alleging that the Workers’ Compensation Law is the plaintiffs sole remedy, and denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on that affirmative defense.

Ordered that the order is modified by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiffs motion and substituting therefor a provision denying that motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant’s second affirmative defense asserting that the Workers’ Compensation Law is her sole remedy is without merit as a matter of law (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Kronos Films v Insurance Co. of State of Pa., 86 AD2d 888 [1982]). Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff (along with her husband) was employed by the defendant on the date of her fall in the basement of the defendant’s building. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing the second affirmative defense.

Moreover, the proof adduced by the defendant upon its cross motion for summary judgment predicated upon the second affirmative defense reflected the presence of triable factual issues as to the plaintiffs employment which precluded the grant of summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on that affirmative defense (see Mojica v Ulrim Realty Corp., 193 NYS2d 524 [1959], affd 10 AD2d 827 [I960]). H. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

17 A.D.3d 532, 793 N.Y.S.2d 159, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4105, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/humphreys-v-201-marine-avenue-llc-nyappdiv-2005.

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