Humphrey v. Henderson County Detention Center

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00116
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 DARRIANA HUMPHREY, Case No. 2:24-cv-00116-GMN-EJY

4 Plaintiff ORDER

5 v.

6 HENDERSON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al., 7 Defendants 8 9 10 Plaintiff Darriana Humphrey filed this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 while she was detained at Henderson Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) On 12 December 10, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint by 13 January 9, 2025. (ECF No. 23.) The Court warned Plaintiff that the action could be 14 dismissed if she failed to file a second amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 6–7.) 15 That deadline expired and Plaintiff did not file a second amended complaint, move for an 16 extension, or otherwise respond. Mail sent to Plaintiff from the Court is also being 17 returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 24.) 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 19 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 20 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 21 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 22 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 23 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 24 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 25 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an 26 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 27 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 28 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 1 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 2 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 4 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Plaintiff’s 5 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 6 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 7 a pleading ordered by the Court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 8 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 11 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 12 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 13 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 14 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 15 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 16 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 17 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 18 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 19 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 20 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 21 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until 22 and unless Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a 23 second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address for Plaintiff, the 24 likelihood that the second order would even reach Plaintiff is low, so issuing a second 25 order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court’s finite resources. 26 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 27 the fifth factor favors dismissal. 28 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 1} weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 2| prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s December 10, 2024, Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter 4] judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now- closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue her claims, she must file a complaint in a new 6] case. 7 9 DATED: January 23, 2025 Yj, Me Gloria IM. Navarro, Judge 10 ced States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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