Humphrey, Andy v. Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket

2015 TN WC 170
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 17, 2015
Docket2015-05-0107
StatusPublished

This text of 2015 TN WC 170 (Humphrey, Andy v. Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Humphrey, Andy v. Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket, 2015 TN WC 170 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

ANDY HUMPHREY, ) Employee, ) Docket No. 2015-06-0107 ) v. ) State File No. 2015184197 ) LEWISBURG RUBBER AND ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker GASKET, ) Employer, ) ) And ) ) ACCIDENT FUND INS. CO., ) Insurer. )

ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY BENEFITS (RECORD REVIEW ONLY)

This cause came before the undersigned on a Request for Expedited Hearing filed by the employee, Andy Humphrey, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. Humphrey seeks accrued and future temporary disability benefits and requests the Court enter an order based on review of the case file. The central legal dispute concerns whether Mr. Humphrey’s injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the employer, Lewisburg Rubber and Gasket. For the reasons provided below, the Court finds Mr. Humphrey failed to carry his burden of proving that he is likely to succeed at a hearing on the merits in proving a causal relationship between his injury and his work for the employer. The Court denies his claim for temporary disability benefits.1

1 Additional information regarding the documents the Court considered in this record review is attached to this Order as an Appendix. Claim History

Mr. Humphrey is a sixty-three-year-old resident of Marshall County, Tennessee. On December 23, 2014, a little less than two weeks prior to the date of the alleged accident, Mr. Humphrey presented at Fast Pace Medical Clinic, PLLC “with a chief complaint of pain of the left lower extremity.” (R. 4.) Fast Pace’s providers diagnosed Mr. Humphrey with a sprain or strain and instructed him to follow up with his primary care physician. Id.

In his Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), Mr. Humphrey alleged that, on January 5, 2015, he fell and fractured his femur while walking from his car to the door of his workplace at Lewisburg Rubber. He wrote, “walking on crutches, due to sprained mussel [sic], slipped and fell on uneven ground in parking lot, not handicapped [sic] friendly.” (R. 5.)

That same day, Mr. Humphrey went to Marshall Medical Center where providers transferred him to Williamson Medical Center upon determining he had a fractured hip. At Williamson Medical Center, the medical notes indicate Mr. Humphrey told Dr. Charnes he developed a “twinge in the left hip” while stepping over his cats as he walked down the stairs to his basement carrying groceries approximately two weeks before the date of the alleged workplace accident. (R. 9.)

Following the incident at home, Dr. Charnes’ notes indicate Mr. Humphrey experienced left-sided groin pain over the next several days, and went to a walk-in clinic where he received medication. Id. His pain, however, continued to worsen until he “felt kind of a pop in the left hip” while getting into his truck to go to work the morning of January 5. When he arrived at work, the medical records indicate that the he felt a similar discomfort in his hip while exiting his truck. He used crutches to ambulate and received assistance from co-workers. Despite the crutches and assistance of co-workers, Mr. Humphrey “eventually ended up flat on his back in the parking lot.” Id. In the medical notes, Dr. Charnes stated the following:

[T]alking with the patient I feel that he initially injured that hip when he was walking down the stairs a few weeks back with his groceries, maybe that was the initial injury and then he had a further break today. Unclear on that, either way he has a left hip fracture.

Id.

Dr. Perkinson, an orthopedic surgeon, operated on Mr. Humphrey’s hip on January 6, 2015. (R. 7.) The operation note states, “The patient [is] a 62-year-old

2 male who reports an approximately 2-week history or antecedent left hip pain after going up stairs. He subsequently had a fall yesterday and was unable to ambulate[.]” Id.

Lewisburg Rubber filed a First Report of Injury on January 20, 2015. (R. 1.) The report stated it received notice of the injury on January 17, 2015. On January 28, 2015, Lewisburg Rubber denied Mr. Humphrey’s claim, asserting that his injury did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. (R. 2.)

On May 13, 2015, Dr. Perkinson wrote a letter stating he believed Mr. Humphrey’s femur fracture “was caused by his fall and not from a prior injury.” (R. 3.) Mr. Humphrey filed a PBD seeking temporary disability and medical benefits. (R. 5.) Mr. Humphrey and Lewisburg Rubber did not settle their dispute through mediation, and the Mediating Specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice (DCN). (R. 14.) The DCN, however, did not list medical benefits as a disputed issue.

When neither party requested a hearing, the Court issued a show cause order. Following a hearing, the Court declined to dismiss the claim but ordered Mr. Humphrey to request a hearing before October 21, 2015. (R. 13.) Mr. Humphrey filed a Request for Expedited Hearing and asked the Court to issue a ruling based on the documents in the claim file. (R. 15.) Mr. Humphrey did not provide an affidavit with his Request for Expedited Hearing. Lewisburg Rubber did not file an objection to the Court considering Mr. Humphrey’s Request for Expedited Hearing despite his failure to file an affidavit.

Application of Law and Conclusion

The Workers’ Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). The employee in a workers’ compensation claim has the burden of proof on all essential elements of a claim. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987); Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 2015). An employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited hearing, an employee has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. Id.

3 Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an injury is accidental “only if the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014). “An injury ‘arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B) (2014).

The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of the employment are not synonymous “although both elements exist to ensure a work connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits.” Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance, 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005).2 “Arising out of employment” refers to causation. Reeser v.

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Related

Blankenship v. American Ordnance Systems, LLS
164 S.W.3d 350 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2005)
Fritts v. Safety National Casualty Corp.
163 S.W.3d 673 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2005)
Reeser v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.
938 S.W.2d 690 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1997)
Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc.
181 S.W.3d 314 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2005)
Fink v. Caudle
856 S.W.2d 952 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
Tindall v. Waring Park Ass'n
725 S.W.2d 935 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
2015 TN WC 170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/humphrey-andy-v-lewisburg-rubber-and-gasket-tennworkcompcl-2015.