Humes v. Transunion

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: April 22, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-10394
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION LEONARD HUMES,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-10394 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson v.

TRANS UNION,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [1] On November 14, 2024, Leonard Humes filed a complaint in small claims court in Detroit seeking $1,750 from Trans Union for “false reporting” and “perfessional [sic] negligence.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) The complaint included no factual allegations. (Id.) On December 31, Trans Union moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim, failed to identify a legal theory, and was preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Id. at PageID.16.) Humes responded on January 6 and indicated that he was indeed raising claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Id. at PageID.29.) Trans Union filed a reply brief and then decided to remove the case based on federal question jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID.1–3.) Thus, the fully briefed motion to dismiss is now before this Court. See Williamson County Bd. of Educ. v. C.K., No. 3:07-0826, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76081, *11 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2007) (“A federal court takes the case on removal exactly as the case stood in state court and treats all pending motions as if filed in federal court.” (citing 16 Moore Federal Practice, § 107.31[3])). No further argument is needed. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.01(f). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court “construes the complaint in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff and determines whether it “‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss, HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012), but a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also Charter Twp. of Royal Oak v. Oakland Cares Coal., No. 367522, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 10173, *14 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2024) (“In Michigan, a mere declaration of a pleader’s conclusion and legal assertions that lack factual substantiation is inadequate to establish a viable cause of action.”).

And while a pro se litigant’s complaint must be construed “liberally,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), the Court’s leniency is “not boundless.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). Basic pleading requirements “apply to self-represented and counseled plaintiffs alike.” Williams v. Hall, No. 21-5540, 2022 WL 2966395, at *2 (6th Cir. July 27, 2022); see Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004). Here, Humes’ complaint fails to plead any factual allegations. He simply

asserts “p[ro]fessional negligence” and “false reporting” which are legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”) Humes’ “failure to include any statement of the ‘circumstances, occurrences, and events’ giving rise to the claim leaves [the Court] with nothing to construe.” Black v. City of Royal Oak, No. 23-12371, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167469, *35 n.4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App’x 336, 345 (6th

Cir. 2001)). While Humes’ response to the motion to dismiss does further flesh out his claims, his response cannot make up for deficiencies in the complaint. A motion to dismiss “tests the sufficiency of a complaint.” Gardner v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 567 Fed. Appx. 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2014). And “it is black-letter law that . . . a court evaluating . . . a motion to dismiss[] must focus only on the allegations in the

pleadings.” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Caraway v. Corecivic of Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 682 n.2 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Ordinarily, courts evaluate the sufficiency of a claim based only on the four corners of the complaint.”). A plaintiff’s response brief to a motion to dismiss cannot cure a deficient complaint. Bates, 958 F.3d at 483–84 (“Plaintiffs cannot . . . amend their complaint in an opposition brief or ask the court to consider new allegations (or evidence) not contained in the complaint. If a complaint fails to state a claim even under the liberal requirements of the federal rules, the plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency by inserting the missing allegations in a document that is not either a

complaint or an amendment to a complaint.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Humes’ pro se status “does not alter this conclusion.” Black, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167469, at *35 n.4 (quoting Armengau, 7 F. App’x at 345). Accordingly, Trans Union’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2025 s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE