Hull v. Greeley

31 Fla. 471
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJanuary 15, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 31 Fla. 471 (Hull v. Greeley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hull v. Greeley, 31 Fla. 471 (Fla. 1893).

Opinion

Raney, C. J. :

On the seventh day of September, 1891, R. H. Ramsey bought lot 4, of block 83, in the city of Jacksonville, which was sold that day at public outcry by the tax collector of Duval county, for unpaid State and county taxes of the year 1890. Ramsey paid the sum which he had bid, and on the 15th day of the same month the collector issued to him a certificate stating the fact of such sale, and that Ramsey or his assigns would be entitled to a deed of conveyance of such land in accordance with law, unless the same should' be redeemed within one year by the payment of the amount with interest at the rate of twenty-five per cent, per annum. Ramsey transferred the certificate to one Hinchinan, and the latter assigned to .Greeley, and in October last Greeley brought mandamus against the plaintiff in error, the clerk of the Circuit Court of Duval county, to compel him to execute a deed for the land. A peremptory writ was awarded.

The controlling question, in view of our conclusions, is whether or not the law, as it was on the day of the sale, authorized the sale of land for taxes of [473]*4731890. This question involves that of the effect of the legislation of 1891, upon the prior statutes authorizing and regulating the sale of land for non-payment of State and county taxes. The sale of this land for its taxes of 1890, had there been no legislation in 1891, or if that legislation does not apply to such sale, would have been governed entirely by the general revenue act of 1887, Chapter 3681, approved June 13th, 1887, as amended by the acts of June 3d, 1889, Chapter 3847, and May 28th, 1889, Chapter 3848. The last •of these chapters, 3848, took the place of the 47th section of the act of 1887, and provided that if the taxes upon any real estate should not be paid before the fourth day of February of any year, the tax collector should advertise and sell in the manner therein •directed; and sections 39 to 42 of the act of 1887 regulated the sale of personal property for all taxes. The collector’s warrant provided for by Section 32 of this act of 1887 required the collector to make all collections by levy and sale of goods and chattels, lands and tenements, on or before the first Monday in March, and make a full report to, and settlement with, the County Commissioners before the third Monday in that month. The same section enacted also that if the collector should fail or omit to obey the command of the warrant as therein required, it should be the duty of the County Commissioners to issue another warrant in the same form, naming and appointing therein such day as in their judgment should be proper, not exceeding sixty days from the first Monday in March, by which the taxes should be [474]*474collected and paid over and final settlement made with, the Comptroller and Commissioners. The 57th section allowed one year next succeeding the sale of any land by collectors for the redemption thereof, on the terms and in the manner therein stated.

If the act of 1887 as thus amended, controls of itself the question before us, the redemption period of one year prescribed by it had passed before the day, September 21st, 1892, on which application was made to the clerk for a deed, or that, October 31st, on which resort was made to the courts for relief, and it not being pretended that a redemption of the land had been made, the relator was entitled to a deed. We, however, must ascertain the effect of the legislation of 1891 on the law as it stood at the time of the enactment of that legislation. The legislation of that year to be considered consists of two statutes: One, Chapter 4010, entitled: “An act for the assessment and collection of revenue,” (the same title as that of the general revenue law of 1887," supra,) and the other, Chapter 4011, entitled: “An act to provide for certifying lands to the Comptroller upon which taxes have not been paid, for the redemption thereof, and for the forfeiture and sale of lands not redeemed.” Each of these statutes was approved June 10th, 1891, and, under the operation of Section 18 of Article III of the Constitution, went into effect August 4th, 1891, or sixty days from the final adjournment of the Legislature, which adjourned sine die on the 5th day of June.

[475]*475The former of these acts (Chapter 4010) which as such- acts are usually described, is the general revenue law of 1891, has no section like Chapter 3848, supra, the amended forty-seventh section oí the act of 1887, providing for the sale of land for taxes, but Sections 44 to 47 inclusive, provide for and regulate the ’ sale of personal property; and while the thirty-seventh section of the statute (Chapter 4010) occupies in it a similar place to that held in the act of 1887 by the thirty-second section thereof, supra, and prescribes the form of warrant to be issued to the collector, that warrant’s command or direction is that the taxes on personal property shall, in case they are not paid by the first-day of March of any year, be collected by the sale of goods and chattels of the person so assessed, and that-“the tax on personal property must be collected without resort to real property,” and it expressly requires-that on the first day of April the collector shall ‘ ‘certify to the Comptroller the amount of taxes due and unpaid on real property, in such manner and form.as the Comptroller may direct;” and requires a final settlement with the Comptroller and County Commissioners on or before ■ the tenth day of April. The next or thirty-eighth section, after providing like the thirty-second section of the act of 1887, for the issue of the second warrant in the same form as the first, but returnable not later than the first Monday in March, enacts, in the form of a proviso, that “all warrants now outstanding shall be in full force and effect [476]*476until all taxes remaining unpaid, other than those upon lands and tenements, shall have been collected and final report and settlement made by the tax collectors with the State and county authorities; and all warrants heretofore issued or to be issued shall be of full force and effect as to goods an 1 chattels in the hands of any successor, immediate or remote, of the ■collector to whom it may have been or may be issued.”

Pausing to consider the effect of this act of 1891, 'Chapter 4010, in so far as we have stated its provisions, and not failing to remember that it is a statute of fifty-eight sections covering every subject covered by the general revenue law of 1887, and operating as .a revision of it, and entirely repealing it (State ex rel. vs. Palmes, 23 Fla., 620, 624, 3 South. Rep., 171), except in so far as any of its provisions as to assessment and sale may be kept alive by the fifty-seventh section, hereinafter noticed, for the special purposes therein mentioned, and excepting also the retention by the seventh and eighth sections of Chapter 4011, mentioned below, of its provisions as to redemption and deeds, it seems clear not only that its purpose was that there should not be any public sale of lands by tax collectors for the collection of unpaid taxes to be assessed under its provisions, but also that the warrants which were outstanding on- the day it became of force, August 4th, 1891, should no longer authorize compulsory collection of the. taxes assessed on land [477]*477and unpaid, or the sale of land. No other conclusion, as to the outstanding warrants and unpaid taxes is. consistent with the proviso to the thirty-eighth section given above, and we do not find anything in the act-that is inconsistent with this view.

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Bluebook (online)
31 Fla. 471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hull-v-greeley-fla-1893.