Hulewat v. Medical Management Resource Group LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided January 3, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-00377·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Linda Hulewat, No. CV-24-00377-PHX-DJH

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Medical Management Resource Group LLC, et al., Defendants. Defendants Medical Management Resource Group, L.L.C. d/b/a American Vision Partners, Barnet Dulaney Perkins Eye Center, PC, the Southwestern Eye Center, Ltd., Marc Ellman, M.D., P.A. d/b/a Southwest Eye Institute, and the Eye Associates of Nevada d/b/a Wellish Vision Institute (collectively, “Defendants”) have moved for a stay of discovery in this matter pending their Motions to Dismiss1 (“the Motion to Stay”). (Doc. 57). Plaintiffs Linda Hulewat, Karen Foti Williams, Ralph Gallegos, Michael Martinez, Lynnae Anderson, Candia Franklin, Marie Therese Montoya, Charles Peterson, Robert Kirk, Marilyn Zajacka, Lynda Israel, Latricia Pelt, Barry Pelt, Ken Waters, Brenda Moreno- Decerra, Robert Ahrensdorf, and David Yeager (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose a stay. (Doc. 59). Defendants have not filed a Reply. The Court grants Defendants Motion to Stay in part and denies it in part. “The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 1 All Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 52). Defendants Eye Associates of Nevada and Southwest Eye Institute have also separately filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 51). control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “Discovery may be stayed when a dispositive motion does not require discovery, but discovery should not be stayed if it is necessary to decide the dispositive motion.” Flynn v. Nevada, 345 F.R.D. 338, 343 (D. Nev. 2024) (citations omitted). A motion to stay discovery pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion may be granted for good cause. See Body Xchange Sports Club, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 2457482, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (“Though the Ninth Circuit has not provided a clear standard for evaluating a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion, it has affirmed that district courts may grant such a motion for good cause.”) (citations omitted). Good cause exists to stay discovery “when the district court is ‘convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief.’ ” Flynn, 345 F.R.D. at 343 (quoting Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). Generally speaking, “a pending motion challenging [personal] jurisdiction strongly favors a stay, or at a minimum, limitations on discovery until the question of jurisdiction is resolved.” Kabo Tools Co. v. Porauto Indus. Co., 2013 WL 5947138, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2013) (citation omitted). However, “the filing of a motion challenging personal jurisdiction does not mandate a stay of discovery and the Court retains discretion to require discovery to go forward.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has not set forth a clear standard for district courts to apply when deciding to stay a case pending the resolution of a potentially dispositive motion. See Williams v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 2024 WL 739676, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2024). However, “[m]ost federal district courts . . . apply a two-part test under which it is appropriate to stay discovery [where] (1) the pending motion must be potentially dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at which discovery is aimed and (2) the pending, potentially dispositive motion can be decided absent additional discovery. Discovery should proceed if either prong of the test is not met. This test has the Court take a ‘preliminary peek’ at the underlying motion without exhaustively reviewing the merits.” Id. (citing Ferrell v. AppFolio, Inc., 2024 WL 132223, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2024)). “The party seeking the stay bears the burden of proving that it is warranted.” Aliphcom v. Fitbit, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Alternatively, the district court “may, in lieu of a general stay, impose protective orders, seal interrogatories, impose a stay for a finite period of time, or limit a stay to a particular subject matter.” Lizarraga v. City of Nogales Arizona, 2007 WL 215616, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2007) (internal citations omitted). Defendants argue that a stay is appropriate here because (1) they have filed motions which could dispose of the entire case against some or all Defendants and/or substantially narrow the claims in this case, and (2) a brief stay will not prejudice Plaintiffs, but commencing discovery now will unduly prejudice Defendants. (Doc. 57 at 5, 8). Plaintiffs argue that a stay is inappropriate here because (1) Defendants’ Motions are not likely to dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) Defendants have not demonstrated undue burden or irreparable injury; and (3) granting Defendants’ Motion will prejudice Plaintiffs. (Doc. 59 at 3, 7–8). With regard to those Defendants seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court finds that a stay is not proper here. The Court must be convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief. See Wood, 644 F.2d at 801–02. At this juncture, the Court is not convinced. Plaintiffs bring sixteen different counts in this class action lawsuit for: Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Express and Implied Contract, Breach of Confidence, Breach of Third-Party Beneficiary Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Invasion of Privacy, Violation of Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Violations of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices, Violations of Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Declaratory Judgment. (Doc. 28 at ¶¶ 336–504). Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit. See Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 30 F.4th 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2011). In Arizona, to establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Diaz v. Phoenix Lubrication Serv., Inc., 230 P.3d 718, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007)). Taking a “preliminary peek” at Defendants’ Motion and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint without exhaustively reviewing the merits, the Court finds that, at the very least, Plaintiffs have likely plead a plausible claim for negligence. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs plead all four of these elements. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant American Vision “owed a duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, securing, safeguarding, storing, and protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII/PHI within their control from being compromised, lost, stolen, accessed, and misused by unauthorized persons.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 337). Next, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant American Vision “breached these duties by failing to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII/PHI.” (Id. at ¶ 342). Third, Plaintiffs allege that they would not have been compromised but

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Related

Landis v. North American Co.
299 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Gipson v. Kasey
150 P.3d 228 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2007)
Diaz v. PHOENIX LUBRICATION SERVICE, INC.
230 P.3d 718 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2010)
Susan Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC
30 F.4th 1151 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Aliphcom v. Fitbit, Inc.
154 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. California, 2015)
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership
634 F.3d 524 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)