Hukman v. Terrible Herbst Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01279
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 SHEIDA HUKMAN, Case No. 2:21-cv-01279-ART-VCF 6 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 7 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

8 TERRIBLE HERBST INC.,

9 Defendant.

10 11 This is a civil rights action brought by plaintiff Sheida Hukman, alleging 12 various claims of employment discrimination against her former employer, 13 Terrible Herbst Inc. (“Terrible’s”). Defendant moves for summary judgment, 14 arguing that Hukman was never discriminated against and that her employment 15 ended due to insubordinate and erratic conduct. (ECF No. 75.) Defendant argues 16 that Hukman does not, and cannot, provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. 17 For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary 18 judgment. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 A. Factual Background 21 Hukman is a woman of Middle Eastern and Kurdish descent from Iraq. 22 (ECF No. 38-1 at 2.) Hukman started working as a cashier at Terrible’s, a 23 convenience and gas station store, in September 2017. (ECF Nos. 38-1 at 2; 75- 24 3 at 23.) Her starting pay was $8.50 per hour. (ECF No. 75-3 at 24.) Hukman 25 worked the graveyard shift from around 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. (Id. at 25.) This case 26 concerns events that led to Hukman’s departure from Terrible’s in March 2020. 27 In March 2018, Hukman sent an email to her manager, Janell Hooks, 28 1 stating that she believed an individual named Fatemah Tehrani was causing 2 issues and asking Janell to let her know if she was contacting her “to play drama.” 3 (ECF No. 75-8 at 3.) Tehrani is not a party to this case and there is no evidence 4 suggesting that she was ever employed by Terrible’s. During her deposition, 5 Hukman stated that Fatemah Tehrani is an “Iranian lady” who bribed a judge in 6 an employment discrimination case Hukman brought against a former employer. 7 (ECF No. 75-3 at 11–12.) Hukman transferred to a different store at around this 8 time. (ECF No. 75-3 at 37–40.) 9 In July 2018, Hukman received a disciplinary notice based on a customer 10 service complaint “about an interaction with a slot customer.” (ECF No. 75-6.) In 11 response, Hukman stated that Laura Williams-Anderson had come to speak with 12 Hukman’s supervisors and “asked them to play drama and get involved in my 13 personal business.” (ECF No. 75-7.) Laura Williams-Anderson is not a party to 14 this case and Hukman does not contend that she was ever employed by Terrible’s. 15 During her deposition, Hukman testified that Laura Williams-Anderson is 16 a former coworker who had harassed stalked her at subsequent jobs, including 17 at Terrible’s. (ECF No. 75-3 at 4, 14.) Hukman testified that Laura Williams- 18 Anderson works with Fatemah Tehrani “for the Israeli government” and came to 19 the store invisibly and told employees to harass her. (ECF No. 75-3 at 39–40.) 20 In August 2018, Hukman wrote a letter to human resources stating that 21 Janel Hooks was harassing her upon instruction and payment from Fatemah 22 Tehrani. (ECF No. 75-9.) In September 2018, Hukman sent an email to Whitmore 23 claiming that her manager, Sam Nakoma, was retaliating against her because of 24 her complaint against Hooks. (ECF No. 75-10.) Hukman said Nakoma was 25 “helping Fatemah to [m]urder [Hukman] and blame it on Terrible Herbst” and 26 sending individuals to harass and discriminate against her. (Id. at 2.) In October 27 2018, Hukman emailed Jason King, a district manager at Terrible’s, complaining 28 that Nakoma had refused to interview her for a promotion, and claiming that 1 Tehrani and Williams-Anderson had tried to murder her and called her a terrorist 2 because of her national origin. (ECF Nos. 75-11, 75-3 at 48.) 3 In February 2019, assistant store manager Eric Ruelas wrote a statement 4 complaining that Hukman had asked him if he had mixed chemicals to kill her. 5 (ECF No. 75-15.) The interaction “made [Ruelas] and other employees very 6 uncomfortable” and Ruelas requested that Hukman be transferred, stating that 7 since his first day at work she had “never let up with numerous outlandish 8 accusations.” (Id.) In April 2019, Ruelas emailed human resources complaining 9 that Hukman had called his store phone and accused him of stalking her and 10 being with “an Iranian wom[a]n that hates her.” (ECF No. 75-16.) In a statement 11 the next day, he said that she had accused him of mixing chemicals to kill her; 12 accused him of stalking her; and tried to blackmail him by saying that he had 13 photos of him with the Iranian woman. (ECF No. 75-17.) That same day, Hukman 14 emailed human resources to inform them that Ruelas had been stalking her and 15 was “involved with the Tehrani and Anderson Family.” (ECF No. 75-18.) 16 In February 2020, Hukman received a second disciplinary notice after her 17 supervisor, Michael Turner, came into the store and found Hukman “sleeping in 18 the chair.” (ECF No. 75-12.) In the comments section, Hukman stated that she 19 had not been sleeping, was dizzy from a smell, and that Turner was “helping 20 Fatemah Tehrani to get me terminated because she wants to murder me.” (ECF 21 No. 75-12 at 2.) Later that month, Hukman emailed employee relations a letter 22 complaining about Turner. (ECF No. 75-14.) In the letter, Hukman stated that 23 Turner was “very [l]oud, disrespectful, [a]rgumentative, [r]ude and [n]asty.” (Id. at 24 3.) Under the heading “harassment and discrimination by Michael Turner,” 25 Hukman described several incidents in which she alleged that Turner assigned 26 her additional duties that she was not responsible for. (Id. at 4–5.) 27 Around February 2020, Hukman interviewed for the position of store 28 manager. (ECF No. 75-3 at 55.) She had applied in January. (ECF No. 75-19.) 1 On March 5, 2020, Hukman was informed that she was not selected for the 2 position and requested an explanation. (ECF No. 75-20.) She stated that she 3 “answered all the interview [q]uestions [c]orrectly” and that there was no 4 disciplinary action in her file. (Id. at 2.) 5 Parties dispute the details of an incident in March 2020 which resulted in 6 Hukman’s departure from Terrible’s. On March 17, 2020, Hector Castaneda, 7 another Terrible’s cashier, gave a statement detailing an incident between 8 Hukman and Turner. (ECF No. 75-22.) He stated that when Turner asked her for 9 the keys, Hukman “snap[ped] at [him] with a loud voice and said don’t talk to me 10 like that again” and then “threw them on the floor.” (Id.) Hukman was suspended 11 pending investigation of the incident. (ECF Nos. 75-23; 75-24.) In response, 12 Hukman said that Turner had been harassing her, telling people that she would 13 get fired, and called her a terrorist. (Id.) She said that she called the police 14 because she was scared. (Id.) Hukman had a call with human resources to 15 discuss her suspension. (ECF No. 75-25.) On March 19, 2020, Terrible’s sent 16 Hukman a memo of understanding stating that Hukman’s actions violated 17 company policy and that she would be transferred to another store. (ECF No. 75- 18 26.) On March 24, 2020, Hukman resigned. (ECF No. 75-27.) 19 B. Procedural Background 20 Hukman filed this action against Terrible’s in state court in March 2021, 21 alleging various employment discrimination claims. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant 22 removed the action to this Court in July 2021. (Id.) After the Court granted in 23 part Defendant’s second motion to dismiss, the following claims remain: 24 (1) National origin discrimination, in violation of Title VII, based on: (a) 25 assignment of more duties than others in the same job; (b) denial of 26 meal and rest breaks; (c) denial of promotions; and (d) denial of Spanish 27 Premium Pay; 28 (2) Retaliation, in violation of Title VII; 1 (3) Harassment, in violation of Title VII; 2 (4) Constructive termination; 3 (5) Violation of Equal Pay act and Nevada state equal pay law. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 The party moving for summary judgment must show that there is no 6 genuine issue as to any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 7 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, 8 the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that 9 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 10 256 (1986). In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does 11 not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Soremekun v. 12 Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Rather, the Court views 13 the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 14 the non-moving party. Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Ctr., Inc., 108 F.4th 765, 768 15 (9th Cir. 2024). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Terrible’s asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment, arguing that 18 Hukman has failed to establish a prima facie case on any claim. The Court 19 addresses each in turn. 20 A. National Original Discrimination 21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 22 discriminating against employees based on national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 23 2(a). To state a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that 24 (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to her 25 employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment 26 action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated 27 more favorably. Sischo–Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 28 1109 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds). The evidence 1 necessary to establish a prima facie case is minimal but must be more than 2 conclusory allegations of discrimination. Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 3 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 4 burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of legitimate 5 nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action at issue. McDonnell 6 Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). If the defendant meets that burden, 7 the plaintiff must then show that the employer’s proffered reason is merely 8 pretext for a discriminatory motive. Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 9 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 Hukman alleges that Terrible’s discriminated against her based on national 11 origin by: assigning her more duties than others in the same job; denying her 12 meal and rest breaks; denying her promotions; and denying Spanish premium 13 pay. Though Terrible’s does not dispute the first element (national origin), it 14 argues that Hukman has failed to establish a prima facie case of national origin 15 discrimination on any of her theories. 16 a. Assignment of more duties 17 Hukman alleges that she was assigned more duties to perform during her 18 shift than other cashiers. (ECF No. 38-1 at 6.) She claims that she was assigned 19 cleaning duties that other cashiers were not responsible for, including cleaning 20 the coffee machine, ice machine, hot dog grill, windows, refrigerator doors, 21 storage shelves—and was responsible for receiving deliveries and assisting the 22 store’s manager with monthly inventories and weekly order. (Id. at 2, 10.) 23 However, Hukman has not provided evidence to support this claim and does not 24 mention it in her declaration. (See ECF No. 85 at 21-23.) 25 In fact, Hukman contradicts this claim in her deposition. She describes the 26 job responsibilities of a cashier as including cleaning the fountain drinks, grills, 27 shelves, floor, and stocking shelves. (ECF No. 75-3 at 26–27.) She explains that 28 “basically most of the cashiers, they all do the job.” (Id. at 27.) Hukman’s 1 testimony suggests that similarly situated individuals were not treated more 2 favorably: all cashiers had similar job responsibilities. Hukman has therefore 3 failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 4 b. Denial of Spanish premium pay 5 Hukman alleges that Terrible’s offers a Spanish premium pay program to 6 its employees, under which employees who speak Spanish are eligible for pay 7 increases. (ECF No. 38-1 at 2.) Although Hukman speaks Spanish, she claims 8 that she never received the premium pay while other non-Kurdish and non-Iraqi 9 employees did. (Id.) Terrible’s responds that this program does not exist and that 10 it has never paid any employee Spanish premium pay. (ECF Nos. 75 at 17; 75-5 11 at 4.) 12 In her affidavit, Hukman repeats her claim in a conclusory statement. (ECF 13 No. 85 at 21.) In deposition testimony, Hukman claims that a Mexican employee 14 at another store told her that they were paid an extra dollar per hour for speaking 15 Spanish. (ECF No. 31 at 88–89.) But Hukman has not named this employee or 16 provided any evidence from another employee supporting her claim. “A 17 conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting 18 evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” F.T.C. v. Publ'g 19 Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997). Hukman’s deposition 20 testimony alone, without even a name of the employee she alleges is paid more 21 for speaking Spanish, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22 c. Denial of meal and rest breaks 23 Hukman alleges that despite being entitled to take a paid thirty-minute 24 lunch break and two paid ten-minute breaks, she was never advised to take them. 25 (ECF No. 38-1 at 5, 11.) She alleges that other cashiers outside her protected 26 class were allowed to take these breaks. (Id.) Hukman provides some evidence to 27 support this claim in the form of deposition testimony and an affidavit, but these 28 are conclusory. In her deposition, Hukman states that Terrible’s “never told me 1 to take breaks” and that she heard from other stores that the agents who worked 2 the graveyard shift “close the store for half an hour” to take a break. (ECF No. 75- 3 3 at 29.) In her declaration, she states that she was not advised to take these 4 breaks while others outside her protected class were. (ECF No. 85 at 22.) This 5 evidence does not suggest that she was denied these breaks; just that she was 6 not advised to take them. This claim fails because there is no evidence that 7 Terrible’s ever denied Hukman her meal or rest breaks or prevented her from 8 taking those breaks. 9 d. Denial of promotions 10 Hukman claims that in March 2020, she was denied a promotion to store 11 manager and the position went to a non-Kurdish individual. (ECF No. 38-1 at 12, 12 13.) For a failure to promote claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to 13 a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position she was 14 denied; (3) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) the employer filled 15 the position with an employee not of plaintiff’s class, or continued to consider 16 other applicants whose qualifications were comparable to plaintiff’s after rejecting 17 plaintiff. Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 18 2005). 19 Hukman has shown that she belongs to a protected class and that she 20 applied for and was rejected the position of store manager but has not shown 21 that she was qualified for the position. Hukman supports her claim only with 22 self-serving conclusory statements, stating that she “provided excellent customer 23 service,” “had an excellent attendance record” and “never had a customer 24 complaint.” (ECF No. 85 at 21.) But an employee’s subjective personal judgments 25 of her competence alone do not a raise a genuine issue of material fact. Bradley 26 v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996). 27 Even if Hukman had established a prima facie case, Terrible’s have offered 28 sufficient evidence to show that Hukman was not qualified for the position. 1 Contrary to Hukman’s contentions, she received at least one customer complaint. 2 (ECF No. 75-6.) Hukman’s coworker, Ruelas, also filed several complaints against 3 Hukman describing erratic behavior, and requested that she be transferred to a 4 different store. (ECF Nos. 75-15; 75-16; 75-17.) And in February 2020, Hukman’s 5 manager reported that she had been sleeping in a chair while a customer was in 6 the store. (ECF No. 75-12.) Hukman has not demonstrated that these legitimate 7 reasons for denying her promotions are pretextual. 8 Because Hukman has not produced sufficient evidence to make a prima 9 facie case of national origin discrimination on any of her four theories of liability, 10 the Court grants Defendant summary judgment on this claim. 11 B. Hostile Work Environment 12 To prevail on a hostile work environment claim based on national origin, 13 Hukman must show that: (1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct 14 because of her national origin; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the 15 conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 16 plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment. Kang v. U. Lim 17 Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002). To determine whether conduct was 18 sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII, courts look at “all the 19 circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 20 severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 21 utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 22 performance.” Vasquez v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) 23 (citation omitted)). 24 Hukman alleges that assistant manager Michael Turner harassed her 25 because he thought she was a terrorist based on her national origin. (ECF No. 26 38-1 at 13.) She does not provide details of specific incidents in her declaration, 27 but merely states again that she was harassed by Turner on a daily basis based 28 on her national origin and because he thought she was a terrorist. (ECF No. 85 1 at 21.) In a February 2020 letter addressed to human resources, Hukman 2 describes some specific instances of harassment. (ECF No. 75-14.) Hukman 3 alleges that in December 2019, after a customer vomited outside, Turner sent her 4 outside to clean the vomit “in a very disrespectful way.” (Id. at 4.) In December 5 2020, when Turner came to work at the end of Hukman’s nightshift, he was “very 6 mad, rude and nasty, yelling and screaming” and saying that she had not cleaned 7 the bathroom, without checking the bathroom first. (Id. at 5.) In January 2020, 8 Turner called Hukman into his office and falsely accused her of “not making one 9 of the [d]rops” and “screamed” at her in a “very abusive way.” (Id.) In February 10 2020, when Hukman was sitting in a chair because she felt dizzy, Turner yelled 11 at her again. (Id. at 5.) Hukman alleges that he had been talking to Fatemah 12 Tehrani who had given him chemicals to poison her. (Id. at 6.) 13 Viewing this evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in Hukman’s 14 favor, Turner yelled at Hukman in an abusive manner on four separate occasions 15 over the course of more than one year. The only evidence suggesting that these 16 incidents were based on race is Hukman’s claim that Turner thought she was a 17 terrorist. Although undoubtedly offensive, four remarks over the course of a year 18 are not pervasive enough to support a hostile work environment claim. See 19 Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no 20 hostile work environment where employee was yelled offensive remarks about 21 plaintiff being Hispanic twice in front of others); Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 22 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no hostile work environment where coworker 23 made several offensive racial comments and acts over the course of two years); 24 Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no hostile 25 work environment where the supervisor made sexist remarks about employees 26 and plaintiff on several occasions). Because Hukman has not provided evidence 27 showing that Turner’s conduct was pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work 28 environment, the Court grants Defendant summary judgment on this claim. 1 C. Retaliation 2 Title VII forbids employers from retaliating against an employee who seeks 3 to bring a discrimination claim against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To 4 establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show 5 that she (1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) suffered an adverse employment 6 action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the 7 adverse employment decision. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 8 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 9 production shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse 10 employment action. Id. Once the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff must 11 demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced 12 by the employer was pretext. 13 Hukman has demonstrated the first two elements necessary for a prima 14 facie case. Hukman has demonstrated that she engaged in a protected activity: 15 she submitted a complaint about harassment and discrimination to human 16 resources about her manager, Michael Turner. (ECF No. 75-14.) See Villiarimo v. 17 Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (filing an internal 18 complaint constituted protected activity). And Hukman has shown that she 19 suffered an adverse employment action: she was informed that she would be 20 transferred to another store. (ECF No. 75-26.) Instead of accepting the transfer, 21 Hukman chose to resign. (ECF No. 75-27.) See Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of 22 Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2004) (the Ninth Circuit defines “adverse 23 employment action” broadly). 24 Defendant argues that Hukman’s retaliation claim fails to establish a 25 causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment 26 decision. To satisfy the causation element, Hukman must provide evidence that 27 the unlawful retaliation “would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged 28 wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 1 Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). “[W]hen adverse employment decisions are 2 taken within a reasonable period of time after complaints of discrimination have 3 been made, retaliatory intent may be inferred.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson 4 Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Hukman 5 submitted a complaint against Michael Turner in February 2020 and was 6 informed that she would be transferred the following month. Terrible’s stated 7 reason for the transfer was the incident that occurred in March 2020 between 8 Hukman and Turner. Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to 9 Hukman, that incident—and the subsequent decision to transfer her—would not 10 have happened but for her complaint against Turner. 11 However, Terrible’s presents legitimate reasons for the transfer decision: a 12 violation of the store’s code of conduct. After Hukman was suspended pending 13 investigation, she met with Natasha Tiffany to discuss the suspension. (ECF No. 14 75-25.) In her summary of the call, Tiffany notes that Hukman asked about her 15 complaint against Turner and Tiffany responded that she had received the 16 complaint, but that Hukman had not provided “substantial evidence to support 17 her complaint.” (ECF No. 75-26.) Tiffany notes concerns that Hukman is “very 18 un-predictable” and may cause “physical harm to others,” in part because “[i]n 19 the video provided, she displays to be the aggressor.” (Id.) Tiffany then sent 20 Hukman a “memo of understanding” explaining that Hukman had violated the 21 company’s code of conduct. (ECF No. 75-26.) Hukman has not offered any 22 evidence suggesting that these legitimate reasons were pretextual. 23 The Court therefore grants Defendant summary judgment on Hukman’s 24 retaliation claim. 25 D. Constructive Discharge 26 A constructive discharge under Title VII occurs “when a person quits [her] 27 job under circumstances in which a reasonable person would feel that the 28 conditions of employment have become intolerable.” Lawson v. Wash., 296 F. 3d 1 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must show “aggravating factors, such as a 2 continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 3 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). Nevada law also 4 recognizes a tortious constructive discharge claim and has adopted the same 5 standard as the Ninth Circuit for a federal claim. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330; Martin 6 v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 899 P.2d 551, 553 (Nev. 1995) (“A constructive discharge 7 has been held to exist when an employer creates working conditions so intolerable 8 and discriminatory that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would feel 9 compelled to resign.”) 10 Hukman’s constructive discharge claim fails as a matter of law for the same 11 reasons as her hostile work environment claim: there is insufficient evidence of 12 discriminatory treatment by Terrible’s from which a reasonable juror could 13 conclude that Hukman’s work environment was intolerable. “Where a plaintiff 14 fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a 15 hostile work environment claim, it will be impossible for her to meet the higher 16 standard of constructive discharge: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable 17 person would leave the job.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th 18 Cir. 2000). The Court therefore grants Defendant summary judgment on 19 Hukman’s constructive discharge claim. 20 E. Violation of Equal Pay Act and Nevada State Equal Pay Law 21 Both the Equal Pay Act and Nevada Revised Statute 608.017 prohibit 22 employers from discriminating on the basis of sex by paying employees of the 23 opposite sex different wages for substantially equal work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); 24 Freyd v. University of Oregon, 990 F.3d 1211, 1219 (9th Cir. 2021); NRS 608.017. 25 “To make out a case under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must prove that an 26 employer is paying different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal 27 work.” Hein v. Oregon College of Education, 718 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1983). 28 Hukman has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of 1 || discrimination by showing that employees of the opposite sex were paid different 2 || wages of equal work. Hukman alleges that other male employees were offered 3 || additional money for speaking Spanish. (ECF No. 38-1 at 2.) In her deposition, 4 || Hukman stated that some males were paid $9.50 per hour but said that she could 5 || not remember their names. (ECF No. 75-3 at 33.) In response to the motion for 6 || summary judgment, Hukman alleges that “Mr. Donald” was paid more than her. 7 || (ECF No. 85 at 17.) In reply, Terrible’s explains that Donald Hunt, a cashier at 8 || one of the store locations that Hukman worked, was in fact paid $8.00 per hour— 9 || less than Hukman’s $8.50 per hour. (ECF No. 91 at 11.) Hukman does not name 10 || any other employees who were named more than here. Because Hukman has not 11 || provided evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on this claim, the 12 |} Court grants Defendant summary judgment on this claim. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary 15 || judgment (ECF No. 75) is GRANTED. 16 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant 17 || Terrible Herbst Inc. and close this case. 18 19 DATED: March 7, 2025 20 21 j Vd 22 vos 23 ANNER TRAUM 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28