Huiqiang Xu v. Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 HUIQIANG XU, Case No.: 26-cv-1765-GPC-DEB

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES IN PART

14 PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity [ECF No. 9] as Attorney General of the United States; 15 et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 20 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under 21 the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). ECF No. 9. For the reasons 22 outlined below, the Court GRANTS the motion in part. 24 On March 26, 2026, this Court granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 25 and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner. ECF No. 5. On March 26, 2026, Petitioner 26 was released from custody. ECF No. 7. Petitioner now moves for an award of attorney’s 27 1 fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). See ECF 2 No. 9. 4 “The EAJA provides . . . that in an action brought by or against the United States, a 5 court must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the court 6 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 7 circumstances make an award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 8 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). The government bears the burden of 9 showing that its position was substantially justified. Id. 10 The EAJA specifies a maximum statutory rate of $125 per hour, which the Ninth 11 Circuit has adjusted to $258.46 for work performed in 2025. United States Courts for the 12 Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 13 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited May 14, 14 2026). The statutory rate is to apply “unless the court determines that . . . a special factor, 15 such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies 16 a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 17 Thus, a court may award enhanced hourly rates based on the limited availability of 18 qualified attorneys when an attorney possesses (1) “distinctive knowledge and specialized” 19 skill that was (2) “needful to the litigation in question” and (3) “not available elsewhere at 20 the statutory rate.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 21 quotation marks and citations omitted). Examples of “distinctive knowledge” include “an 22 identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language." 23 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 2 Respondents have not filed an opposition to Petitioner’s motion and, thus, do not 3 oppose an award of attorney’s fees in this case. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner 4 is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA. 5 I. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Enhancement 6 Petitioner seeks an enhanced rate of $300 per hour, which is above the adjusted 7 statutory maximum of $258.46 per hour. ECF No. 9-2 ¶ 10. Petitioner’s counsel, however, 8 does not argue a special factor that would warrant an enhanced rate. Instead, Petitioner only 9 cites to an out-of-circuit case that awards counsel $275 per hour in a default judgment. Id. 10 ¶ 9. Thus, the Court finds that an enhanced rate is not warranted. 11 II. Petitioner’s Fee Request is Reasonable 12 Petitioner’s counsel has provided an itemized log detailing the number of hours that 13 he dedicated to this action and how that time was spent. ECF No. 9-3. Mr. Li billed 28 14 hours on this case on a combination of case review, legal research, brief drafting, and case 15 filing. Id. As Respondents have not filed an opposition, Respondents do not identify any 16 billed hours as excessive or present argument as to why the time billed is unreasonable. 17 Courts should generally “defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to 18 how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 19 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon 20 reviewing the itemized billing hour record, the Court finds the hours reported by 21 Petitioner’s counsel to be reasonable. 22 III. Total Fee Award 23 Fees awarded under the EAJA are calculated pursuant to the lodestar method. Costa, 24 690 F.3d at 1135. Under the lodestar method, the Court multiplies the number of hours 25 reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate to determine an ultimate fee award. Id. 26 The Court has determined that the reasonable rate for Mr. Li’s billable hours is $258.46 27 1 hour. The Court has further found that the hours billed by Mr. Li—28 hours—are 2 ||reasonable. Thus, applying the lodestar method, the total fee award in this case amounts to 3 || $7,236.88. 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s 6 || fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act IN PART. The Court finds that an enhancement 7 ||above the EAJA statutory hourly rate is not merited. Petitioner is awarded fees and costs 8 the amount of $7,236.88. 10 || Dated: May 26, 2026 2 Ss Hon. athe Coke 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25-ev-3730-GPC-DEB