Hugo Reisinger (Inc.) v. United States

20 C.C.P.A. 67, 1932 CCPA LEXIS 199
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 2, 1932
DocketNo. 3469
StatusPublished

This text of 20 C.C.P.A. 67 (Hugo Reisinger (Inc.) v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hugo Reisinger (Inc.) v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 67, 1932 CCPA LEXIS 199 (ccpa 1932).

Opinion

Garrett, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

By act of the German Reichstag (German Federal Parliament) of July 9, 1923, a tax was levied upon illuminants and illuminating materials destined for consumption in Germany (certain specified territories being excepted) amounting to 20 per centum of the selling price.

The act declares—

Illuminants within the meaning of this law are:
1. Electrical lamps and burners for Nernst lamps;
2. Mercury vapor and similar lamps;
3. Carbons for electrical arc lamps;
4. Incandescent bodies for increasing the illuminating power of flames.

Appellants made a number of importations from Germany of articles falling within the definitions above quoted from the German law, said importations being made while the Tariff Act of 1922 was in force, and the local appraiser at the port of entry included the 20 per centum tax item as a part of the foreign value of the merchandise so imported.

Appellants, contending that such tax was no part of the foreign market value, appealed to reappraisement. The controversy was heard and determined by Judge Young, sitting in reappraisement, and the action of the local appraiser was sustained. Thereupon [69]*69appeal was taken to the Customs Court, and, being heard by the Second Division of that tribunal, the judgment of the single judge was affirmed.

From the latter judgment appellants have appealed to this court.

No issue of fact is presented, and the sole question is whether, as a matter of law, the aforesaid German tax is a part of the foreign value of the merchandise, as defined in section 402 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1922, which reads as follows:

(b) The foreign value of imported merchandise shall be the market value or the price at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States.

In rendering bis decision Judge Young, among other things, said—

* * * the tax in question is simply a sales tax collected at the time of the sale of the merchandise by the German seller.

This view was approved by the participating judges of the Second Division of the Customs Court upon appeal.

Various authorities were cited in Judge Young’s opinion and held by the Second Division to be controlling, particularly that of United States v. Passavant, 169 U. S. 16.

It is the contention of appellants that the German-

tax is obviously designed to attach to the use of the illuminants after title has been acquired by the purchaser,

and, therefore, that it is not such a tax as under the decisions of the courts becomes a part of foreign value.

We are unable to agree that under the record in this case the contention as to the tax being designed to attach to the use of the illumi-nants after title has been acquired by the purchaser is correct. It is not supported by any testimony, nor does any proper interpretation of the German statute sustain such a theory.

A verified translation of the statute is made a part of the record in the case. The first clause of paragraph 4 therein expressly provides—

In connection with the illuminants produced within the territory of the application of the provisions of this law, there shall be considered as tax debtor, whosoever introduces illuminants into the open market; the tax indebtedness is incurred upon the entering of the illuminants into the open market.

The succeeding clause declares that the “pertinent provisions of the [Gei-man] customs law” define “the person of the tax debtor and the origination of the tax indebtedness ” in the case, we assume, of illumi-nants not produced in the territory to which the law applies, but which are imported into same.

[70]*70The first clause of paragraph 7 of said statute provides—

As taxable value there shall apply the price invoiced by the tax debtor to his customer. If the tax debtor supplies the illuminant without compensation (gratuitous), then there shall be applied as assessable value, pursuant to further detailed regulations, to be issued by the Federal Minister for Finances, the price for similar illuminants.

The succeeding clause provides—

If the tax on illuminants is included in the price, then there shall be considered as assessable value the price less the tax on illuminants.

Other provisions of the act define the methods of making the tax returns and provide certain administrative details.

In support of appellants’ argument it is pointed out that—

The law requires the tax to be invoiced separately — that is, to be shown separately on the invoice to the purchaser — and by reference to pages 6 and 7 of the record it will be seen exactly how carbons subject to such tax are invoiced. The manufacturer’s gross price is given; from this price the discount of 46% per cent is deducted, and to this net amount is added the packing cost, and then there is invoiced 20 per cent as the lighting tax.
The manufacturer, after he collects the tax, which, as shown, is invoiced as a separate item, makes a report to the German Government every fortnight on an official form and remits the amount collected. In doing this it is obvious that he is merely an agent of the German Government for the collection of a tax predicated upon the use of illuminants in the German territory.

. Conceding, though not holding, all this to be true, we yet fail to see wherein this affects the soundness of Judge Young’s observation quoted supra, as to the nature of the tax.

The tax is paid by some one upon the merchandise sold in the German market and becomes due and payable upon the sale being made. So far as the German Government is concerned, its collection is enforced at the source of that particular sale which “introduces the merchandise into the open market.” The seller is liable, and the tax is actually collected by the Government from such seller, who in turn, in the ordinary course of trade, collects it from the purchaser. It is included — must be included — upon the invoice made by the seller to the purchaser. Even if the tax debtor gives the merchandise itself away, it is still subject to have applied to it “as assessable value * * * the price for similar illuminants,” under authorized regulations, and said tax debtor is liable for the tax so assessed.

Furthermore, paragraph 20 of said German act provided — ■

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Related

United States v. Passavant
169 U.S. 16 (Supreme Court, 1898)

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Bluebook (online)
20 C.C.P.A. 67, 1932 CCPA LEXIS 199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hugo-reisinger-inc-v-united-states-ccpa-1932.