Hugo Jimenez-Morales v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 16, 2023
• Docket: 19-70766
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 16 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUGO JIMENEZ-MORALES, No. 19-70766

Petitioner, Agency No. A200-626-301

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Hugo Jimenez-Morales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination that Jimenez-Morales’ conviction under

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CIMT”) under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), rendering him ineligible for cancellation of

removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

1. Jimenez-Morales argues that his conviction for assault with a deadly

weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) does not qualify as a

CIMT that would disqualify him from eligibility for cancellation of removal. The

BIA concluded that Jimenez-Morales’ conviction is a categorical CIMT based on

its decision in Matter of Wu, 27 I. & N. Dec. 8 (BIA 2017). “[W]e must uphold the

BIA’s determination that a given offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if it

‘is based on a permissible construction[]’ . . . of the phrase ‘crime involving moral

turpitude.’” Safaryan v. Barr, 975 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).

Concluding that Matter of Wu is entitled to Chevron deference, we recently held

that “the BIA correctly determined that [a petitioner’s] conviction under

§ 245(a)(1) was for a [CIMT] and that he was therefore inadmissible under the

[Immigration and Nationality Act].” Id. at 988. Therefore, Jimenez-Morales’

conviction under § 245(a)(1) qualifies as a CIMT.

2. On January 1, 2015, the California legislature enacted California

Penal Code § 18.5, which reduced the maximum jail sentences for misdemeanor

convictions from “up to or not exceeding one year” to “a period not to exceed 364

2 days.” Cal. Penal Code § 18.5 (2015). Two years later, effective January 1, 2017,

the California legislature amended § 18.5 to apply retroactively to all misdemeanor

convictions, regardless of whether the conviction was finalized on or before the

statute’s original enactment date. Cal. Penal Code § 18.5. Jimenez-Morales

argues that this reduction applies retroactively to his conviction under § 245(a)(1)

for purposes of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). In

rejecting this argument, the BIA relied on its decision in Matter of Valesquez-Rios,

27 I. & N. Dec. 470, 473 (BIA 2018), in which it held that the state amendment did

not affect the applicability of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) to a past CIMT conviction

because the BIA looks to the maximum possible sentence at the time of conviction.

In Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson, we affirmed the BIA, “hold[ing] that California’s

amendment to § 18.5 of the California Penal Code . . . cannot be applied

retroactively for purposes of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).” 988 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir.

2021). Accordingly, Jimenez-Morales remains “convicted of a crime for which a

sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

3. Finally, Jimenez-Morales contends that his conviction under

§ 245(a)(1) was not for “an offense under” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) that would bar him

from cancellation of removal because he did not commit the CIMT within five

years of admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C),

1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The BIA rejected this argument based on its decision in

3 Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA 2018). There, the BIA

concluded that, “pursuant to the cross-reference in § 1229b(b)(1)(C), [a noncitizen]

is ineligible for cancellation of removal if the [noncitizen] has been convicted of a

[CIMT] for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed, regardless

whether the [noncitizen] meets the immigration prerequisites for inadmissibility or

deportability.” Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 693 (9th Cir. 2020). We

recently concluded that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(b)(1)(C) in Matter of

Ortega-Lopez is permissible and therefore entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at

690–93. We thus hold that Jimenez-Morales’ § 245(a)(1) conviction was “an

offense under” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) even though he was not convicted of a CIMT

committed within five years of admission to the United States.

PETITION DENIED.