Hugo Hurtado v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Hugo Hurtado v. Loretta E. Lynch

609 F. App'x 508

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 14, 2015

Docket12-71916

StatusUnpublished

This text of 609 F. App'x 508 (Hugo Hurtado v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hugo Hurtado v. Loretta E. Lynch, 609 F. App'x 508 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

1. Substantial evidence supports the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of Hugo Hurtado’s application for asylum. The BIA properly found that the government’s evidence rebutted, on an individualized basis, the specific grounds for Hurtado’s fear of future persecution on account of imputed political opinion. See Popova v. INS, 273 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir.2001). The government submitted two country reports on El Salvador establish *509 ing that (1) the civil war ended in 1993, (2) the military has been restructured, and (3) the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front is now the majority political party. That evidence supports the BIA’s determination that fundamentally changed conditions rebutted the presumption of future persecution. See Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 832-33 (9th Cir.2014); Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir.2003). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Hurtado did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution from other sources— namely, criminal gangs. The BIA reasonably concluded that Hurtado’s testimony established only the “mere prevalence of violence” and not that he would be a particular target.

2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hurtado humanitarian asylum. See Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir.2000). The BIA found that Hur-tado is statutorily eligible for such relief due to the severity of his 1985 mistreatment, and took into account the severity of his past persecution. The BIA also considered relevant factors in Hurtado’s favor, including his significant family ties and his employment during his 25 years in the United States. See Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916, 918-19 (9th Cir.2007); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1995). The BIA nonetheless concluded that Hurtado’s record of criminal convictions, stemming from his abuse of alcohol, and his lack of rehabilitation outweigh these favorable factors. That determination was not an abuse of discretion.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

***

¶-his disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

1. Substantial evidence supports the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of Hugo Hurtado’s application for asylum. The BIA properly found that the government’s evidence rebutted, on an individualized basis, the specific grounds for Hurtado’s fear of future persecution on account of imputed political opinion. See Popova v. INS, 273 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir.2001). The government submitted two country reports on El Salvador establish *509 ing that (1) the civil war ended in 1993, (2) the military has been restructured, and (3) the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front is now the majority political party. That evidence supports the BIA’s determination that fundamentally changed conditions rebutted the presumption of future persecution. See Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 832-33 (9th Cir.2014); Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir.2003). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Hurtado did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution from other sources— namely, criminal gangs. The BIA reasonably concluded that Hurtado’s testimony established only the “mere prevalence of violence” and not that he would be a particular target.

2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hurtado humanitarian asylum. See Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir.2000). The BIA found that Hur-tado is statutorily eligible for such relief due to the severity of his 1985 mistreatment, and took into account the severity of his past persecution. The BIA also considered relevant factors in Hurtado’s favor, including his significant family ties and his employment during his 25 years in the United States. See Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916, 918-19 (9th Cir.2007); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1995). The BIA nonetheless concluded that Hurtado’s record of criminal convictions, stemming from his abuse of alcohol, and his lack of rehabilitation outweigh these favorable factors. That determination was not an abuse of discretion.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

***

¶-his disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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