Connor, J.,
after stating the facts: The learned judge instructed the jury to answer the first issue, which was directed to the question of .title, in the affirmative. The exception to this instruction presents the question for our decision. His Honor was of opinion that, by the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties, the title to the property passed; that before the defendants could demand payment they were required to deliver the tobacco free on. board cars in Raleigh; he therefore instructed the jury that “the obligation of the defendants under the contract was to place the goods on board cars Raleigh, N. C. and immediately their right to demand pay for the goods in cash accrued to them, and not until then. The contract as construed by the court means that the defendants were entitled to cash as per contract for the goods upon delivery f. o. b. cars Raleigh. As the defendants admit that they never delivered the goods f. o. b. Raleigh, the court construes the contract to be, under that state of facts, that the defendants were guilty of a breach of the contract.”
The defendants insist that in the absence of any provision in the contract naming the carrier to which the tobacco was to be delivered or the point to be shipped, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to give directions to the defendants in both respects before they could demand performance.
In
Armitage v. Insole,
14 Ad. & Ell. (68 E. C. L. ) 727,
tbe plaintiffs sued for breach of contract by the defendants “to deliver free on board” a quantity of coal. The defendants demurred for that it did not appear that the plaintiffs named the ship or the place of destination.
Coleridge J.,
said: “When circumstances, left uncertain by the contract, are of such a nature that one party cannot perform his part of the contract until they are fixed, the other party insisting on the contract ought to fix, those particulars. Here, both time and place should have been fixed by the plaintiffs, but certainly place.” Wightman, J., said: “I should say the agreement being silent as to time, that it must be at the option of the plaintiffs. But, however that may be, the defendant clearly cannot give the coal free on board until they know the ship and at what port it is to discharge. Whatever, therefore, the construction of the agreement may be as to time, the plaintiff must fail for want of averring that he was ready and willing to name a ship.”
In
Dwight v. Eckhert,
117 Pa. St., 490, 508,
Clark, J.,
says: “It is a well established principle of law that in a contract for sale and delivery of goods Tree on board vessel’ the seller is under no obligation to act until the buyer names the ship to which the delivery is to be made; for until he knows that, the seller could not put- the goods on board.” Benjamin on Sales, 699; Mechera, on Sales, Sec. 1130.
The plaintiffs rely upon
Henderson v. Bessent,
68 N. C., 223. We find nothing said therein which conflicts with the authorities 'cited. It was there held that under the contract it was the duty of the defendant to have certain tobacco manufactured by the day named. So, in our case, it was the duty of the defendants to have the tobacco prized and ready for delivery on July 1, 1904, and it was the duty of the plaintiffs to be ready “to take and pay for said tobacco” and notify the defendants to what carrier it should be delivered and to what place they desired it shipped. In the absence of any directions in either respect, we are unable
to see how the defendants could be in default. It is conceded that the evidence does not show that any shipping directions were given. It may be' that in fact such directions were given. As the cause must be sent back for a- new trial, we deem it proper to express an opinion in regard to the other questions discussed before us.
We do not concur in the construction put upon the contract by the Judge below. Whatever views we may entertain in regard to the rights acquired and the duties imposed by the terms of the contract of January 20, 1904, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admissions in the pleadings and the testimony of both parties, the subject matter of the contract (the tobacco) was designated, set apart and on June 29, 1904,. accepted by the plaintiffs as conforming to the contract in all respects. It was prized into 45 hogsheads, weighed and numbered. An invoice was made and delivered to the plaintiffs, nothing more was to be done in that respect. There can be no question that if the plaintiffs had been in Raleigh on July 1 and tendered the price thereof in money, they would have been entitled .to have, immediate possession, that- is, to demand its delivery f. o. b. on cars, carrier and destination being fixed by them. What then were the relative rights and duties of the parties in regard to the order of payment and delivery? The conditions prescribed by the two first rules laid down by Mr. Benjamin (Sales 318) had been met and complied with. The third rule, upon compliance with which both the title and • right of possession Vest, is: “When the buyer is by the contract bound to do anything ás a condition, either precedent or concurrent, on which the passing of the property depends,. the property will not pass until the condition be fulfilled, even though the goods may have been actually delivered in the possession of the buyer.” It is immaterial here whether we so construe the contract that payment of the price was a condition precedent or concurrent. It is well settled by
abundant authority that, in a contract for the sale of personal property nothing being said as to the time of payment, the price must be paid either before or concurrently with the passing of the title. Mechem, supra, 540;
Bloxam v. Sanders,
3 B .& C. (10 E C. L.) 477;
Scudder v. Brodburg,
106 M. & S. 427.
Battle,
J. in
Grandy v. McCleese,
47 N. C., 142, construing a contract for sale of corn in which no time was fixed for payment, said: “The legal effect of it was to bind the parties to the performance of concurrent acts. The plaintiff was to send for the corn and to pay for it upon delivery and the defendant was to deliver it upon receiving payment. Neither party could demand performance by the other without the allegation and proof of his own readiness and ability to perform his part of the agreement.” The status of the parties is well stated by
Pearson,
J. in
Grandy v. Small,
48 N. C., 10: “The acts to be done by the parties under this contract were concurrent. The plaintiff was bound to pay the money on delivery of the corn. His doing so was a condition precedent to the right of action, and the question is whether there was anything to discharge him from its performance.” The plaintiffs, recognizing this condition, say that they were discharged from the duty of paying on July 1, 1904, by an express contract with the defendants that payment should be postponed until July 4, 1904. This the defendants deny. This question should have been submitted to the jury. It is directly raised by the pleadings.
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Connor, J.,
after stating the facts: The learned judge instructed the jury to answer the first issue, which was directed to the question of .title, in the affirmative. The exception to this instruction presents the question for our decision. His Honor was of opinion that, by the terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties, the title to the property passed; that before the defendants could demand payment they were required to deliver the tobacco free on. board cars in Raleigh; he therefore instructed the jury that “the obligation of the defendants under the contract was to place the goods on board cars Raleigh, N. C. and immediately their right to demand pay for the goods in cash accrued to them, and not until then. The contract as construed by the court means that the defendants were entitled to cash as per contract for the goods upon delivery f. o. b. cars Raleigh. As the defendants admit that they never delivered the goods f. o. b. Raleigh, the court construes the contract to be, under that state of facts, that the defendants were guilty of a breach of the contract.”
The defendants insist that in the absence of any provision in the contract naming the carrier to which the tobacco was to be delivered or the point to be shipped, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to give directions to the defendants in both respects before they could demand performance.
In
Armitage v. Insole,
14 Ad. & Ell. (68 E. C. L. ) 727,
tbe plaintiffs sued for breach of contract by the defendants “to deliver free on board” a quantity of coal. The defendants demurred for that it did not appear that the plaintiffs named the ship or the place of destination.
Coleridge J.,
said: “When circumstances, left uncertain by the contract, are of such a nature that one party cannot perform his part of the contract until they are fixed, the other party insisting on the contract ought to fix, those particulars. Here, both time and place should have been fixed by the plaintiffs, but certainly place.” Wightman, J., said: “I should say the agreement being silent as to time, that it must be at the option of the plaintiffs. But, however that may be, the defendant clearly cannot give the coal free on board until they know the ship and at what port it is to discharge. Whatever, therefore, the construction of the agreement may be as to time, the plaintiff must fail for want of averring that he was ready and willing to name a ship.”
In
Dwight v. Eckhert,
117 Pa. St., 490, 508,
Clark, J.,
says: “It is a well established principle of law that in a contract for sale and delivery of goods Tree on board vessel’ the seller is under no obligation to act until the buyer names the ship to which the delivery is to be made; for until he knows that, the seller could not put- the goods on board.” Benjamin on Sales, 699; Mechera, on Sales, Sec. 1130.
The plaintiffs rely upon
Henderson v. Bessent,
68 N. C., 223. We find nothing said therein which conflicts with the authorities 'cited. It was there held that under the contract it was the duty of the defendant to have certain tobacco manufactured by the day named. So, in our case, it was the duty of the defendants to have the tobacco prized and ready for delivery on July 1, 1904, and it was the duty of the plaintiffs to be ready “to take and pay for said tobacco” and notify the defendants to what carrier it should be delivered and to what place they desired it shipped. In the absence of any directions in either respect, we are unable
to see how the defendants could be in default. It is conceded that the evidence does not show that any shipping directions were given. It may be' that in fact such directions were given. As the cause must be sent back for a- new trial, we deem it proper to express an opinion in regard to the other questions discussed before us.
We do not concur in the construction put upon the contract by the Judge below. Whatever views we may entertain in regard to the rights acquired and the duties imposed by the terms of the contract of January 20, 1904, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admissions in the pleadings and the testimony of both parties, the subject matter of the contract (the tobacco) was designated, set apart and on June 29, 1904,. accepted by the plaintiffs as conforming to the contract in all respects. It was prized into 45 hogsheads, weighed and numbered. An invoice was made and delivered to the plaintiffs, nothing more was to be done in that respect. There can be no question that if the plaintiffs had been in Raleigh on July 1 and tendered the price thereof in money, they would have been entitled .to have, immediate possession, that- is, to demand its delivery f. o. b. on cars, carrier and destination being fixed by them. What then were the relative rights and duties of the parties in regard to the order of payment and delivery? The conditions prescribed by the two first rules laid down by Mr. Benjamin (Sales 318) had been met and complied with. The third rule, upon compliance with which both the title and • right of possession Vest, is: “When the buyer is by the contract bound to do anything ás a condition, either precedent or concurrent, on which the passing of the property depends,. the property will not pass until the condition be fulfilled, even though the goods may have been actually delivered in the possession of the buyer.” It is immaterial here whether we so construe the contract that payment of the price was a condition precedent or concurrent. It is well settled by
abundant authority that, in a contract for the sale of personal property nothing being said as to the time of payment, the price must be paid either before or concurrently with the passing of the title. Mechem, supra, 540;
Bloxam v. Sanders,
3 B .& C. (10 E C. L.) 477;
Scudder v. Brodburg,
106 M. & S. 427.
Battle,
J. in
Grandy v. McCleese,
47 N. C., 142, construing a contract for sale of corn in which no time was fixed for payment, said: “The legal effect of it was to bind the parties to the performance of concurrent acts. The plaintiff was to send for the corn and to pay for it upon delivery and the defendant was to deliver it upon receiving payment. Neither party could demand performance by the other without the allegation and proof of his own readiness and ability to perform his part of the agreement.” The status of the parties is well stated by
Pearson,
J. in
Grandy v. Small,
48 N. C., 10: “The acts to be done by the parties under this contract were concurrent. The plaintiff was bound to pay the money on delivery of the corn. His doing so was a condition precedent to the right of action, and the question is whether there was anything to discharge him from its performance.” The plaintiffs, recognizing this condition, say that they were discharged from the duty of paying on July 1, 1904, by an express contract with the defendants that payment should be postponed until July 4, 1904. This the defendants deny. This question should have been submitted to the jury. It is directly raised by the pleadings. If the plaintiffs had on July 1, 1904, tendered the price and it had been rejected and delivery of the tobacco refused, there can be no question that in view of the admitted facts the plaintiffs could have recovered the possession of the property upon tendering the price or upon refusal to deliver by showing readiness and ability to pay. Upon giving shipping directions they would have been entitled to demand its delivery f. o. b. on the cars at Ealeigh. As no directions were given and this duty was imposed upon de
fendants for the benefit of plaintiffs, they could waive it or, by failing to give them forfeit the right to demand performance in that Respect. If the jury find with the plaintiffs in respect to the change of time for payment, they would have the same rights and duties on July 4, which by the original contract they had on July 1st. They say that on that day “Plaintiffs went to Raleigh, as agreed, ready, able, willing and prepared to take and pay for said tobacco, but the defendants failed and refused to deliver it.” This averment is denied by the defendants and in this way the second controverted question of fact is presented by the pleadings. It should have been submitted to the jury. It is conceded that no tender of the price was made on July 4, 1904. It is further conceded that defendants, when plaintiff Hughes went to Knott’s home on the night of July 4, the latter said “We were there in the warehouse on the first day of July and you did not come and we are holding the scrap.” De-tendants say in their answer that the only reason why they did not deliver the tobacco was that plaintiffs did not make any tender of the price on July 1st. The defendants by their i’efusal to deliver waived a tender.
“If a party to an executory contract is in a condition to demand performance by being ready and able at the time and place, and the other party refuses to perform his part, an offer is not necessary.”
Grandy v. Small, supra; Blalock v.
Clark, 133 N. C., 306. There is a class of cases in which neither a tender nor an averment of readiness is necessary, as when before the day fixed for performance the party renders it impossible to perform on his part, as an agreement to marry on a day named if the defendant marries some one else before the day. The case before us does not fall within the principle upon which these cases are based.
Grandy v. McCleese, supra.
The defendants had the tobacco on July 4. The plaintiff Hughes testified that he came to Raleigh on July 4 ready and prepared to pay for the tobacco and that
be bad a check on the Norfolk National Bank and ample collateral to secure the money from the bank here if demanded; that be did not ask the defendants to take his check but told Knott that be would get the money the next day and pay him; that be went to the defendants’ warehouse during the day but failed to find them; that be did not find either of them until nine o’clock at night, when be found the defendant Knott at bis home and told him that be was prepared to pay for the tobacco and would do so next morning. Whereupon Knott said that they bad decided to keep it. He did nof tender the check. If Knott bad demanded the currency, the plaintiffs would have been compelled to pay it, but, as we have seen, the defendants waived the tender. Were the plaintiffs ready to comply with their part of the contract? We have held that testimony tending to show a custom among cotton dealers to accept checks in payment for cotton sold in large lots, was competent. Tbe plaintiffs in this case offered to prove general custom in the tobacco trade in that respect. Objection to it was sustained. As we have seen, the view which His Honor took of the case rendered this immaterial. While we do not intend to relax the well settléd rule that where performance of a contract is a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right of action, be must allege and show .either a tender or waiver etc., we are of the opinion that if the jury should find that there was an agreement to extend the time of payment to July 4 and it should appear that on that day plaintiff Hughes was here and went to the warehouse of defendants during business hours for the purpose of paying for the tobacco and bad available funds for that purpose, either in money or checks, which he could'have promptly converted into money, and the defendants were not at their place of business, that the plaintiff would be relieved of the duty of converting such checks into currency on that day and carrying the same about on bis person until be could find the defendants. The
plaintiff Hughes testified that in the conversation on June 29 the defendant Williamson asked him about the exchange on the check, to which he said if there was any exchange he would pay it. This would- indicate that it was understood between the parties that checks would be received in payment.
■ Upon another trial the plaintiffs would be permitted to prove, if they can, such custom as alleged, not for the purpose of varying the contract, but as interpreting its terms.
Brown v.
Atkinson, 91 N. C., 389.
We have been unable to find any authority in regard to the question as to what would constitute readiness and ability under the. circumstances testified to by the plaintiff Plughes. It would seem that if his view of the entire transaction is correct, he should have been allowed a reasonable time, after the refusal of the defendants, to deliver the tobacco, to convert his funds into currency, and if his funds were available for that purpose, the jury would be justified in finding that he was ready,' able and willing, within the terms of the contract as modified by the conduct of the parties. All this, however, will be for the jury upon proper instructions by the court. Eor the errors pointed out there mjist be a
New Trial.