HUGHES

18 I. & N. Dec. 289
Board of Immigration Appeals·Decided July 1, 1982·No. ID 2917·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Interim Decision #2917

MATTER OF HUGHES

In Visa Petition Proceedings LOS-N-29403

Decided by the Commissioner February 9, 1982

(1) For the purpose of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L), affiliation exists between tOo companies when the petitioning company: Has a 50% financial interest in the foreign company; has de facto control over the foreign company; and, the foreign company exists solely. to sell the petitioner's product. (2) The terms "affiliate" or "affiliation" may be broadly used to describe business entities which have relationships with one another based Upon both ownership and control. Ownership need not be majority if control exists. (3) The term "affiliate* is sometimes more specifically used to describe the relationship between two companies which have :.o direct linkage but are directed, controlled, and at least partially owned by the same parent corporation. (4) The term "subsidiary" is a more specinc form of affiliation in which We rosnpany 50 described is subordinate to the control of another. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Ron Jeffrey Tasoff, Esquire 10880 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California

Co-Counsel: Sam Bernsen, Esquire 1000 16th Street, N.W., Suite 511 Washington, DC 20036

This matter is before the Commissioner on certification from the decision of the :Western Regional Commissioner denying the visa petition. The Regional Commissioner in dismissing an appeal from the District Director's decision of May 12, 1981, found that the petitioner had failed to establish an affiliate or subsidiary relationship between itself and the foreign einployer of the beneficiary.

The petitioner seeks to classify the beneficiary as an intra-company transferee based upon the petitioner's intention to employ him in a managerial capacity and the claim that the beneficiary has been employed abroad for one year as a manager for Smith-Boart, Ltd., which the petitioner characterized as a "fifty percent owned subsidiary". The petitioner is Smith Tool International, a division of Smith international Incorporated. The petitioner is incorporated under the laws of the State

Interim Decision #2917

of Californiind is physically located in the city of Irvine, California. The petitioner is a major United States manufacturer and distributor of drilling and milling equipment. Smith Tool owns a 50% interest in Smith- Bout, Ltd., located in South Africa- Smith-Boart is incorporated as a "private limited liability company" under the South Africa Companies Act of 1973 and is empowered to issue stock. A limited liability company is a legal entity which has no exact counterpart in the United States. The other 50% share of ownership is with Board International, a South African corporation. The purpose of Smith-Boart, Ltd., is solely to manufacture, assemble, and market products of the Smith Tool Company. Smith-Boart, Liinited, is also characterized by the petitioner as a joint venture. In letters dated June 3, 1981, and April '7, 1981, Ernest L. Bishop of Smith Tool stated that it is an extremely common practice for multinational corporations to utilize joint ventures beciaise often under foreign law it is not always possible to establish a wholly owned subsidiary. Mr. Bishop states further that in practice these ventures are 'operated by the managers: of the overseas multinational corporation which created them.

Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(1,), provides for classification of the following person as an intra-company transferee:

an alien who, immediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the United States has been employed continuously for one year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge. .

Endel J. Kolde writing in International BUsiness Enterprise (Englewood Cliffs;• Prentice Hall, 1973) defihes joint venture as a "business enterprise in which two or more economic entities from different countries participate on a permanent basis". He sees two basic types of such ventures. One is an "equity joint venture" in which there is a joining of capital or capital resources; another form is when one or more of the partners participates by contributing the use of manufacturing processes, patents, trademarks, managerial know how, or other essential factors, -

but does not contribute capital. There can also be mixed forms of these two basic types. Kolde states that the "nonequity joint venture" is created under contract law while the "equity joint venture" is created under corporation law. Examining the models developed by Kolde, an "equity joint venture" which is recognized as an entity under local law must be recognized as a "legal entity" as used in section 101(a)(15)(L), supra. However, a joint venture established through contract such as the "nonequity joint venture" in its pure form or one which is not recognized as a separate entity under the foreign law would not come within the meaning of an "other legal entity" as contained in the statute. After reviewing the record of proceeding, I conclude that in this instance the

Interim Decision #2917

beneficiary was employed abroad for one year by a legal entity under the laws of South Africa. In order to establish eligibility for L-1 nonimmigrant classification here, the petitioner must further establish that it is a subsidiary or affiliate of Smith-Boart in South Africa or in the alternative that it is the same employer.

The Immigration and Nati mality Act does not define the term "subsidiary" nor does the House of Representatives Report No. 451 which contains the legislative history of Public Law 91-225 which created the "L-1" intra-company transferee nonimmigrant classification. Corporations and other constructed legal entities are created under the legislative power of each state, the federal government, or by foreign political units; and each jurisdiction has developed its own body of laws, regulations, definitions, and judicial and administrative interpretations concerning corporation structure. Because Congress did not define the term with respect to immigration statutes, we must conclude that the common or general meaning and usage of the term is applicable and not specific statutory, regulatory, or judicial language interpreting narrow areas of law .and public policy. It is, therefore, appropriate, that we examine broadly drafted definitions of the term.

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HUGHES, 18 I. & N. Dec. 289 (bia 1982).

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