Aflirrned; Opinion Issued October 10, 2012
In The (itiiirt nf ippeaIs Fifth 1istrirt uf xwi at allas No. 05-i 1-00839-CR
WILLIAM HUGG INS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-51870-l
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang Opinion By Justice Francis
William Huggins appeals his conviction for felony assault family violence. After the jury
found him guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years in prison. In three issues, appellant
claims the evidence is insufficient to prove he was previously convicted of a family violence offense
and the trial court erred in charging the jury. We affirm.
Loquitta Howard and appellant dated for several years. On February 1, 2010, the two gave
appellants mother, Ms. Freddie, a ride to B&G. the neighborhood “stop and shop,” to buy some
cigarettes. I-toward knew Ms. Freddie would not be able to get out of the car because the back seat
doors had child-proof locks which were engaged. Once they arrived at the B&G, Howard got out
of the car and opened the back door for Ms. Freddie. Appellant became upset and started yelling and cursing at her because she opened the door up for his mother.’
When Ms. Freddie got back in the car. appellant was still yelling and fussing. Howard told
her appellant acted this way when he was upset and had been drinking, and appellant responded h
hitting Howard in the flice. I-Ic also took her phone from her. When they arrived home, Howard told
appellant she was going to open the door for Ms. Freddie. He threatened to kick her if she did.
Despite appellant’s threats, Howard got out and opened the back car door for Ms. Freddie.
Appellantjumped out of the car and knocked Howard down. He stomped on her glasses and
kicked her, leaving bruises and boot prints on her body. Howard managed to find her cell phone and
called the police who arrested appellant.
During trial, the State introduced evidence that appellant had been charged with assaulting
a woman named Anita Henderson in 2004. Appellant pleaded guilty. and the trial court deferred
adjudication of guilt. The deferred adjudication order contained an affirmative finding of family
violence.
In his first issue. appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of
felony assault fhmily violence because the State failed to prove a prior conviction for assault family
violence. Specifically, he argues the evidence shows the conviction was for assaulting “another
girlfriend” and a dating assault was not family violence at the time of the prior conviction.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence under well established standards.
See Jackson v. Virginia. 444 U.S. 307, 319(1979); Brooks v. Slate, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). A person commits an assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.0 l(a)(1) (West 2011). Although usually a Class A
misdemeanor. the offense is elevated to a third degree felony if it is committed against a person
whose relationship with the defendant is described in sections 71 .0021(b) (dating). 71 .003 (family),
—2— or 71 .005 (household) of the fiimilv code and the detendant has been convicted previously of an
iss wit UT\ oR Ing I ImIl\ ‘ iolenct Id 22 01 (b)(2)(I\) see I I \ I \M ODE ANN 71 0021(b)
71 .003. 71 .005 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). lfthe trial court determines the offense “involved flimily
violence, as defined by Section 71 .004, Family Code, the court shall make an affirmative finding of
that fact and enter the affirmative finding in thejudgmentofthe case.” TEx. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.013 (West 2006); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71 .004 (West 2008). To prove the defendant had been previously convicted of an assault involving family
violence, the State may introduce the prior judgment containing the affirmative finding of family
violence. See Stale v. Eakins. 71 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002. no pet.) (“Article
42.0 13 was obviously intended to simplify the prosecution of subsequent family assault cases by
making it unnecessary to relitigate the details of the previous assault. Instead, the State may rely on
the affirmative finding in the prior judgment to prove that the victim of the defendanfs previous
assault was a family member.”). For purposes of penal code section 22.01 (b)(2)(A). a defendant was
“previously convicted’” of an assault involving family violence if he “was adjudged guilty of the
offense or entered a plea of guilty or nob contendere in return for a grant of deferred adjudication.
regardless of whether the sentence for the offence was ever imposed or whether the sentence was
probated and the defendant was subsequently discharged from community supervision... .“ TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(0(1). In this case, the indictment and jury charge alleged appellant intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly caused bodily injury to Howard, a member of his household or familyor with whom he
had a dating relationship. In addition, the indictment and charge alleged he had been convicted
previously of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a person who was a member of appellant’s
household and family and with whom he had a dating relationship, and that the offense, cause number F04—74 140 ftom the 283rd Judicial District Court on November 2, 2005. constituted a family
violence offense under section 22.01 (h)(2) of the penal code.
During the testimony of Deputy Margaret Brown. the State introduced, without objection.
exhibit #2. the trial court s order of deferred adjudication in cause number F04—74 140 from the 283rd
Judicial District Court. in which appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Brown testified she
was an expert in fingerprint analysis and took appellant’s fingerprints before trial. She then
compared those prints to the prints taken at the time of thejudgment in cause number F04-74 140 and
determined the fingerprints from the judgment were appellant’s. The November 2, 2005 deferred
adjudication order contains an affirmative finding of family violence. This evidence is sufficient to
establish a prior conviction lbr assault involving family violence. See Flowers’ v. State, 220 S.W.3d
919. 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In reaching this conclusion, we necessarily reject appellanfs argument that the law in effect
at the time of his prior conviction did not provide for a dating relationship to constitute “family
violence.” At the time of appellant’s first assault charge, article 42.0 13 of the code of criminal
procedure provided that, in a trial of an offense under Title 5 (including assault), the trial court shall
make an affirmative findings of family violence if the court determines ‘the offense involved family
violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code.” TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.013.
Section 71.004 of the family code defined family violence as “an act by a member of a family or
household against another member of the family or household” or “dating violence, as that term is
defined b Section 71.0021.” TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Aflirrned; Opinion Issued October 10, 2012
In The (itiiirt nf ippeaIs Fifth 1istrirt uf xwi at allas No. 05-i 1-00839-CR
WILLIAM HUGG INS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-51870-l
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang Opinion By Justice Francis
William Huggins appeals his conviction for felony assault family violence. After the jury
found him guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years in prison. In three issues, appellant
claims the evidence is insufficient to prove he was previously convicted of a family violence offense
and the trial court erred in charging the jury. We affirm.
Loquitta Howard and appellant dated for several years. On February 1, 2010, the two gave
appellants mother, Ms. Freddie, a ride to B&G. the neighborhood “stop and shop,” to buy some
cigarettes. I-toward knew Ms. Freddie would not be able to get out of the car because the back seat
doors had child-proof locks which were engaged. Once they arrived at the B&G, Howard got out
of the car and opened the back door for Ms. Freddie. Appellant became upset and started yelling and cursing at her because she opened the door up for his mother.’
When Ms. Freddie got back in the car. appellant was still yelling and fussing. Howard told
her appellant acted this way when he was upset and had been drinking, and appellant responded h
hitting Howard in the flice. I-Ic also took her phone from her. When they arrived home, Howard told
appellant she was going to open the door for Ms. Freddie. He threatened to kick her if she did.
Despite appellant’s threats, Howard got out and opened the back car door for Ms. Freddie.
Appellantjumped out of the car and knocked Howard down. He stomped on her glasses and
kicked her, leaving bruises and boot prints on her body. Howard managed to find her cell phone and
called the police who arrested appellant.
During trial, the State introduced evidence that appellant had been charged with assaulting
a woman named Anita Henderson in 2004. Appellant pleaded guilty. and the trial court deferred
adjudication of guilt. The deferred adjudication order contained an affirmative finding of family
violence.
In his first issue. appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of
felony assault fhmily violence because the State failed to prove a prior conviction for assault family
violence. Specifically, he argues the evidence shows the conviction was for assaulting “another
girlfriend” and a dating assault was not family violence at the time of the prior conviction.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence under well established standards.
See Jackson v. Virginia. 444 U.S. 307, 319(1979); Brooks v. Slate, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). A person commits an assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.0 l(a)(1) (West 2011). Although usually a Class A
misdemeanor. the offense is elevated to a third degree felony if it is committed against a person
whose relationship with the defendant is described in sections 71 .0021(b) (dating). 71 .003 (family),
—2— or 71 .005 (household) of the fiimilv code and the detendant has been convicted previously of an
iss wit UT\ oR Ing I ImIl\ ‘ iolenct Id 22 01 (b)(2)(I\) see I I \ I \M ODE ANN 71 0021(b)
71 .003. 71 .005 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). lfthe trial court determines the offense “involved flimily
violence, as defined by Section 71 .004, Family Code, the court shall make an affirmative finding of
that fact and enter the affirmative finding in thejudgmentofthe case.” TEx. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.013 (West 2006); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71 .004 (West 2008). To prove the defendant had been previously convicted of an assault involving family
violence, the State may introduce the prior judgment containing the affirmative finding of family
violence. See Stale v. Eakins. 71 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002. no pet.) (“Article
42.0 13 was obviously intended to simplify the prosecution of subsequent family assault cases by
making it unnecessary to relitigate the details of the previous assault. Instead, the State may rely on
the affirmative finding in the prior judgment to prove that the victim of the defendanfs previous
assault was a family member.”). For purposes of penal code section 22.01 (b)(2)(A). a defendant was
“previously convicted’” of an assault involving family violence if he “was adjudged guilty of the
offense or entered a plea of guilty or nob contendere in return for a grant of deferred adjudication.
regardless of whether the sentence for the offence was ever imposed or whether the sentence was
probated and the defendant was subsequently discharged from community supervision... .“ TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(0(1). In this case, the indictment and jury charge alleged appellant intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly caused bodily injury to Howard, a member of his household or familyor with whom he
had a dating relationship. In addition, the indictment and charge alleged he had been convicted
previously of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a person who was a member of appellant’s
household and family and with whom he had a dating relationship, and that the offense, cause number F04—74 140 ftom the 283rd Judicial District Court on November 2, 2005. constituted a family
violence offense under section 22.01 (h)(2) of the penal code.
During the testimony of Deputy Margaret Brown. the State introduced, without objection.
exhibit #2. the trial court s order of deferred adjudication in cause number F04—74 140 from the 283rd
Judicial District Court. in which appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Brown testified she
was an expert in fingerprint analysis and took appellant’s fingerprints before trial. She then
compared those prints to the prints taken at the time of thejudgment in cause number F04-74 140 and
determined the fingerprints from the judgment were appellant’s. The November 2, 2005 deferred
adjudication order contains an affirmative finding of family violence. This evidence is sufficient to
establish a prior conviction lbr assault involving family violence. See Flowers’ v. State, 220 S.W.3d
919. 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In reaching this conclusion, we necessarily reject appellanfs argument that the law in effect
at the time of his prior conviction did not provide for a dating relationship to constitute “family
violence.” At the time of appellant’s first assault charge, article 42.0 13 of the code of criminal
procedure provided that, in a trial of an offense under Title 5 (including assault), the trial court shall
make an affirmative findings of family violence if the court determines ‘the offense involved family
violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code.” TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.013.
Section 71.004 of the family code defined family violence as “an act by a member of a family or
household against another member of the family or household” or “dating violence, as that term is
defined b Section 71.0021.” TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004. Section 71.0021 defined dating violence as an act committed against a victim with whom the actor has or has had a dating
relationship. Act of April 27, 2001. 77th Leg.. R.S.. ch. 91, 2001 Tex. Gen Laws 176, 176 (current
version at TEX. F.\M. CODE ANN. 71.0021(a)). As noted, all three provisions were in effect at the
-4- time appellant was charged with assaulting I lenderson, thereby allowing a finding of flimily violence
whether appellant assaulted a member of his family or household or someone with whom appellant
had a dating relationship. Because the law at the time allowed for a finding offamily violence based
on a dating relationship and the State properly established the prior conviction for assault family
violence, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, appellant claims the trial court erred by instructing thejury to consider
whether there was a dating relationship” with respect to the prior 2005 offense involving Henderson
because. under the law in effect at the time, dating violence could not be used to enhance an assault.
As noted above, the law in effect at the time of appellant’s prior conviction allowed for a
dating relationship to form the basis of a finding of family violence. Thus, his claim ofjury charge
error lacks merit. We overrule his second issue.
In his third issue. appellant claims the trial court erred by commenting on evidence of dating
violence in the prior case. Although he concedes the trial court made no such comment, appellant
argues the “jury would have assumed . . . dating violence” occurred. To the extent he complains
about specific wording in the charge. we note the charge does not contain the phrase ‘dating
violence” or “violence.” Furthermore, because the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, the
proper instruction tracking the language of a relevant statute could not have constituted a comment
on the weight of the evidence. See Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1,8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We
overrule appellant’s third issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I)o Not Publish TEX. R. App. P. 47 I 10839F.U05 (tntrt nf ijzth FiftIi Dhtrirt uf cxa at Oa1tai
JUDGMENT WILLIAM HUOCIINS. Appellant Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County. Texas. ( Fr.Ct.No. F 10- No. 05-1 1-00839-CR V. 51870-I). Opinion delivered by Justice Francis, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Lang participating.
Based on the Courts opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered October 1 0, 201 2.
MOLLY F NCIS JUSTICE