Hugg v. Augusta Insurance & Banking Co.

12 F. Cas. 821
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland
DecidedApril 15, 1851
StatusPublished

This text of 12 F. Cas. 821 (Hugg v. Augusta Insurance & Banking Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hugg v. Augusta Insurance & Banking Co., 12 F. Cas. 821 (circtdmd 1851).

Opinion

TANEY, Circuit Justice.'

The first question to be decided is, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for a total loss of freight. In deciding this question, it is not material to inquire whether the loss is to be adjusted by the terms of the Baltimore Insurance Company, or by those of the Augusta Insurance Company, without regard to the memorandum of George C. Morton, at the foot of that policy.

1. There was not a total loss, when the cargo of the Margaret Hugg was unladen at Nassau, because a part of the jerked beef still remained in specie, and had not been totally destroyed by the disasters. And the plaintiffs are not entitled for a total loss, if the Margaret Hugg could have been repaired within a .reasonable time, and at a reasonable expense, and there was reasonable ground for believing that a portion of this beef might, by that means, be transported to Matanzas, although it might arrive there in a damaged condition, but yet retaining the character of jerked beef.

2. If this vessel could not have been repaired in a reasonable-time, and at a reasonable expense, at Nassau, yet if another vessel or vessels could have been procured upon reasonable. terms, which could have carried it to the port of destination, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.

8. The sale made by order of the court, having been made upon the application of the master, will not entitle the plaintiffs to recover for a total loss, unless the loss was at that time total, independently of such sale.

4. The loss was total, if the repairs would have produced such a delay, as would, in all probability, have occasioned a destruction of the remaining portion of the cargo before it could arrive at its port of destination; or that it would have become so damaged, as to endanger the health of the crew, on the voyage, from the noxious effluvia arising from it. It is also total, if the expense of making the repairs at Nassau, so as to fit the vessel for carrying cargo, would have exceeded the amount of freight which would have been earned by completing the voyage, and the delivery at Matanzas of the remaining portion of the cargo; provided another vessel or vessels could not have been procured at Nassau, upon terms that would have enabled the master to save some portion of the freight, for the benefit of the underwriters. But in order to justify the sale, and entitle the plaintiffs to recover for a total loss, it is incumbent upon them to show that these obstacles existed, and prevented him from completing the voyage.

If, under these instructions, the jury find that the .plaintiffs are not entitled to recover for a total loss, the next question is, whether they are entitled to recover for a partial loss.

5. Upon that question, the court instruct the jury, that if the written memorandum at the foot of the policy, was made by George C. Morton, the agent of the company, acting within the scope of the authority conferred on him by the company, and was made before the policy was delivered to the plaintiffs and accepted by them, then the loss mentioned in the testimony must be settled ¿ceording to the terms of the policy, at that time adopted and used by the Baltimore Insurance Company. And according to that policy, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover whatever loss of freight they may have actually sustained by the disasters mentioned in the testimony, provided such loss exceeds five per cent., and was occasioned by one of the perils enumerated and insured against in the Augusta policy.

G. If the jury find that the said George C. Morton was not acting within the scope of his authority, in making and signing the memorandum before mentioned, yet the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of loss of freight actually sustained by them, if the jury find that jerked beef is not a perishable article, in the mercantile sense of the term, as used in policies of insurance; but in determining this question, they are not to look merely at the preparation and quality of this particular cargo, but must inquire and determine whether jerked beef, as an article of commerce, is a perishable one, in the sense in which the other articles enumerated in the policy of the Augusta Company, are regarded as perishable.

As to interest, in ease the verdict was for the plaintiff's, the court were of opinion that, although in some of the states, and in the English courts, interest would be allowed as a matter of course, in a ease of this kind, yet, in Maryland, the weight of authority appeared to be in favor of leaving the question to the jury, where the sum due had never" been liquidated, and was in dispute between the parties. The jury were, there[826]*826fore, instructed, if they found for the plaintiffs, to allow interest or not, as in their judgment they might deem just, upon the evidence before them. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.

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Bluebook (online)
12 F. Cas. 821, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hugg-v-augusta-insurance-banking-co-circtdmd-1851.