Huger v. SEWERAGE AND WATER BD.

672 So. 2d 1053, 1996 WL 138671
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 27, 1996
Docket95-CA-2261
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 672 So. 2d 1053 (Huger v. SEWERAGE AND WATER BD.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huger v. SEWERAGE AND WATER BD., 672 So. 2d 1053, 1996 WL 138671 (La. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

672 So.2d 1053 (1996)

Killian L. HUGER, Jr.
v.
SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD OF NEW ORLEANS.

No. 95-CA-2261.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

March 27, 1996.

*1054 Mary-Elizabeth Paltron, New Orleans, for appellant.

Michael M. Christovich, Christovich & Kearney, L.L.P., New Orleans, for appellee.

Before SCHOTT, C.J., and LOBRANO and ARMSTRONG, JJ.

LOBRANO, Judge.

The Sewerage and Water Board of the City of New Orleans (the Board) appeals the trial court judgment which awarded plaintiff damages for the structural damage to his building at 812-818 Chartres Street. Plaintiff, Killian L. Huger, Jr., filed the instant suit asserting that the Board's failure to properly connect a drain line from his building to the street sub-surface line caused subsidence beneath a pilaster which supported his building's facade. As a result of that subsidence, Huger alleged that substantial cracking in the building's facade and structure occurred.

The trial judge agreed with Huger and awarded him $100,178.95 in damages, plus interest and court costs. The trial judge reasoned that "[t]he testimony and evidence demonstrated that the [Board] was responsible for the improper drainage connection which caused the washout condition and the subsequent differential settlement and cracking of the facade wall."

The Board perfects the instant appeal arguing that plaintiff's claim has prescribed, that plaintiff failed to prove a causal connection between the unconnected drain pipe and the damaged facade, that Civil Code Article 2317 is not applicable because of lack of notice and error by the trial court in deeming admitted those facts contained in plaintiff's request for admissions. We affirm.

PRESCRIPTION:

In 1989 plaintiff was notified by the Vieux Carre Commission that his property was in need of repairs due to cracks and sagging of the structure. As a result, plaintiff hired George Hopkins, an architect, to investigate the matter. As a result of his investigations, the particulars of which are detailed later in this opinion, Hopkins discovered a problem existing between the sidewalk and curb in front of plaintiff's building. This discovery was made in February 1992. In particular, he noted a unusual, large crevice or hole between the sidewalk and curb. He testified that this hole was large enough for a man to crouch in and that he could see back towards the plaintiff's building all the way to a cleanout. He also noted that the soil surrounding the cleanout had subsided. As a result, the Board was notified.

On May 28, 1992 there was an on site meeting among representatives of the Board, plaintiff, his attorney and an architect who worked for Hopkins. At that time, the Board decided to excavate in order to better determine the cause of the soil erosion. On May 30, 1992 the excavation revealed that the subsurface drain which extended to the downspout[1] from plaintiff's building was not connected to the main line running under the street.[2] Suit was not filed until November of 1993.

*1055 "When damage is caused to immovable property the one year prescription commences to run from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage." La.C.C. art. 3493. The Board argues that plaintiff acquired sufficient knowledge to commence prescription at the earliest in 1989, and at the latest, on May 30, 1992. In either case, the one year period had lapsed when suit was filed in November of 1993.

Plaintiff counters that argument with the assertion that there was no reason, in 1989, to believe that the faulty connection was the cause of his damages and that, subsequent to May 30, 1992, prescription was interrupted by the Board's acknowledgment of its responsibility. Plaintiff asserts that it was not until September of 1993 that the Board denied any responsibility.

Normally, if the assertions in a petition clearly show that a plaintiff's claim is prescribed on its face, the plaintiff has the burden of proving an interruption or suspension. Alexander v. Minnieweather, 595 So.2d 802 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1992). Arguably the instant case falls into that category, although proof of knowledge to commence prescription usually rests with the persons asserting prescription. However, regardless of where the burden lies, we conclude that prescription did not accrue.

The only knowledge plaintiff acquired in 1989 was that which was received from the Vieux Carre' Commission. The Commission advised plaintiff of a problem with the brick facade of his building. There is no evidence at that time to suggest that the cause of the problem was a faulty connection of the drain line, or anything remotely close to suggesting the Board was responsible. It was not until February of 1992 when plaintiff's expert, George Hopkins, discovered the hole between the sidewalk and curb, that knowledge sufficient to start the prescriptive toll was acquired. At that point, the Board was notified and the May 30th excavation occurred. See, Brady v. Bunge Corp., 582 So.2d 346 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 100 (La.1991).

Plaintiff argues however, that the Board acknowledged its responsibility subsequent to the excavation and that acknowledgment interrupted the accrual of prescription. Plaintiff asserts the interruption continued until the Board denied any responsibility in September, 1993. Suit was filed in November of 1993 and was thus timely according to plaintiff.

Relying on interruption, plaintiff bore the burden of proof. "Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe." La.C.C. art. 3464. Once prescription is interrupted, it commences to run anew. La.C.C. art. 3466. Interruption by acknowledgment may be oral, in writing, formal, informal, express or tacit. Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Co. v. Eckert, 95-156 (La.App. 5th Cir. 5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1081, writ denied, 95-1632 (La. 10/6/95), 661 So.2d 474. With respect to delictual actions, the acknowledgment need not be of a certain amount of damages, only of the defendant's responsibility and plaintiff's right against that defendant. See, Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624 (La.1992). "A tacit acknowledgement occurs when a debtor performs acts of reparation or indemnity, makes an unconditional offer or payment, or lulls the creditor into believing he will not contest liability." Id. at 634 (emphasis added).

At the time of the May 30, 1992 excavation, the evidence shows that one of the Board's representatives on the site, as well as the Board's claims investigator, acknowledged that the Board was responsible for the unconnected drainpipe.[3] Subsequently, the Board requested that plaintiff file a proof of claim, which he did.

Plaintiff's former attorney in this matter, James Selman, testified that he represented the plaintiff until September of 1993 and that Marilyn Magendie, the Board's claims investigator admitted the Board's responsibility to him on May 30, 1992 and never changed her *1056 position throughout his representation of plaintiff. Magendie testified that she had a telephone conversation with Selman in which she told him that the Board was going to deny the claim but she did not state the date of that conversation. She further testified that when she told Selman that the Board was going to deny the claim, he indicated to her that he would no longer be representing plaintiff in this matter because a lawsuit would have to be filed and he had a conflict of interest because of work he did for the Board.

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672 So. 2d 1053, 1996 WL 138671, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huger-v-sewerage-and-water-bd-lactapp-1996.