Huffman v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 24-7348
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 24-5653, 24-7348 BRUCE E. HUFFMAN, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00903-JJT Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM * 0F

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al.,

Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John J. Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 19, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: COLLINS, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Bruce E. Huffman appeals the district court’s dismissal and summary

judgment orders in his action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and

Goodman Holmgren Law Group, LLP (“Goodman”). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We vacate and remand in part, and affirm in part.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Goodman on

Huffman’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim. Goodman

concedes that it mistakenly pursued garnishment of Huffman’s Social Security

benefits, but invokes the statute’s bona fide error defense. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692k(c). That defense requires Goodman to establish that the violation was

unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite the

maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation. McCollough

v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011).

We find that Goodman’s asserted mistake was not objectively reasonable as

a matter of law. See Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 728–29 (10th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that bona fide error defense has a “subjective” and “objective”

reasonableness component). By July 2021, Goodman knew that the funds in the

account consisted entirely of direct-deposited Social Security benefits that were

immune from garnishment. Federal law has long prohibited such benefits from

being garnished. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); Philpott v. Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd., 409

U.S. 413, 415–16 (1973). Goodman nevertheless continued to defend the

garnishment for months, arguing that federal regulations protected only two

months’ worth of benefits from garnishment. But those regulations do not limit,

override, or diminish the broader statutory exemption for Social Security benefits;

indeed, they expressly preserve an individual’s right to assert further exemptions

2 under federal law. See 31 C.F.R. § 212.6(c) (“A protected amount calculated and

established by a financial institution pursuant to this section shall be conclusively

considered to be exempt from garnishment under law.”); id. § 212.8(a) (“Nothing

in this part shall be construed to limit an individual’s right under Federal law to

assert against a creditor a further exemption from garnishment for funds in excess

of the protected amount . . . .”).

Given the clarity of the governing law, Goodman’s position lacked any

objectively reasonable basis in law. An error resting on a plainly incorrect view of

settled law cannot qualify as bona fide within the meaning of § 1692k(c). See

Kaiser v. Cascade Cap., LLC, 989 F.3d 1127, 1138–40 (9th Cir. 2021). Summary

judgment was therefore improper, and we vacate and remand Huffman’s FDCPA

claim for further proceedings.

We affirm the district court’s rulings on Huffman’s state law claims against

Chase. Huffman’s unjust enrichment claim fails because his relationship with

Chase was governed by a Deposit Account Agreement that authorized the bank to

freeze funds pursuant to legal process. Arizona law bars unjust enrichment claims

where an express contract governs the subject matter. See Brooks v. Valley Nat.

Bank, 548 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Ariz. 1976). Huffman also failed to show the absence

of an adequate legal remedy, which independently precludes equitable relief. See

3 Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Arizona, NA, 48 P.3d 485, 493 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2002).

His conversion claim fails because deposits into a general bank account

transfer possessory rights to the bank absent a special deposit with notice to the

bank, which Huffman did not establish. See Universal Mktg. & Ent., Inc. v. Bank

One of Ariz., N.A., 53 P.3d 191, 193–96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).

Huffman’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim against

Chase also fails. In our view, the bank’s approximately two-and-a-half-month

delay in restoring access to funds does not constitute extreme and outrageous

conduct as a matter of Arizona law. See Christakis v. Deitsch, 478 P.3d 241, 245

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).

We also affirm the dismissal of Huffman’s IIED claim against Goodman.

Arizona’s litigation privilege generally protects statements made in the course of

judicial proceedings, but it does not categorically bar claims based on improper

litigation conduct. See Goldman v. Sahl, 462 P.3d 1017, 1031, 1033 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2020). To state a claim based on such conduct, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege conduct amounting to abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Id. at 1029

n.5, 1033–34.

Huffman failed to plead facts supporting either theory, and the record makes

clear that amendment would be futile. Goodman’s conduct, while clearly legally

4 mistaken, does not plausibly suggest an improper purpose or malicious motive

beyond debt collection itself. See Nienstadt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1982); Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 671–72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).

Dismissal of the IIED claim against Goodman was therefore proper.

In his companion appeal (No. 24-7348), Huffman challenges the district

court’s award of attorney’s fees to Chase under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). We reverse

that award. Although Huffman’s unjust enrichment claim nominally “arises out of

contract,” the resolution of that claim turned solely on the availability of an

equitable remedy, not on the existence, interpretation, or breach of the Deposit

Account Agreement. No contract dispute was ever adjudicated on the merits, and

Chase’s success was therefore a purely technical one.

Given the unusual, limited, and attenuated nature of Chase’s success, this

case falls outside the scope of § 12-341.01(A). Under the Warner factors,

awarding fees in these circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion. See

Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985).

Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s order granting

summary judgment on Huffman’s FDCPA claim against Goodman, affirm the

dismissal of all remaining claims, and reverse the award of attorney’s fees to

Chase.

VACATED and REMANDED in part, AFFIRMED in part.