Huffman v. Commissioner
This text of 1994 T.C. Memo. 73 (Huffman v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
*70 Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
NAMEROFF,
We begin by noting, initially, that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, in connection with the quantum of explanation required in an attorney's fees determination: On the one hand, we need some "indication or explanation of how the district court arrived at the amount of fees awarded" because without an adequate explanation, "it is simply not possible for this court to review such an award in a meaningful manner." , amended ; . "On the other hand, we do not require an elaborately reasoned, calculated, or worded order; a brief explanation of how the court arrived at its figures will do". .*72
The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence as to the number of hours reasonably spent on the case. This is normally done by submission of time charge records. In the instant case, petitioners' counsel has submitted summaries of the time charges. In the appendix to this opinion we reproduce, in part, the summary of the claims made by petitioners' counsel, both in the original motion for litigation costs and in the supplemental motion. It is to be noted that there are numerous instances of combinations of activities for which a one-time charge is made, and it is extremely difficult for the Court to determine precisely the number of hours spent on various tasks. We observe the following with respect to charges made
We think the amount of time assigned to legal research solely for the purpose of enhancing*73 the fee petition is unreasonable. We question the need to bring in another attorney for review and consultation and to charge the client with the time spent by each. Petitioners' counsel, in his motion, had claimed a higher rate for the attorney's fees than provided by statute based upon his alleged expertise as a special factor. We denied the higher rate in our prior opinion, and the claimed charges do not reflect such expertise. The elaborateness of the motion, affidavits, supplemental motions and affidavits, and reply to respondent's objection was unnecessary.
Accordingly, using our best judgment, we award petitioners legal fees for 5.9 hours charged prior to filing of the petition. Further, we award petitioners' counsel the attorney's fees claimed as set forth in the motion and supplement to the motion (including paralegal fees) reduced as follows: for the period beginning September 26, 1989, we reduce the time spent for legal research by 8 hours. 2 Further, we reduce the claim by 4 hours for conferences with KGS, 2 hours pertaining to 1989, and 2 hours pertaining to 1990. Accordingly, petitioners are entitled to recover for 55.2 hours of attorney services.
*74 Furthermore, we allow petitioners to recover their paralegal fee, costs, and filing fee as set forth in the motion and amendment to the motion in the total amount of $ 156.77.
Appendix
Time spent by petitioner's counsel is designated with the initials "SLS", and time spent by another attorney with the law firm is indicated by the initials "KGS". Paralegal time is represented with the initials "LS".
| ATTORNEY'S FEES | |||
| Date | Person | Description | Time |
| 2/3/89 | SLS | Telephone conference with client; | .4 |
| telephone conference with IRS in | |||
| San Jose; transmittal letter to | |||
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