Huff v. Thousandshores, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 1, 2021
• Docket: 4:21-cv-02173
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTHONY HUFF, et al., Case No. 21-cv-02173-HSG

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 39 10 THOUSANDSHORES, INC., et al., 11 Defendants.

12 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Anthony Huff, Estate of J.H., and minor child’s 13 (“Plaintiffs”) administrative motion to file under seal their Motion for Approval of Compromise of 14 Pending Action Involving Minor, as well as the Settlement Agreement and an accompanying 15 declaration. See Dkt. No. 39. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES the 16 administrative motion to seal. 17 I. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 19 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 20 v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the 21 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 22 and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of 23 access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this 24 strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion 25 must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 26 general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in 27 understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations 1 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a 2 vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 3 scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. 4 Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records 5 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 6 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 7 Records attached to non-dispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of 8 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only 9 tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This 10 requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information 11 is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th 12 Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 13 examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 14 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 Because approval of the compromise of the action will likely terminate this suit, the Court 17 will apply the “compelling reasons” standard to Plaintiffs’ administrative motion to file under seal. 18 See Sever v. Icon Aircraft, Inc., No. 18-CV-00584, 2019 WL 343469, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 19 2019); Doe v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-02167, 2015 WL 5438951, at *2 (N.D. 20 Cal. Sept. 14, 2015); see also Keirsey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-CV-1200, 2013 WL 5609318, at *2 21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (“[A] motion seeking the Court’s preliminary approval of the settlement 22 of the case may be effectively dispositive. While the Court has not identified any authority 23 discussing the appropriate standard for a motion of this type, the Court concludes that the 24 ‘compelling reasons’ standard is the appropriate standard.”). 25 Plaintiffs seek to seal the Motion, Settlement Agreement, and accompanying declaration 26 because confidentiality is an “essential” term of the Settlement Agreement and because the 27 documents contain confidential information about the identity of the minor child. See Dkt. No. 39 1 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to articulate “compelling reasons” to seal these 2 documents in their entirety. To begin, the parties’ preference that their settlement remain 3 confidential does not outweigh the “general history of access and the public policies favoring 4 disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process’ and ‘significant public 5 events.’” Doe, 2015 WL 5438951, at *2 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79) (internal 6 citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted); see also M.P. ex rel. Provins v. Lowe's 7 Companies, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01985, 2012 WL 1574801, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (“Once 8 the matter is brought to the court for resolution, it is a public matter. It is immaterial that sealing of 9 the settlement agreement is an integral part of a negotiated settlement between the parties.”) 10 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 11 The Court is also not persuaded that the parties need to seal the entire motion, settlement 12 agreement, and accompanying declaration to protect the identity of the minor. The very few 13 references to the minor in the Settlement Agreement, for instance, simply state the minor’s 14 initials—which is the same information already publicly available through the docket and included 15 in the pleadings. But even if there were compelling reasons to seal this information, Plaintiffs 16 have failed to explain why discrete redactions would not suffice. This is insufficient. See Estate 17 of Levingston v. Cty. of Kern, No. 16-cv-00188-DAD, 2017 WL 4700015, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18 19, 2017) (denying request to seal petition for approval of minor’s compromise because the 19 confidential information and addresses of the settling minors could be redacted); Ambriz v. CVS 20 Pharmacy, Inc., No. 119-CV-01391-NONE-BAM, 2020 WL 4368364, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 21 2020) (denying joint application to file minor’s compromise under seal because the nature of the 22 action and existence of settlement were already publicly known through the docket, and personal 23 and sensitive information could be redacted rather than sealed in its entirety); M.P. ex rel. Provins 24 v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01985–GEB, 2012 WL 1574801, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 25 2012) (denying request to seal petition for approval of minor’s compromise because the proffered 26 interest in protecting minor’s information was belied by the fact that other filings included 27 references to the minor). 1 meets the compelling reason standard and should be shielded from public disclosure. But 2 || Plaintiffs have neither made a narrowly tailored request nor articulated a compelling reason to seal 3 each category of information identified. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to seal is DENIED 4 || without prejudice. 5 || I. CONCLUSION 6 Plaintiffs’ motion to seal is DENIED without prejudice. Should Plaintiffs wish to file a 7 revised motion to seal that complies with Civil Local Rule 79-5, they must do so by December 8, 8 || 2021. Such a “future motion to seal must identify a compelling reason to seal and propose tailored 9 || redactions of only the information to which that compelling reason applies.” Doe, 2015 WL 10 5438951, at *2. If Plaintiffs do not file a revised motion to seal by December 8, 2021, the Court 11 will consider Plaintiffs’ Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action Involving Minor as 12 || currently filed. See Dkt. No. 39-3. 5 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. S 14 || Dated: 12/1/2021 Abpspured 5 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. = 16 United States District Judge

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