Huff v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co.

95 S.W.2d 498, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 663
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 22, 1936
DocketNo. 1556.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 95 S.W.2d 498 (Huff v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huff v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 95 S.W.2d 498, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

LESLIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Viola Huff, as beneficiary, instituted this suit against the Southwestern Life Insurance Company to recover on a policy of insurance for $1,500, issued to her deceased husband, Andy Huff. The company answered by general demurrer and general denial. The trial was before the court without a jury, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The policy was issued to Andy Huff on July 6, 1926, and he paid all premiums coming due thereon to and including October 6, 1928, a period of 2⅛ years. This carried the policy in force to January 6, 1929. The quarterly premiums due on the last date and subsequent thereto were not paid iiT cash when due and within the grace period. The company, acting under the automatic premium loan provision of the policy, paid the premium due January 6, 1929, and those due each quarter thereafter to, but not including, April 6, 1930 (1¼ years). On this last date, the cash value of the policy, in the absence of any indebtedness resting against the same, was $46.50, and the amount theretofore advanced by the insurance company in the payment of premiums on said policy, together with interest thereon in advance at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, amounted to the sum of $45.71. Hence, on said date (April 6, 1930), 79 cents was all that remained of the cash value of the policy applicable to premiums falling due.

The only question in the case is as to whether the policy had lapsed -at the time of Andy Huff’s death on December 2, 1932. The appellant insists it had not so lapsed, and bases the proposition on the contention to the effect that where a life insurance policy .contains a provision for automatic premium loans and for automatic extension benefits, the company issuing such policy does not have the legal right to deduct a premium loan advancement from the legal reserve value of the policy in such manner as to reduce the term of extended insurance provided for in the policy. Further, that the provisions of the policy evidence that it was the intention of the parties to this contract that by virtue of the automatic premium loan feature the insured would have exactly the same right under the policy when the premiums were advanced by reason of such provision as he would have if he had paid the premiums in cash, subject only to have the amount of such premiums advanced deducted from the total amount payable upon any final settlement of the policy. Stated somewhat differently, it is contended that “in the very act of advancing the premium under the aforesaid automatic premium loan privilege, the insurance company depletes and destroys the only reserve fund that exists under the policy for the purchase of such extended insurance, and at any time in which the company would admit that there was a default in the payment of the premiums, the aforesaid legal reserve would have been completely exhausted and destroyed by such premium advancements and there would be nothing left with which to purchase said paid-up term insurance or extended insurance as it is commonly called.”

*499 Preliminary to the consideration of the controlling- point in the case, the appellant directs attention to the well-recognized rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts: (1) That an insurance contract is strictly construed against the company writing the same; (2) that conditions of forfeiture contained in the policy must be construed strictly against the company; and (3) that in such cases the rules of construction require that every provision of the insurance contract shall be given effect, if possible.

These fundamental rules are stated and applied by the authorities generally. First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 125 Tex. 377, 82 S.W.(2d) 635; Baker v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 275 S.W. 316; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 83 S.W.(2d) 428; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Raley (Tex.Civ.App.) 81 S.W.(2d) 220; Mitchell v. Southern Union Life Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 218 S.W. 586; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chavey, 185 Ark. 865, 50 S.W.(2d) 245; Wolff v. National Liberty Ins. Co. (Ark.) 83 S.W.(2d) 836. But where the provisions of the contract are clear and unambiguous, .and the words thereof used in their ordinary and usual sense, there is no occasion for invoking rules of construction. In fact, it has been held that rules of construction furnish no • warrant for avoiding hard consequences by importing into the contract an ambiguity which otherwise would not exist, and that such rules may not be used to force unusual and unnatural meanings from plain words. Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489, 52 S.Ct. 230, 76 L.Ed. 416.

We discover nó ambiguity, uncertainty, or inconsistency in. the provisions of the policy here involved. This is reflected by frequent judicial considerations given them by the appellate courts of this and other jurisdictions. It only remains to determine the legal effect of such provisions under the undisputed facts of this case.

The pertinent portions of the policy are as follows:

“I. Premiums. * * * Except as herein otherwise provided this policy shall lapse in the event of non payment of any premium or installment thereof. ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“IV. Loan and Non Forfeiture Provisions: Loans - * * * Automatic Premium Loans. — If at any time after the expiration of the second' policy year and while this policy is in full force, any premium or installment of premium shall not be paid or settled in any other way within the time allowed for its payment, the company, unless otherwise instructed in writing by the insured, will forthwith advance the amount of isuch premium or installment of premium, with ■ interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum,' payable in advance, as a loan against this policy, provided the loan value hereof shall be sufficient to secure such loan with - any other existing indebtedness and interest in advance on the total debt until the next premium or installment thereof becomes due. ' Premiums falling due thereafter will in like manner be so advanced and paid by the company and this policy so continued from time to time as long as the loan value hereof, after deducting all indebtedness and interest, is • sufficient to pay a quarterly premium on this policy. At any time while this policy is thus continued in force, the payment of premiums may be resumed by the owner of the policy without medical re-examination, and all rights of the insured under this policy will remain in full force and .effect, subject only to the indebtedness hereon, the same as if the premiums had been paid in cash by the insured. In any settlement of the policy the indebtedness to the company hereon shall be a first lien in priority to ’the claim of any beneficiary or assignee. Such loan may be repaid at any time, but failure to repay it shall not avoid the policy until the total indebtedness thereon shall equal or exceed the loan value, in which case this policy shall automatically cease and determine.
“Other' Non Forfeiture Provisions: If default' shall be made in the payment of any premium or premium note after the payment of premiums for three full years (there being no default if such premium has been advanced under the automatic Premium Loan Privilege above described) then

“(Automatic Feature) — 1.

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95 S.W.2d 498, 1936 Tex. App. LEXIS 663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huff-v-southwestern-life-ins-co-texapp-1936.