HUFF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedApril 26, 2023
Docket2:21-cv-03250
StatusUnknown

This text of HUFF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (HUFF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
HUFF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LATOYLA HUFF,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 21-03250

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, OPINION

Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Latoyla Huff’s (“Plaintiff”) request for review of Administrative Law Judge Richard West’s (the “ALJ”) decision regarding Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3) and 405(g). For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) decision is AFFIRMED. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW A. Standard of Review This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner’s application of legal precepts is subject to plenary review, but his factual findings must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Stated differently, substantial evidence consists of “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).

“[T]he substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the standard places a significant limit on the district court’s scope of review: it prohibits the reviewing court from “weigh[ing] the evidence or substitut[ing] its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). Therefore, even if this Court would have decided the matter differently, it is bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 35 (3d Cir. 2001)). In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must consider: “(1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnoses of expert opinions of

treating and examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fact; (3) subjective evidence of pain testified to by the Plaintiff and corroborated by family and neighbors; and (4) the Plaintiff’s educational background, work history, and present age.” Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d 590 F. Appx. 167 (3d Cir. 2014). B. The Five-Step Disability Test Under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1). To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the Commissioner applies a five-step test. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity.” Id. “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity involving physical or mental activities that are “usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.972. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then he or she is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. Alternatively, if the Commissioner determines that the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the analysis proceeds to the second step: whether the claimed impairment or combination of impairments is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The regulations provide that a severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimed impairment or combination of impairments is not severe, the inquiry ends, and benefits must be denied. See id. At the third step, the Commissioner must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the claimant suffers from a cross-referenced impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).

If so, a disability is conclusively established, and the claimant is entitled to benefits. Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. If not, the Commissioner, at step four, must decide if the claimant has the “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(e). If so, then the claim for benefits must be denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(3). At the fifth step, if the claimant is unable to engage in past relevant work, the Commissioner must ask whether “work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do given [her] residual functional capacity and vocational factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c). The claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. II. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance and SSI benefits on May 19, 2015, alleging disability as of October 3, 2014. Administrative Transcript, (“Tr.”) 160-172. Her claims

were initially denied on February 15, 2016, and upon reconsideration on October 23, 2017. Tr. 87-92, 97-102. On February 17, 2016, Plaintiff requested than an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) review her claims. Tr. 103, 104. Plaintiff thereafter appeared at a hearing before ALJ Dennis O’Leary on October 23, 2017, in Newark, NJ. Tr. 23-50. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Id.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Bowen v. Yuckert
482 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Shirley McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security
370 F.3d 357 (Third Circuit, 2004)
Mark Hagans v. Commissioner Social Security
694 F.3d 287 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security
577 F.3d 500 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Anita Holley v. Commissioner Social Security
590 F. App'x 167 (Third Circuit, 2014)
Jessie Holloman v. Commissioner Social Security
639 F. App'x 810 (Third Circuit, 2016)
Holley v. Colvin
975 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. New Jersey, 2013)

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HUFF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huff-v-commissioner-of-social-security-njd-2023.