I-IoKE, I.,
after stating tbe case: There were two objections urged upon our attention by counsel for tbe appellant: first, that on tbe entire testimony, if believed, tbe Judge should have held tbe killing of tbe intestate to have been an excusable accident; second, that on such testimony, as a matter of law tbe intestate was guilty of contributory negligence, barring a recovery. In our opinion, neither position can be sustained. We have held in
Ray v. Railroad,
141 N. C., 84, that it is negligence to back a train into a railroad yard where passengers are rightfully moving about, without warning and without having some one in a position to observe conditions and to signal tbe engineer or warn others in cases of impending peril. This being a correct position,
a fortiori
would it be negligence under tbe conditions existing here.
The evidence shows that tbe defendant company, moving cars for its own convenience on a spur-track, cut loose a car on a down grade where by its own momentum it crashed into five other cars, stationary and two of them scotched, on the yard of the Edgecombe County Oil Mills, and with sufficient force to drive these cars from their position and against the bumping-post, causing the death of the intestate, an employee of the mills, who was standing on the track at the time. The defendant had no one in a position to ascertain and note conditions in the yard where the employees of the mills were accustomed and had a right to be, and no one was in a position to exercise any control over the detached car. even if the peril had been noted.
We agree with the Judge below that the undisputed testimony establishes a negligent act causing damage on the part of the defendant, and very certain it is that the Judge could not have held, as requested by defendant, that as a matter of law the defendant was in no way culpable. The reason assigned by the defendant for this contention is not well considered : “That the defendant was not required to foresee that a person would pass between the coupling-head and the butting-post in so short a space as about 20 inches.” When one is guilty of a negligent act causing damage — negligent because some damage was likely to result — he cannot be excused because the damage in the particular case was more serious than he anticipated or different from what he had reason to expect. The doctrine is that “consequences which follow in unbroken sequence without an intervening efficient cause from the original wrong are natural, and for such consequences the original wrong-doer must be held responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular result, provided that in the exercise of ordinary care he might have foreseen that some injury would likely follow from his negligence.” 16 A. and E. Enc. (1 Ed.), 438.
This was substantially bel'd in
Drum v. Miller,
135 N. C., 204. In that cas© a school-teacher threw a pencil at a pupil, which struck and injured the pupil’s eye; and the Judge below on request of defendant instructed the jury: “Unless you find from the evidence that a reasonably prudent man might reasonably, or in the exercise of ordinary care, have expected or anticipated that the injury complained of would likely result from the defendant’s act in throwing or pitching the pencil, you will answer the first issue, ‘No.’ ” The jury answered the issue “No”; and on appeal,
Walicer, J.,
for the Court, said: “It is not necessary that he should actually intend to do the particular injury which follows, nor indeed any injury at all, because the law in such cases will presume that he intended to do that which is the natural result of his conduct in the one case, and in the other he will be presumed to intend that which, in the exercise of the care of a prudent man, he should see will be followed by injurious consequences. In the case of conduct merely negligent, the question of negligence itself will depend upon the further question whether injurious results should be expected to flow from the particular act. The act, in other words, becomes negligent, in a legal sense, by reason of the ability of a prudent man in the exercise of ordinary care to foresee that harmful results will follow its commission. The doctrine is thus expressed and many authorities cited to support it in 21 A. and E. Enc. (2 Ed.), 487: ‘In order, however, that a party may be liable for negligence, it is not necessary that he should have contemplated, or even been able to anticipate, the particular consequences which ensued, or the precise injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It is sufficient if by the exercise of reasonable care the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.’ It is not essential, therefore, in a case like this, in order that the negligence of a
party which, causes ,au injury should become actionable, that the injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should have been foreseen. It is enough if it now appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, and the parties sought to be charged with liability for the negligence should have foreseen by the exercise of ordinary care that some mischief would be done.”
In
Christianson v. Railroad,
67 Minn., 94, it was held: “That where an act is negligent, the person committing it is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not reasonably have anticipated that the injury would result in the form and way in which it did in fact happen.” And Mitchell, Jin delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “It is laid down in many cases and by some text-writers that in order to warrant a finding that negligence (not wanton) is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, -and that it (the injury) was such as might or ought, in the light of attending circumstances, to have been anticipated.” Such or similar statements of law have been inadvertently borrowed and repeated in some of the decisions of this Court, but never, we think, where the precise point now under consideration was involved.
The doctrine contended for by counsel would establish practically the same rule of damages resulting from tort as is applied to damages resulting from breach of contract, under the familiar doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch., 341. This mode of stating the law is misleading, if not positively inaccurate. It confounds and mixes the definition of negligence with that of proximate cause. "What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an injury which ensues. If a person had no reasonable ground
to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; but if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could hare foreseen them or not.
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I-IoKE, I.,
after stating tbe case: There were two objections urged upon our attention by counsel for tbe appellant: first, that on tbe entire testimony, if believed, tbe Judge should have held tbe killing of tbe intestate to have been an excusable accident; second, that on such testimony, as a matter of law tbe intestate was guilty of contributory negligence, barring a recovery. In our opinion, neither position can be sustained. We have held in
Ray v. Railroad,
141 N. C., 84, that it is negligence to back a train into a railroad yard where passengers are rightfully moving about, without warning and without having some one in a position to observe conditions and to signal tbe engineer or warn others in cases of impending peril. This being a correct position,
a fortiori
would it be negligence under tbe conditions existing here.
The evidence shows that tbe defendant company, moving cars for its own convenience on a spur-track, cut loose a car on a down grade where by its own momentum it crashed into five other cars, stationary and two of them scotched, on the yard of the Edgecombe County Oil Mills, and with sufficient force to drive these cars from their position and against the bumping-post, causing the death of the intestate, an employee of the mills, who was standing on the track at the time. The defendant had no one in a position to ascertain and note conditions in the yard where the employees of the mills were accustomed and had a right to be, and no one was in a position to exercise any control over the detached car. even if the peril had been noted.
We agree with the Judge below that the undisputed testimony establishes a negligent act causing damage on the part of the defendant, and very certain it is that the Judge could not have held, as requested by defendant, that as a matter of law the defendant was in no way culpable. The reason assigned by the defendant for this contention is not well considered : “That the defendant was not required to foresee that a person would pass between the coupling-head and the butting-post in so short a space as about 20 inches.” When one is guilty of a negligent act causing damage — negligent because some damage was likely to result — he cannot be excused because the damage in the particular case was more serious than he anticipated or different from what he had reason to expect. The doctrine is that “consequences which follow in unbroken sequence without an intervening efficient cause from the original wrong are natural, and for such consequences the original wrong-doer must be held responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular result, provided that in the exercise of ordinary care he might have foreseen that some injury would likely follow from his negligence.” 16 A. and E. Enc. (1 Ed.), 438.
This was substantially bel'd in
Drum v. Miller,
135 N. C., 204. In that cas© a school-teacher threw a pencil at a pupil, which struck and injured the pupil’s eye; and the Judge below on request of defendant instructed the jury: “Unless you find from the evidence that a reasonably prudent man might reasonably, or in the exercise of ordinary care, have expected or anticipated that the injury complained of would likely result from the defendant’s act in throwing or pitching the pencil, you will answer the first issue, ‘No.’ ” The jury answered the issue “No”; and on appeal,
Walicer, J.,
for the Court, said: “It is not necessary that he should actually intend to do the particular injury which follows, nor indeed any injury at all, because the law in such cases will presume that he intended to do that which is the natural result of his conduct in the one case, and in the other he will be presumed to intend that which, in the exercise of the care of a prudent man, he should see will be followed by injurious consequences. In the case of conduct merely negligent, the question of negligence itself will depend upon the further question whether injurious results should be expected to flow from the particular act. The act, in other words, becomes negligent, in a legal sense, by reason of the ability of a prudent man in the exercise of ordinary care to foresee that harmful results will follow its commission. The doctrine is thus expressed and many authorities cited to support it in 21 A. and E. Enc. (2 Ed.), 487: ‘In order, however, that a party may be liable for negligence, it is not necessary that he should have contemplated, or even been able to anticipate, the particular consequences which ensued, or the precise injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It is sufficient if by the exercise of reasonable care the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.’ It is not essential, therefore, in a case like this, in order that the negligence of a
party which, causes ,au injury should become actionable, that the injury in the precise form in which it in fact resulted should have been foreseen. It is enough if it now appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, and the parties sought to be charged with liability for the negligence should have foreseen by the exercise of ordinary care that some mischief would be done.”
In
Christianson v. Railroad,
67 Minn., 94, it was held: “That where an act is negligent, the person committing it is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not reasonably have anticipated that the injury would result in the form and way in which it did in fact happen.” And Mitchell, Jin delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “It is laid down in many cases and by some text-writers that in order to warrant a finding that negligence (not wanton) is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, -and that it (the injury) was such as might or ought, in the light of attending circumstances, to have been anticipated.” Such or similar statements of law have been inadvertently borrowed and repeated in some of the decisions of this Court, but never, we think, where the precise point now under consideration was involved.
The doctrine contended for by counsel would establish practically the same rule of damages resulting from tort as is applied to damages resulting from breach of contract, under the familiar doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch., 341. This mode of stating the law is misleading, if not positively inaccurate. It confounds and mixes the definition of negligence with that of proximate cause. "What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an injury which ensues. If a person had no reasonable ground
to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; but if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could hare foreseen them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is, that if the act is one which the party ought in the exercise of ordinary care to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did happen. Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening cause from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrong-doer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow. 1 Bevan Neg., 97;
Hill v. Winsor,
118 Mass., 251;
Smith v. Railroad,
L. R., 6 C. P., 14. These and other decisions of like import from courts of the highest authority show that the position contended for by the defendant in its prayer for instructions on the first issue cannot be sustained.
The jury have found under -proper instructions that the defendant was guilty of negligence causing damage; negligent as stated, because it permitted, without any control, a car to run on a down grade into the mill yard where it was likely to and did hurt one of the employees of the mills; and it cannot be excused because the employee, being in an unexpected and unusual position, received a greater injury than the defendant had reason to anticipate.
The position of the defendant on the question of contributory negligence is likewise untenable. The intestate, an employee of the mills, was at work in a room the door of which opened in 12 feet of the place where the killing occurred. He had gone there, no doubt, for his own personal convenience, and the existing conditions gave little or no indication that
Ms temporary position would be one of peril. Tbe cars in the mill yard were stationary and scotched, and other employees were at work in them at the time, unloading cotton seed. .The circumstances did not require the intestate to anticipate that the defendant company, in disregard of its duty, would recklessly turn a car loose on a down grade, which would run into the yard, drive the stationary cars from their position, and crush out his life.
The charge of the Court, in leaving it to the jury to determine the question under the rule of ordinary care of a prudent man, was as favorable as the defendant had a right to expect. -To hold, as requested by the defendant, that the intestate was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, would have been clearly erroneous. We find no error to the prejudice of the defendant, and the judgment below is
Affirmed.