Hudson v. King County Housing Authority

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 10, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00770
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 MARIA ANN HUDSON, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00770-TL 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS v. 13 KING COUNTY HOUSING 14 AUTHORITY et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 This is an action alleging wrongful conduct by the King County Housing Authority, 18 Bellevue Police Department, and several employees of each agency. The alleged misconduct 19 appears to be related to the municipal agencies’ alleged theft of Plaintiff’s personal property. 20 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 45, 46) and 21 Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Surreply and Subjoined Declaration (Dkt. No. 55), and Plaintiff’s 22 Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Dkt. No. 56). 23 24 1 Having considered the briefing for all motions, as well as the relevant record, the Court 2 GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 45, 46), and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ 3 Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 55) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave (Dkt. No. 56). 4 I. BACKGROUND

5 A. Procedural Background 6 On June 1, 2024, Plaintiff Maria Hudson, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit by 7 filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 1), which was granted by United 8 States Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan on June 4, 2024 (Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff’s original 9 complaint named two municipal agencies as defendants—King County Housing Authority 10 (“KCHA”) and Bellevue Police Department (“BPD”). Id. at 1. Plaintiff also named numerous 11 individuals as defendants, including current and former KCHA employees Stephen Norman, 12 Shawli Hathaway, Ron Ovadenko, Peter Tran, Scott Fier, and Corey Brown; and current and 13 former BPD employees Wendell Shirley, Kathleen Carly, Robin Peacy, Landon Barnwell, an 14 individual named Hyatt, and “other officers unknown.” Dkt. No. 5 at 2.

15 On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 12. The amended 16 complaint dropped Norman, Fier, Peacy, Hyatt, and the unknown officers from the roster of 17 defendants and proceeded against the remaining eight. Id. at 1. 18 On July 22, 2024, Plaintiff sought leave to amend her complaint again. Dkt. No. 19. 19 While Plaintiff’s motion to amend was pending, Defendants organized into two groups: the 20 “King County Defendants,” comprising KCHA, Hathaway, Ovadenko, and Tran; and the 21 “Bellevue Defendants,” comprising BPD, Shirley, Carly, and Barnwell. See Dkt. Nos. 20, 21. 22 Both sets of Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Dkt. Nos. 23, 24), and both sets 23 concurrently moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, in the event that the Court denied Plaintiff’s

24 motion to amend (Dkt. Nos. 25, 26). On September 18, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s 1 motion to amend and denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss as moot. Dkt. No. 42. Plaintiff was 2 ordered to file a second amended complaint within 30 days, and Defendants were invited to re- 3 file their motions to dismiss after that. Id. at 3. 4 On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), which is the

5 operative complaint in this case. Dkt. No. 44. Plaintiff followed the “King County 6 Defendants”/“Bellevue Defendants” convention and named as defendants: KCHA, Hathaway, 7 Ovadenko, and Tran; and BPD, Shirley, Carly, and Barnwell. Id. at 2. On November 4 and 5, 8 2024, each set of Defendants respectively filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 45, 46. Plaintiff 9 responded (Dkt. No. 49), and Defendants replied (Dkt. Nos. 52, 53). After Defendants filed their 10 replies, however, Plaintiff on December 2, 2024, submitted an unauthorized 24-page surreply 11 labeled as a “Second Response.” Dkt. No. 54; see LCR 7(g)(2). On December 5, 2024, the 12 Bellevue Defendants moved to strike Plaintiff’s surreply. Dkt. No. 55. The next day, Plaintiff 13 filed an ex post motion for retroactive permission to file her surreply. Dkt. No. 56. On December 14 11, 2024, the Bellevue Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 57. On December

15 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a 38-page reply. Dkt. No. 60. 16 Presently before the Court, then, are four pending motions: (1) King County Defendants’ 17 Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 45); (2) Bellevue Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 46); 18 (3) Bellevue Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Surreply (Dkt. No. 55); and (4) Plaintiff’s 19 ex post Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Dkt. No. 56). 20 B. Factual Background 21 The Court assumes as true all facts alleged in the SAC. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff is a disabled individual who resides in Bellevue, Washington. Dkt. No. 23 44 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date, she “receive[d] two reasonable

24 accommodation moves” from carriers “Reliable and Eco Movers.” See id. (The SAC also 1 contains references to a commercial relationship between Plaintiff and a carrier named 2 “Packrat,” but it is unclear how Packrat was involved, if at all, in the events that gave rise to this 3 lawsuit.) At least one of Plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” moves—that involving Eco 4 Movers—transported Plaintiff’s “household goods.” Id. at 10. This move was facilitated by

5 KCHA, which assumed the role of “customer,” while Plaintiff was “considered the consignee.” 6 Id. During these moves, Plaintiff alleges that she “was deprived of personal property” worth 7 $177,000. Id. at 3–4. 8 Plaintiff alleges further that she was also “deprived of . . . records in [her] file.” Id. at 3. 9 On August 23, 2019, Plaintiff contacted Defendant KCHA by email and requested “a complete 10 and full copy of my file for both containers.” Id. at 7. It is not apparent from the SAC what 11 “containers” Plaintiff was referring to, or which “file” she was seeking. In any event, Plaintiff 12 alleges that KCHA did not respond, and that on or about November 11, 2019, Plaintiff’s 13 daughter made another request for the records on Plaintiff’s behalf. Id. at 8. On December 2, 14 2019, KCHA responded by email and provided Plaintiff with “what [it] could find.” Id. at 9. On

15 March 8, 2021, Plaintiff received an email from the Washington Utilities and Transportation 16 Commission, which advised her that Eco-Movers had not been “completing a cube sheet inventory 17 for household goods moves it perform[ed] for King County Housing Authority.” Id. at 10. 18 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about March 24, 2021, she became aware that she had been a 19 victim of “conversion frauds” perpetrated by “Eco and Reliable movers.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff 20 subsequently “fil[ed] fraud reports” with KCHA and BPD. Id. Plaintiff alleges that KCHA’s 21 “fraud department . . . did nothing about Plaintiffs [sic] request for investigation,” and that BPD 22 “conspired to do an improper criminal investigation and deliberately did not speak with 23 witnesses who had . . . knowledge of” the “crimes” that Plaintiff had reported. Id. at 14. Plaintiff

24 also alleges that during this time period, she “was in a lawsuit with Bellevue School District . . . 1 for Injuries to a Child.” Id. at 20. Plaintiff alleges that “Bellevue Police Department was named 2 in civil conspiracy malfeasance of child abuse and mandatory reporting duties.” Id. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A defendant may seek dismissal when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief

5 can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 6 Court takes all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and considers whether the complaint 7 “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. 8 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 9 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient, a claim has “facial 10 plausibility” when the party seeking relief “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 11 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 at 672. “When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Rule . . . 12(b)(6), ‘we accept as true all facts 13 alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ], the non- 14 moving party.’” DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019)

15 (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 16 1152, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2017)). 17 A pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and held “to less stringent standards 18 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 19 F.3d 916, 923 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even so, 20 a court should “not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 21 Henderson v. Anderson, No. C19-789, 2019 WL 3996859, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2019) 22 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 23 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Khalid v. Microsoft Corp., 409 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1031 (W.D. Wash.

24 2019) (“[C]ourts should not have to serve as advocates for pro se litigants.” (quoting Noll v. 1 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))). Further, “it is axiomatic that pro se litigants, 2 whatever their ability level, are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.” 3 Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted). Still, “[a] 4 district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is

5 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” 6 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 7 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). 8 III. PRELIMINARY MATTER 9 The SAC includes what appears to be information—including unredacted medical 10 records—pertaining to a minor child. See Dkt. No. 44 at 29, 34, 38–39. Local Civil Rule 5.2 11 requires parties to omit from all documents full dates of birth and names of minor children. LCR 12 5.2(a). “Although there is a presumption in favor of maintaining public access to court records, 13 the Court notes that medical records are deemed confidential under the Health Insurance 14 Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. In view of these considerations, the Court finds that

15 the need to protect the Patient’s confidential medical information outweighs any necessity for 16 disclosure.” San Ramon Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. C10-2258, 2011 WL 17 89931, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011). Here, this Court likewise finds the need to protect the 18 name of a minor child and other personal and medical information, even more so as the 19 information in question does not appear to be related to the merits of the case. Plaintiff is advised 20 that documents filed with the Court are public records and are accessible online. 21 The Clerk is therefore DIRECTED to SEAL Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 22 No. 44); REDACT the name N. that appears twice on page 29 and once on page 34; REDACT pages 23 38 and 39 in their entirety; and REFILE the redacted version of the SAC. See Benshoof v. Admon,

24 No. C23-1392, 2024 WL 3358608, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2024) (redacting sua sponte parts 1 of record that include private information “that in no way relate[s] to the merits of the case”); 2 San Ramon Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. 2011 WL 89931, at *1 n.1 (redacting medical information sua 3 sponte). 4 IV. DISCUSSION

5 The SAC is somewhat difficult to follow. It includes lengthy excerpts from the Revised 6 Code of Washington and Washington Administrative Code, as well as correspondence and 7 records and documents from legal proceedings of seemingly limited relevance to the matter at 8 hand. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 44 at 4–7, 16–19. Although relevant information appears throughout the 9 SAC, the Court will primarily take the text plainly labeled as “First Claim,” “Second Claim,” and 10 “Third Claim” as the operative causes of action in this matter. See id. at 26–27. Those three 11 claims are for: 12 First Claim[:] 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Against All Defendants

13 [ . . . ]

14 Second Claim[:] Conspiracy to Compound Anticipated Litigation Insurance Conversion Frauds Housing Authority Records Crimes 15 $177,000 Personal Property with Reliable and Eco Movers Violations of RCW 48.30A.070 Duty to investigate, enforce, and 16 prosecute violations and RCW 9A.80.010 Official misconduct— Against Defendants KCHA and BPD 17 [ . . . ] 18 Third Claim[:] Violations RCW 49.60.178 Washington Law 19 Against Discrimination Human Rights Commission Unfair practices with respect to insurance transactions during a 20 Reasonable Accommodations Move for a Disabled Person and WAC 284-30-330 Specific unfair claims settlement practices 21 defined (1)–(4);(6)—Against Defendants KCHA and BPD

22 Id. at 26. 23 The Court notes that in her Response to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff 24 attempts to augment and add to the allegations in the SAC. See generally Dkt. No. 49. When 1 discussing her Section 1983 claim, for example, Plaintiff references “The Fair Housing Act of 2 1968, as amended in 1988,” and the “federal interstate commerce clause.” Id. at 7. This statute 3 and constitutional provision are not mentioned in the SAC. Plaintiff also asserts that BPD “aided 4 suppression of evidence and witnesses,” an allegation she does not present in the SAC. Id. “It is

5 axiomatic that [a] complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to 6 dismiss.” Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (first citing Car 7 Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984); then citing Lee v. City of 8 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court will thus necessarily limit its review 9 to those allegations specifically made in the SAC. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. 10 A. Section 1983 Claim 11 Plaintiff brings her first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and directs her 12 allegations against all Defendants. Dkt. No. 44 at 26. Allegedly, Defendants “unlawfully 13 deprived Plaintiff of $177,000 values [sic] worth of property without due process of law in 14 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. Further,

15 Defendants allegedly “made an unreasonable and warrantless seizure of Plaintiff’s personal 16 property values and papers/documents for anticipated litigation insurance claims in violation of 17 the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. Plaintiff also appears to 18 predicate her Section 1983 claim on alleged violations of the First, Second, and Eighth 19 Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985; the 20 Rehabilitation Act of 1973; the Americans With Disabilities Act; and the Uniform Relocation 21 Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Id. at 3. But it is not clear from 22 the SAC how these other constitutional and statutory provisions are implicated in her Section 23 1983 complaint. Plaintiff expressly pleads violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

24 in the SAC’s Statement of Claim, but her references to these other amendments and statutes 1 appear only in an introductory section of the SAC and are not elaborated upon later. Compare 2 Dkt. No. 44 at 26, with Dkt. No. 44 at 3. 3 Irrespective of the specific statutory and constitutional bases for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 4 claim, the Court construes its substance—that is, the alleged “deprivation of . . . rights secured

5 by the Constitution and [federal] laws”—as comprising two instances of allegedly unlawful 6 taking: $170,000 worth of property in the first instance, and “personal property values and 7 papers/documents” in the second. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Dkt. No. 44 at 26. Plaintiff asserts that these 8 takings occurred “on or about March 24, 2021.” Dkt. No. 44 at 3. Plaintiff specifically alleges 9 that she “was deprived of personal property rights and its value by both when becoming aware of 10 conversion insurance frauds of anticipated litigation records in tenants file on or about March 24, 11 2021.” Id. 12 This claim is untimely. While “state law governs the limitations period in this case, 13 federal law determines when the limitations period begins to run.” Trotter v. Int’l 14 Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 13, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). As to

15 the statute of limitations relevant to this claim, in Washington, “[a]n action for taking, detaining, 16 or injuring personal property” must be commenced “within three years.” RCW 4.16.080(2). As 17 to accrual of the claim, “[t]he general federal rule is that a limitations period begins to run when 18 the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Trotter, 19 704 F.2d at 1143. This “general federal rule” applies to injuries alleged in Section 1983 claims. 20 See Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (collecting 21 cases). 22 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations conflict with one another, as well as with documentary 23 evidence included in the SAC. Plaintiff provides contradictory dates about when she “was

24 deprived of personal property” (March 24, 2021); when she “was just starting to become aware” 1 of the alleged deprivation (March 8, 2021); when she first inquired into potentially missing 2 property (August 23, 2019); and when “the last wrong actions [were taken]” (July 16, 2021, and 3 September 28, 2021). Dkt. No. 44 at 3, 7, 9; Dkt. No. 49 at 8. 4 “[T]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

5 allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. 6 Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also 7 Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court is 8 not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents 9 referred to in the complaint). Plaintiff alleges that she both sustained the alleged injury and 10 became aware of it on or about March 24, 2021. Dkt. No. 44 at 26. But Plaintiff also asserts that 11 she “start[ed] to become aware” on March 8, 2021. Id. at 9. Moreover, the Court notes that, 12 notwithstanding the language of the claim itself, Plaintiff embedded in the SAC documentation 13 that suggests that her property was actually taken from her at some time in 2019. Dkt. No. 44 at 14 7; see also Dkt. No. 46 at 17. Specifically, on August 23, 2019, Plaintiff sent an email to

15 “dhearon@1800packrat.com” and “cynthiar@kcha.org” that requested “a complete and full copy 16 of my file for both containers,” suggesting that Plaintiff began inquiring into her missing 17 property then. Id. (And one would think that one would realize that property was missing upon 18 unpacking after the completion of the move, not years later.) If that were so, then the alleged 19 deprivation of property would have necessarily occurred before August 23, 2019. Under the 20 three-year statute of limitations provided for in Washington law, then, Plaintiff would have had 21 until August 23, 2022, to file her action. 22 But even if the Court ignores Plaintiff’s inclusion of the email and does not credit the 23 alleged deprivation of property as having taken place in 2019, the Court finds that the most

24 generous it can be with respect to the date of the claim’s accrual is, at the very latest, March 8, 1 2021—the date Plaintiff learned that Eco-Movers had not been completing cube sheet inventory 2 for moves it performed for KCHA. See Dkt. No. 44 at 9, 10. And if March 8, 2021, is the date on 3 which the three-year statute of limitations began to run, Plaintiff did not act before it lapsed on 4 March 8, 2024.

5 Plaintiff opened the instant case by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis on 6 June 1, 2024, some 85 days after the March 8, 2024, expiration of the statute of limitations. See 7 Dkt. No. 1. In her response to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff counters that her “claims are timely 8 and are not barred by the statute of limitations because the last wrong actions taken by 9 Defendants BPD were on July 16, 2021 and KCHA by and through Corey Brown went through 10 September 28, 2021.” Dkt. No. 49 at 8. But neither of these assertions about “last wrong actions 11 taken” gets around the fact that, as alleged, Plaintiff’s claim accrued on March 8, 2021, when she 12 “start[ed] to become aware . . . that movers had not performed cube sheet inventory. Dkt. No. 44 13 at 9; see Trotter, 704 F.2d at 1143. That is the date on which Plaintiff “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to 14 know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Trotter, 704 F.2d at 1143. And as Plaintiff’s

15 claim is specifically for “unlawful[] depriv[ation] . . . without due process of law,” the Court 16 finds that the nonspecific references to “wrong actions taken” do not supersede the date on which 17 Plaintiff allegedly became aware that some of her property was missing—and therefore do not 18 change the date upon which this claim accrued. See id. at 26. 19 Because Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations, the Court finds that 20 amendment would be futile. Simply put, Plaintiff cannot revise the underlying chronology of the 21 events that gave rise to her complaint. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 718 n.20 (9th 22 Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal with prejudice based on lapsed statute of limitations). 23 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s first cause of action.

24 1 B. State Law Claims 2 Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action are state-law claims. In pleading them, 3 Plaintiff invokes the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See Dkt. 4 No. 44 at 3. Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal-question claim with prejudice, however, the

5 Court now declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1367(c)(3). 7 “When a district court ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,’ it 8 ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over the remaining state law claims.” Pell v. 9 Nuñez, 90 F.4th 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The decision 10 whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction is informed by values “of economy, convenience, 11 fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 12 quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 13 eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 14 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

15 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). 16 Here, principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity do not favor the exercise 17 of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims, especially at this early stage in the 18 proceedings. See, e.g., Direct Route, LLC v. Onoffline, Inc., No. C09-1509, 2012 WL 13019204, 19 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2012) (declining supplemental jurisdiction at “very early stage” where 20 “parties ha[d] not undertaken any discovery”). Moreover, as Plaintiff’s remaining “claims arise 21 under Washington state law, the principle of comity counsels against this Court exercising 22 jurisdiction over claims which are properly heard by Washington state courts.” Id. (citing 23 O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Lemmon v. Pierce County, No

24 C21-5390, 2023 WL 184223, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2023) (declining supplemental 1 || jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing plaintiff's Section 1983 claims with 2 || prejudice). 3 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s second and third causes of 4 || action. 5 V. CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 7 (1) Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 45, 46) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs first 8 cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's second and third causes 9 of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 10 (2) The Bellevue Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 55) and Plaintiff's Motion 11 for Leave to File Surreply (Dkt. No. 56) are DENIED AS MOOT. 12 (3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEAL Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 13 (Dkt. No. 44), REDACT the name N. that appears twice on page 29 and once on 14 page 34, REDACT the entirety of pages 38 and 39, and REFILE the redacted version 15 of the Second Amended Complaint. 16 7 | AA PC c 17 Tana Lin United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24