UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM B IA
) EUGENE HUDSON, JR., et al., ) ) P laintiffs, ) ) v. ) No. 17-cv-2543 (KBJ) ) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) GOVERNMENT EMP LOYEES, ) ) Defendant. ) )
M EM ORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO AM END THEIR COM PLAINT
P laintiffs Eugene Hudson, Jr. and Dana Duggins, who are campaigning to be
union officeholders, have filed the instant lawsuit against their union, the American
Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”). (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Because
this Court cannot assure itself of its own jurisdiction to resolve several of the claims
that P laintiffs say they are now seeking to litigate (see P ls.’ Resp. to AFGE’s Suppl. Br.
(“P ls.’ Resp.”), ECF No. 19, at 3–5)—which appear nowhere in the complaint—
P laintiffs must amend their pleading. 1
I.
The complaint in this matter was filed on November 28, 2017. In this one-count
pleading, P laintiffs allege that AFGE “has denied [them] access to the AFGE
TrueBallot email system” for the distribution of their campaign literature, in violation
1 Pag e numbers herein refer t o those t hat t he Court’s electronic case-filing system automatically as signs.
1 of their rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”),
29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq . (Compl. ¶ 40.) And in both the complaint and P laintiffs’
second motion for a preliminary injunction, P laintiffs specifically ask this Court to
“[d]irect AFGE to grant access to the TrueBallot email system for distribution of
campaign literature[.]” (Id., Relief Requested, ¶ 2; see also P ls.’ Revised Mot. for
P relim. Inj. (“Second Mot. for P I”), ECF No. 8, at 1 (asking the Court to “[r]equire
[AFGE] to give P laintiffs immediate access to its email distribution system or to the
TrueBallot e-mail system for distribution of campaign literature to the membership or
selected groups of members”).)
This request was seemingly fulfilled on January 5, 2018, when the contractor
whom AFGE had hired to prepare the TrueBallot email system for use by candidates to
distribute campaign literature completed its work, and P laintiffs were granted access to
that email system. (S ee Def.’s Surreply in Opp’n to P l.’s Revised Mot. for P relim. Inj.
(“Def.’s Surreply”), ECF No. 15, at 1.) But P laintiffs apparently harbor qualms about
the operation and scope of the TrueBallot system, and they have also expressed
concerns about the union’s delay in granting them access to that system. (See P ls.’
Resp. to Order to Show Cause (“P ls.’ Resp. to Show Cause”), ECF No. 16, at 4.) Thus,
P laintiffs have refused to concede that their receipt of access to TrueBallot moots their
case, and instead, have pivoted toward making various other contentions about AFGE’s
purported violations of the law.
Specifically, in their response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause regarding
mootness (see Min. Order of Jan. 18, 2018), P laintiffs represented that three
outstanding legal questions remain in this action: (1) whether AFGE’s refusal to
2 accommodate P laintiff Hudson’s request for email access at an earlier point in time (in
January of 2017) violated the LMRDA; (2) whether P laintiffs are entitled to litigation
costs and attorney’s fees in connection with their filing of this lawsuit; and (3) whether
granting the candidates access to the TrueBallot email system actually fulfills AFGE’s
obligations under the LMRDA, because even with such access, candidates allegedly
were not permitted to distribute literature to local delegates until all local delegates are
elected, nor could candidates reach the entire membership of rank-and-file members,
including those for whom the union has only a government or union email address on
file. (S ee P ls.’ Resp. to Show Cause at 5– 6, 9–14.)
P laintiffs’ position shifted yet again after AFGE’s counsel orally represented
during this Court’s motion hearing that AFGE will permit candidates to make
distributions to local delegates using the TrueBallot email system on a rolling basis.
(S ee Tr. of P relim. Inj. Mot. Hr’g at 55:8– 18, 63:8– 12.) Indeed, the parties have
continued to negotiate various access issues, and P laintiffs have informed the Court
regarding the status of their talks and certain concessions that P laintiffs are apparently
willing to make in light of AFGE’s representations. (See P ls.’ Resp. at 1–3.) In their
most recent filing, P laintiffs indicate that, now, the following are the only issues that
remain in dispute: (1) “[w]hether the LMRDA gives candidates the right to distribute
campaign literature to a specific portion of the membership if such distribution is
practical” (i.e., whether any email system that AFGE provides must permit candidates
“to select specific portions of the membership” to email); (2) whether P laintiff Hudson
“obtained the [physical] mailing labels [for union members] in 2016 improperly”; (3)
whether “AFGE’s conduct was inconsistent with the LMRDA’s requirements beginning
3 in January 2017”; and (4) whether “P laintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed for their
litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” (Id. at 3–5.) P laintiffs also report that
they have offered to withdraw certain previous claims “[b]ased upon conversations with
AFGE’s counsel . . . p rovided that” AFGE fulfills their new requests. (See id. 2–3
(emphasis in original).)
Thus, P laintiffs appear to believe that this Court stands ready to act as referee
and counselor with respect to the parties’ perpetual renegotiations of their respective
positions on various issues based on real-time developments in the factual landscape as
this case proceeds. For the reasons explained below, P laintiffs are sorely mistaken.
II.
Federal courts are constrained by Article III of the U.S. Constitution to exercise
their powers only with respect to actual “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies[.]” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see a lso Iro n Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983).
Given the above recitation of the manner in which this litigation has unfolded, there can
be no doubt that intervening events in the instant case—i.e., AFGE’s grant of access to
TrueBallot, and P laintiffs’ various responses—have “outrun the controversy” that
P laintiffs presented in their complaint, such that at least some of their initial claims are
now moot, and this Court “can grant no meaningful relief” with respect to them.
M cBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Co uncil Co ndu ct & Disab ility Orders o f Ju dicial
Co n f erence o f U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Stated simply, the unquestionable gravamen of P laintiffs’ charge against AFGE
as set forth in the complaint is that AFGE violated the LMRDA b y d en ying Pla intiffs
a ccess to th e TrueBallot email system. (See Compl. ¶ 40 (alleging that “AFGE has
4 denied [them] access to the AFGE TrueBallot email system”); id . ¶ 45 (alleging that
“General Counsel Borer’s refusals to permit candidate Hudson to distribute campaign
literature through the TrueBallot system until after the election of all Convention
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM B IA
) EUGENE HUDSON, JR., et al., ) ) P laintiffs, ) ) v. ) No. 17-cv-2543 (KBJ) ) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) GOVERNMENT EMP LOYEES, ) ) Defendant. ) )
M EM ORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO AM END THEIR COM PLAINT
P laintiffs Eugene Hudson, Jr. and Dana Duggins, who are campaigning to be
union officeholders, have filed the instant lawsuit against their union, the American
Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”). (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Because
this Court cannot assure itself of its own jurisdiction to resolve several of the claims
that P laintiffs say they are now seeking to litigate (see P ls.’ Resp. to AFGE’s Suppl. Br.
(“P ls.’ Resp.”), ECF No. 19, at 3–5)—which appear nowhere in the complaint—
P laintiffs must amend their pleading. 1
I.
The complaint in this matter was filed on November 28, 2017. In this one-count
pleading, P laintiffs allege that AFGE “has denied [them] access to the AFGE
TrueBallot email system” for the distribution of their campaign literature, in violation
1 Pag e numbers herein refer t o those t hat t he Court’s electronic case-filing system automatically as signs.
1 of their rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”),
29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq . (Compl. ¶ 40.) And in both the complaint and P laintiffs’
second motion for a preliminary injunction, P laintiffs specifically ask this Court to
“[d]irect AFGE to grant access to the TrueBallot email system for distribution of
campaign literature[.]” (Id., Relief Requested, ¶ 2; see also P ls.’ Revised Mot. for
P relim. Inj. (“Second Mot. for P I”), ECF No. 8, at 1 (asking the Court to “[r]equire
[AFGE] to give P laintiffs immediate access to its email distribution system or to the
TrueBallot e-mail system for distribution of campaign literature to the membership or
selected groups of members”).)
This request was seemingly fulfilled on January 5, 2018, when the contractor
whom AFGE had hired to prepare the TrueBallot email system for use by candidates to
distribute campaign literature completed its work, and P laintiffs were granted access to
that email system. (S ee Def.’s Surreply in Opp’n to P l.’s Revised Mot. for P relim. Inj.
(“Def.’s Surreply”), ECF No. 15, at 1.) But P laintiffs apparently harbor qualms about
the operation and scope of the TrueBallot system, and they have also expressed
concerns about the union’s delay in granting them access to that system. (See P ls.’
Resp. to Order to Show Cause (“P ls.’ Resp. to Show Cause”), ECF No. 16, at 4.) Thus,
P laintiffs have refused to concede that their receipt of access to TrueBallot moots their
case, and instead, have pivoted toward making various other contentions about AFGE’s
purported violations of the law.
Specifically, in their response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause regarding
mootness (see Min. Order of Jan. 18, 2018), P laintiffs represented that three
outstanding legal questions remain in this action: (1) whether AFGE’s refusal to
2 accommodate P laintiff Hudson’s request for email access at an earlier point in time (in
January of 2017) violated the LMRDA; (2) whether P laintiffs are entitled to litigation
costs and attorney’s fees in connection with their filing of this lawsuit; and (3) whether
granting the candidates access to the TrueBallot email system actually fulfills AFGE’s
obligations under the LMRDA, because even with such access, candidates allegedly
were not permitted to distribute literature to local delegates until all local delegates are
elected, nor could candidates reach the entire membership of rank-and-file members,
including those for whom the union has only a government or union email address on
file. (S ee P ls.’ Resp. to Show Cause at 5– 6, 9–14.)
P laintiffs’ position shifted yet again after AFGE’s counsel orally represented
during this Court’s motion hearing that AFGE will permit candidates to make
distributions to local delegates using the TrueBallot email system on a rolling basis.
(S ee Tr. of P relim. Inj. Mot. Hr’g at 55:8– 18, 63:8– 12.) Indeed, the parties have
continued to negotiate various access issues, and P laintiffs have informed the Court
regarding the status of their talks and certain concessions that P laintiffs are apparently
willing to make in light of AFGE’s representations. (See P ls.’ Resp. at 1–3.) In their
most recent filing, P laintiffs indicate that, now, the following are the only issues that
remain in dispute: (1) “[w]hether the LMRDA gives candidates the right to distribute
campaign literature to a specific portion of the membership if such distribution is
practical” (i.e., whether any email system that AFGE provides must permit candidates
“to select specific portions of the membership” to email); (2) whether P laintiff Hudson
“obtained the [physical] mailing labels [for union members] in 2016 improperly”; (3)
whether “AFGE’s conduct was inconsistent with the LMRDA’s requirements beginning
3 in January 2017”; and (4) whether “P laintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed for their
litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” (Id. at 3–5.) P laintiffs also report that
they have offered to withdraw certain previous claims “[b]ased upon conversations with
AFGE’s counsel . . . p rovided that” AFGE fulfills their new requests. (See id. 2–3
(emphasis in original).)
Thus, P laintiffs appear to believe that this Court stands ready to act as referee
and counselor with respect to the parties’ perpetual renegotiations of their respective
positions on various issues based on real-time developments in the factual landscape as
this case proceeds. For the reasons explained below, P laintiffs are sorely mistaken.
II.
Federal courts are constrained by Article III of the U.S. Constitution to exercise
their powers only with respect to actual “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies[.]” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see a lso Iro n Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983).
Given the above recitation of the manner in which this litigation has unfolded, there can
be no doubt that intervening events in the instant case—i.e., AFGE’s grant of access to
TrueBallot, and P laintiffs’ various responses—have “outrun the controversy” that
P laintiffs presented in their complaint, such that at least some of their initial claims are
now moot, and this Court “can grant no meaningful relief” with respect to them.
M cBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Co uncil Co ndu ct & Disab ility Orders o f Ju dicial
Co n f erence o f U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Stated simply, the unquestionable gravamen of P laintiffs’ charge against AFGE
as set forth in the complaint is that AFGE violated the LMRDA b y d en ying Pla intiffs
a ccess to th e TrueBallot email system. (See Compl. ¶ 40 (alleging that “AFGE has
4 denied [them] access to the AFGE TrueBallot email system”); id . ¶ 45 (alleging that
“General Counsel Borer’s refusals to permit candidate Hudson to distribute campaign
literature through the TrueBallot system until after the election of all Convention
delegates violated the LMRDA”); id ., Relief Requested, ¶ 2 (asking the Court to
“[d]irect AFGE to grant access to the TrueBallot email system for distribution of
campaign literature”).) But now that P laintiffs have been granted access to AFGE’s
TrueBallot email system and are free to contact delegates whenever they want, they
seek to sustain various n ew claims about the adequacy of the TrueBallot system (see,
e.g., P ls.’ Resp. to Show Cause at 8–14 (arguing that the TrueBallot system does not
fulfill the requirements of the LMRDA)), including demands that AFGE alter
TrueBallot’s mechanisms to reflect P laintiffs’ own views about how it should operate
(see, e.g., P ls.’ Resp. at 4 (asserting that one unresolved issue is whether AFGE must
provide “a method for P laintiffs to be able to select specific portions of the
membership” to email)).
Unfortunately for P laintiffs, the purportedly “remaining issues” related to the
features of the TrueBallot system or the propriety of how P laintiff Hudson obtained
physical mailing labels (id. at 3) were not squarely presented in P laintiffs’ complaint,
and P laintiffs themselves appear to recognize as much, given their repeated, updated
representations regarding the issues that the parties have yet to resolve. It is also clear
beyond cavil that a complaint’s claims cannot be amended imp licitly, through
subsequent briefing or otherwise, see Co lb ert v. District o f Co lumb ia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1,
13 (D.D.C. 2015); therefore, P laintiffs’ current catalog of disputed issues has no legal
effect.
5 An additional complication has arisen with respect to the one issue that P laintiffs
have identified as the sole remaining dispute requiring preliminary injunctive relief—
i.e., whether AFGE must accommodate P laintiffs’ request to “be able to select specific
portions of the membership” to email. (P ls.’ Suppl. Resp. at 3–4.) It appears that
Defendant AFGE has not even responded to this claim, either orally or in writing, much
less responded in a manner that clearly demonstrates that a case or controversy exists
with respect to this contention. (S ee id . (“AFGE counsel said he understood the request
and would be following up with AFGE on the matter, but he did not waive AFGE’s
right to object to the legal obligation to provide such selection ability to P laintiffs.”).)
Thus, this new legal claim is manifestly unripe, and the Court has no power to review
it. Cf . S o cialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 589 (1972) (finding a case
premature for adjudication where the remaining issue was “one that received scant
attention in [the] complaint” and in the briefing, and any injury was speculative); Texas
v. Un ited S tates, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it
rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The bottom line is this: this Court knows full well that lawsuits can be catalysts
for change, and as such, they can sometimes evolve as the parties undertake real-time
reevaluations of their respective positions. But federal courts can only resolve live
disputes that are nonetheless pinned down sufficiently, so as to present concrete, actual
controversies for the court to dissect; we have neither the authority nor the ability to
adjudicate constantly moving targets. And the instant case has now morphed into a
being that bears no resemblance to the matter P laintiffs first presented to this Court.
6 III.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that, on or before M arch 16, 2018, P laintiffs shall file an amended
complaint that reflects their current claims against Defendant AFGE, and removes any
claims that have been mooted or withdrawn. For clarity, P laintiffs are encouraged to
plead those claims that pertain to different provisions of the LMRDA (and its related
regulations) in separate counts. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the anticipated amended complaint,
P laintiffs’ second motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 8) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJ UDICE. If P laintiffs believe that preliminary injunctive relief is still
necessary with respect to any of the claims that are made in the amended complaint,
they may file a new motion for a preliminary injunction, on or before M arch 1 6, 20 18,
along with their amended complaint. Following P laintiffs’ submission of the amended
complaint and any preliminary injunction motion, the Court will issue an order that
addresses Defendant’s obligation to answer or otherwise respond to the amended
complaint.
DATE: March 2, 2018 Ketanji Brown Jackson KETANJI BROWN JACKSON United States District Judge