Hudson Stations, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

642 F.2d 261, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20728, 15 ERC (BNA) 1828, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19356
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 12, 1981
Docket80-1830
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 642 F.2d 261 (Hudson Stations, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hudson Stations, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 642 F.2d 261, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20728, 15 ERC (BNA) 1828, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19356 (8th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Hudson Stations, Inc. has petitioned this Court for review of a final order of the Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for Region VII. Specifically, the petitioner challenges the dollar amount of a civil fine levied against it for violation of 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(f)(1) promulgated by the E.P.A. under the authority of § 211(c) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

On June 2, 1977, a Fuel Inspector for the E.P.A. inspected a gasoline station owned by Hudson Stations, Inc., at 1200 Central, Kansas City, Kansas. He found that one of the station’s leaded gasoline pumps was equipped with a nozzle intended for use on an unleaded gasoline pump. The Enforcement Division of the E.P.A. thereafter issued a complaint against Hudson Stations alleging a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 80.-22(f)(1). 1 After a hearing on May 2, 1978, the Presiding Officer issued an Initial Decision finding that Hudson Stations had violated the regulation and assessing a civil penalty against Hudson of $3,000.00. On May 7, 1980, the Regional Administrator issued a Final Order adopting the findings and conclusions of the Presiding Officer. After the filing and denial of Hudson’s Motion to Rehear, Reargue, or Reconsider, this petition for review was timely filed.

*263 On appeal Hudson does not question the Regional Administrator’s finding of liability. The sole question presented is the appropriateness of the dollar amount of the penalty imposed.

The E.P.A.’s authority for the regulation of the sale of leaded gasoline is found in 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c). Subsection (d) sets a civil penalty of $10,000 for each day of violation of any regulation promulgated under section (c). The Administrator of the agency, or his designee, has the additional authority to mitigate or remit any penalty assessed under this section. He is also empowered to determine the facts upon all such applications for remission or mitigation.

The procedural rules governing administrative proceedings to assess civil penalties under section 211(d) of the Act are codified in 40 C.F.R. Part 80, Subpart D— Rules for Assessment of Civil Penalties (1978). 2 If the Presiding Officer determines, after a hearing if requested, that liability has been established, he is directed to use the following guidelines in setting a proposed civil penalty:

(b) Evaluation of proposed civil penalty. In determining the dollar amount of the recommended civil penalty assessed in the initial decision, the Presiding Officer shall consider all elements regarding the appropriateness of a civil penalty set forth in § 80.330(b). In determining the appropriate penalty to be assessed, the Presiding Officer may consult and rely upon the Guidelines for the Assessment of Civil Penalties, published as a Notice in the Federal Register of August 29, 1975, as part of the Part II. The Presiding Officer may at his discretion increase or decrease the assessed penalty from the amount proposed to. be assessed in the complaint.

40 C.F.R. § 80.327(b). Additional guidance is found in § 80.330(b)(1):

(1) In evaluating the appropriateness of such proposed penalty, the Regional Administrator must consider (i) the gravity of the violation, (ii) the size of respondent’s business, (iii) respondent’s history of compliance with the Act, (iv) the action taken by respondent to remedy the specific violation, and (v) the effect of such proposed penalty on respondent’s ability to continue in business.
(2) In determining the appropriate penalty to be assessed, the Regional Administrator may consult and rely upon the Guidelines for the Assessment of Civil Penalties, published as a Notice in the Federal Register of August 29, 1975, as part of the Part II. The Regional Administrator may, at his discretion, increase or decrease the assessed penalty from the amount recommended to be assessed in the initial decision, or in the Guidelines for the Assessment of Civil Penalties.

The scope of a court’s review of the assessment of a civil penalty under the Clear Air Act is limited. The Regional Administrator’s decision must stand unless her decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.Cir.1975).

Petitioner Hudson Stations, Inc., questions the Regional Director’s decision on two bases. Hudson’s first claim is that the Director impermissibly “pierced the corporate veil” in setting the $3,000.00 penalty. Hudson Stations, Inc., owns and operates 16 retail service stations. The corporation is one of six corporations with interlocking officers and employees which, in the aggregate, operate 294 gasoline stations. The four controlling stockholders of the six corporations are all related by blood or marriage, and all six corporations operate out of one office under the name of Hudson and Affiliated Companies.

This first argument amounts to a contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the Administrator to consider the six interlocking corporations in applying the “size of business” criterion when evaluating the *264 proposed penalty. We do not think that the Administrator actually “pierced the corporate veil” in this case. She did not do so, at least, in the sense of holding individual officers liable for corporate acts or holding the other corporations responsible for the acts of Hudson Stations, Inc. See Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978); Bruhn’s Freezer Meats v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 438 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1971). The Administrator described Hudson Stations’ relationship with its sibling corporations as follows:

The corporate organizations and individuals, including Respondent Hudson Stations, Inc., are at the very least agents of one another carrying out a common enterprise; i. e., the marketing of petroleum products including leaded and unleaded gasoline through a large network of retail stations with gross annual revenues far exceeding the $7 million shown for Respondent for the applicable fiscal year, and the matter will be so viewed in determining an appropriate civil penalty.

We do not agree that the Administrator abused her discretion by considering the total corporate structure of the Hudson companies in assessing the penalty.

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642 F.2d 261, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20728, 15 ERC (BNA) 1828, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19356, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hudson-stations-inc-v-united-states-environmental-protection-agency-ca8-1981.