Hudson Shipping Co. v. United States

40 Cust. Ct. 48
United States Customs Court·Decided January 21, 1958·No. C. D. 1957·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Wilson, Judge:

The merchandise at bar consists of. “frozen red snappers, beheaded, eviscerated, with scales and fins removed” (R. 2). It was classified by the collector under paragraph 720 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 51802, at the rate of 12% per centum ad valorem, as fish, prepared or preserved, in immediate containers weighing with their contents not more than 15 pounds each.

Plaintiff claims the merchandise properly dutiable at the rate of 1 cent per pound under paragraph 717 (a) of the said act as “Fish, fresh or frozen * * * whole, or beheaded or eviscerated or both, but not further advanced (except that the fins may be removed): Halibut * * * other fish, not specially provided for.” Alternatively, plaintiff claims the merchandise dutiable under paragraph 720 (b) of the tariff act, as modified, supra, at the rate of 1 cent per pound net weight, as fish, prepared or preserved, not specially provided for, “in bulk or in immediate containers, weighing with their contents more than fifteen pounds each.”

The position of the Government was stated by counsel for the defendant as follows:

Mr. Sklaroff: * * * First the Government feels that scaling the fish removes it from 717 (a), because of the nature of the operations there set forth. The term “scale” does not appear in 717 (a), and the evidence will show that there is a cellophane wrapping involved around each fish. That, claims the Government, is the immediate container, and there is no question, I think, of the fact that the fish in the cellophane do weigh less than 15 pounds, but the evidence will also show that a number of these cellophane wrapped fish are placed in a [50]*50large carton, and if tbe court finds the carton to be the immediate container, then Mr. Glad’s claim is correct. (R. 3-4.)

Plaintiff introduced in evidence as representative of the wrapping in which each fish was contained two sheets of cellophane wrapper (plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit 1), the record indicating that “the sheet in which each fish was wrapped was about the size of both those taken together” (ft. 7-8). It appears that there is no writing on the cellophane sheets in which the fish are wrapped.

The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the imported fish were loosely wrapped in cellophane sheets (ft. 9), after which they were packed in large corrugated cartons, ranging in size from 2 to 4 pounds (ft. 6); that each cardboard carton with its contents weighed about 50 pounds and contained markings as to the nature of the merchandise, the country of origin, and the company for whom imported. It further appears that the involved snappers contained in each carton were imported in odd weights, averaging in size from 3, 5, and 7 pounds each (R. 6-7). Fish such as those here imported are sold to wholesalers, in carton quantity, according to the marked weights on each carton. The fish are sold by the wholesaler to his customers in quantities by weight, the testimony indicating that “If a customer wants 10, 15, or 20 pounds, he takes out several fish, throws them on the scale, and takes off the cellophane paper” (R. 12).

In our opinion, the operation of scaling the imported fish, as disclosed by the record herein, removes the merchandise from the provisions of paragraph 717 (a) of the tariff act for “Fish, fresh or frozen * * * whole, or beheaded or eviscerated or both, but not further advanced (except that the fins may be removed).” The scaling of the fish constitutes a preparation and advancement beyond that permitted by the provisions of paragraph 717 (a), supra. Plaintiff’s protest claim under this paragraph is, accordingly, overruled. On the other hand, the imported fish come within the provisions of paragraph 720 (b) of the tariff act for “Fish, prepared or preserved, not specially provided for.”

There remains for disposition the question whether or not the involved merchandise is packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than 15 pounds each.

What constitutes an “immediate container” of merchandise has previously been considered by this and our appellate court. In A. A. Vantine & Co. v. United States, 20 Treas. Dec. 863, Abstract 25478, the question before the Board of General Appraisers was whether certain coverings or boxes should be included in the dutiable weight of imported confectionery or candy under paragraph 219 of the Tariff Act of 1909, which' contained the provision: “The weight and the value of the immediate coverings, other than the outer packing case or other covering, shall be included in the dutiable weight and the [51]*51value of the merchandise.” It appeared that the imported candy was packed either in half-pound paper boxes or wooden cylindrical boxes containing about a pound. These smaller packages were enclosed in a larger packing case or outside box. The most immediate covering of the confectionery was a thin paper, which was used for the purpose of lining the small packages and preventing the candy from adhering to them. The confectionery itself was packed in powdered sugar, considerable quantities of which were placed above and around the candy. It was the contention of the importer in the Vantine <& Go. case, supra, that “immediate coverings” should not be construed to include the wooden and paper boxes and that these should, accordingly, be excluded from the dutiable weight. In holding that this contention of the importer was without merit, the board stated as follows:

* * * We think this position is untenable. It will be noted the form of the expression is-“the weight and the value of the immediate coverings, other than the outer packing case.” Clearly this is sufficiently definite and specific to indicate that only the outer packing cases should be excluded from the dutiable weight. “Immediate” is a relative term, and applies in this case to both the inside tissue paper and the wooden and pasteboard boxes containing the candy.

The situation in the Vantine & Co. case, supra, does not parallel that in the case before us. Unlike paragraph 219 of the Tariff Act of 1909, covering the merchandise involved in the cited case, paragraph 720 (b) of the tariff act here under consideration does not contain an excepting provision with respect to the outer coverings or containers of the merchandise, and the Vantine & Co. case, supra, is thus distinguishable from the case at bar.

In H. Horsfield v. United States, 26 Treas. Dec. 814, Abstract 35593, the merchandise consisted of dead chickens, packed in a wooden box, which were assessed for duty under paragraph 229 of the Tariff Act of 1913 under the provision therein for poultry, dead or prepared in any manner, “including the weight of the immediate coverings or containers.” The only question raised was whether the wooden boxes should have been included in the weight of the commodity. The record disclosed that a sort of parchment or oilpaper was placed around the chickens inside the boxes, covering them with about two thicknesses to keep the flesh from the wood and from exposure, it appearing that the box was not a tight box, but one put together in a rather loose way, being sufficient to contain and protect the poultry which, it was indicated, was brought in in a frozen condition. The protest of the importer that the dutiable weight should have been the weight of the poultry, including the weight of the paper but excluding the weight of the wooden boxes, was sustained.

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