UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EUGENE HUDSON, JR.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 19-2738 (JEB) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this latest round of Plaintiff Eugene Hudson, Jr.’s abundant litigation, he seeks
reinstatement as a member of Local 1923 of the American Federation of Government Employees
so that he can run for a leadership position in the Local. To achieve such end, he has sued
AFGE, the Local, Local President Anita Autrey, and the U.S. Department of Labor, asserting
myriad intertwined counts under federal statutes and the common law. In moving to dismiss,
DOL contends that the sole claim against it is both moot and facially defective. Agreeing, the
Court will grant the Motion and dismiss Labor from the case.
I. Background
In a prolix 57-page Complaint, Hudson sets out chapter and verse of his long-running
dispute with AFGE and its leadership. See ECF No. 25 (Amended Complaint Corrected). He
currently has multiple suits pending against AFGE, all related to his ouster from a leadership
position and his lack of success in subsequent elections. See, e.g., Hudson v. AFGE, No. 17-
1867; Hudson v. AFGE, No. 17-2094. The Court has issued a surfeit of Opinions regarding the
various disputes, see, e.g., Hudson v. AFGE, 2019 WL 3533602, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2019);
1 Hudson v. AFGE, 289 F. Supp. 3d 121, 123–25 (D.D.C. 2018), and readers curious for more
background can slake their thirst there. For the sake of brevity, the Court sets forth only the facts
relevant to DOL’s Motion, taking them, as is required at this stage, from the operative
Complaint, which was filed in September 2019.
The only count alleged against Labor is Count VII, which names all four Defendants and
invokes a number of provisions of the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act as well as
the LMRDA Bill of Rights. See Compl. at 52. It alleges that DOL planned “to hold DOL-
supervised nominations for Local 1923 office on September 18, 2019[, . . . and DOL intended] to
allow only those members in good standing to be nominated on September 18, 2019, to run in
the upcoming Local 1923 DOL-supervised election.” Id., ¶ 202. Local 1923’s refusal to include
Hudson on that list denies him the right to be nominated. Id., ¶ 203. He will thus suffer
damages from not being able to participate in that election. Id., ¶ 206. He also seeks assorted
injunctive relief relating to that election and future ones. Id. at 55–57. Labor has now moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a
complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must
grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United
States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms.,
2 Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The pleading rules are “not meant to impose
a great burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court
need not accept as true, then, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an
inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178,
193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). For a plaintiff to
survive a 12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” the facts alleged in the
complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555–56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The standard to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is less forgiving. Under
this part of the Rule, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear his claims. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); U.S.
Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A court also has “an
affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.”
Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For
this reason, “‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in
resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id.
at 13–14 (alteration in original) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987)). Additionally, unlike with a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding
3 whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens, 402 F.3d at 1253;
see also Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 409 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[G]iven
the present posture of this case — a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) on ripeness grounds — the
court may consider materials outside the pleadings.”).
III. Analysis
DOL rightly raises a bevy of flaws in Hudson’s claim against it. To begin, any injunctive
relief that he seeks related to the September 2019 or December 2019 elections is moot since
those have come and gone. “[M]ootness must be assessed at ‘all stages’ of the litigation to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EUGENE HUDSON, JR.,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 19-2738 (JEB) AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this latest round of Plaintiff Eugene Hudson, Jr.’s abundant litigation, he seeks
reinstatement as a member of Local 1923 of the American Federation of Government Employees
so that he can run for a leadership position in the Local. To achieve such end, he has sued
AFGE, the Local, Local President Anita Autrey, and the U.S. Department of Labor, asserting
myriad intertwined counts under federal statutes and the common law. In moving to dismiss,
DOL contends that the sole claim against it is both moot and facially defective. Agreeing, the
Court will grant the Motion and dismiss Labor from the case.
I. Background
In a prolix 57-page Complaint, Hudson sets out chapter and verse of his long-running
dispute with AFGE and its leadership. See ECF No. 25 (Amended Complaint Corrected). He
currently has multiple suits pending against AFGE, all related to his ouster from a leadership
position and his lack of success in subsequent elections. See, e.g., Hudson v. AFGE, No. 17-
1867; Hudson v. AFGE, No. 17-2094. The Court has issued a surfeit of Opinions regarding the
various disputes, see, e.g., Hudson v. AFGE, 2019 WL 3533602, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2019);
1 Hudson v. AFGE, 289 F. Supp. 3d 121, 123–25 (D.D.C. 2018), and readers curious for more
background can slake their thirst there. For the sake of brevity, the Court sets forth only the facts
relevant to DOL’s Motion, taking them, as is required at this stage, from the operative
Complaint, which was filed in September 2019.
The only count alleged against Labor is Count VII, which names all four Defendants and
invokes a number of provisions of the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act as well as
the LMRDA Bill of Rights. See Compl. at 52. It alleges that DOL planned “to hold DOL-
supervised nominations for Local 1923 office on September 18, 2019[, . . . and DOL intended] to
allow only those members in good standing to be nominated on September 18, 2019, to run in
the upcoming Local 1923 DOL-supervised election.” Id., ¶ 202. Local 1923’s refusal to include
Hudson on that list denies him the right to be nominated. Id., ¶ 203. He will thus suffer
damages from not being able to participate in that election. Id., ¶ 206. He also seeks assorted
injunctive relief relating to that election and future ones. Id. at 55–57. Labor has now moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a
complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must
grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United
States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms.,
2 Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The pleading rules are “not meant to impose
a great burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court
need not accept as true, then, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an
inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178,
193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). For a plaintiff to
survive a 12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” the facts alleged in the
complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555–56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The standard to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is less forgiving. Under
this part of the Rule, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear his claims. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); U.S.
Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A court also has “an
affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.”
Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For
this reason, “‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in
resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id.
at 13–14 (alteration in original) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987)). Additionally, unlike with a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding
3 whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens, 402 F.3d at 1253;
see also Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 409 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[G]iven
the present posture of this case — a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) on ripeness grounds — the
court may consider materials outside the pleadings.”).
III. Analysis
DOL rightly raises a bevy of flaws in Hudson’s claim against it. To begin, any injunctive
relief that he seeks related to the September 2019 or December 2019 elections is moot since
those have come and gone. “[M]ootness must be assessed at ‘all stages’ of the litigation to
ensure a live controversy remains.” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting
21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v. FCC, 318 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The Court
must thus determine whether “events have so transpired” such that a judicial “decision will
neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting
them in the future.” Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2011). If “intervening
events make it impossible to grant the prevailing party effective relief,” no live controversy
remains. See Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). That is the case here, as the
Court can do nothing now to safeguard Hudson’s chances in past elections.
There is an exception, however: “[E]ven though the specific action that the plaintiff
challenges has ceased, a claim for declaratory relief will not be moot” if “the specific claim fits
the exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Del Monte Fresh
Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This exception “applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
4 same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is thus possible
that Hudson could argue that his efforts to run for office might be stymied again before court
review could take place, yet he never invokes this doctrine. Injunctive relief is thus moot.
Even if he had sought to evade the mootness trap, he would still be out of luck. First,
Hudson cites no authority for the proposition that Labor can compel local unions to classify
individuals as being members in good standing or not. Second, even if it possessed such power,
the LMRDA does not apply to locals such as 1923 that are made up entirely of government
employees, as this Court recently explained. See ECF No. 64 (Mem. Op.) at 4–5. Plaintiff,
accordingly, has no cause of action under that statute against Local 1923 or, by extension, DOL
for any steps related to his membership. Finally, if Hudson is truly seeking money damages
against DOL — a position he never definitively takes — he has not explained how the LMRDA
permits such relief against the Government or how it has waived its sovereign immunity to such
a claim. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”).
IV. Conclusion
The Court will therefore grant Defendant DOL’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order so
stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge
Date: May 14, 2020