Hudnall v. Dudek

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Hudnall v. Dudek. Read the opinion of the Court — 130 F.4th 668
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided March 7, 2025·No. 23-3727·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN S. HUDNALL, No. 23-3727 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:22-cv-02864-DMR v. MEMORANDUM*

LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Donna M. Ryu, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 19, 2024 San Jose, California

Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

John Hudnall appeals the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment

in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security on his claim for disability benefits.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. We address one of

Hudnall’s arguments in a concurrently filed published opinion. We resolve his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. remaining claims here.

We review “the district court’s order affirming the [administrative law judge’s

(“ALJs”)] denial of social security benefits de novo, and we will not overturn the

Commissioner’s decision ‘unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence

or is based upon legal error.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation omitted). In examining medical evidence, the most important factors for

an ALJ to consider are “supportability” and “consistency.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a); see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 791–92.

1. Hudnall challenges the ALJ’s analysis of the medical evidence. First, he

claims that the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinion prepared by his marriage

and family therapist, Jana Klass, and signed by one of his physicians, Dr. Dana

Rosca. The opinion described Hudnall’s symptoms, including “difficulty staying on

task” and his self-description “as despondent.” The opinion concluded that Hudnall

was “unable to maintain work/career due to severe mood [symptoms] that impair

overall functionality.” The ALJ concluded that this opinion was unpersuasive, both

because it suggested that Hudnall’s condition showed “no improvement in five

years” even though he had not sought treatment during that time and because Klass

described Hudnall as a pathological liar in another record. The ALJ also faulted the

opinion for relying on Hudnall’s subjective reports.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. Although Hudnall

2 23-3727 claimed that his disability began on March 1, 2015, the record shows that he sought

little treatment between the initial treatment he received after his mental health

episode, ending in 2016, and when he applied for Social Security benefits in March

2020. The record further shows that Klass stated that Hudnall’s “lying seems to be

pathological and a form of self-preservation” and that much of Klass’s opinion was

based on Hudnall’s own descriptions of his condition. Finally, the record contains

numerous instances in which Hudnall’s symptoms were less severe than those

described in the opinion. So substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to

discount that medical opinion.

Hudnall also challenges the ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of two

doctors who treated him in Japan. The two physicians, Hiroyuki Ide and Yutaka

Minohara, opined that Hudnall suffered from major depressive disorder, struggled

with daily tasks, and could not work. The ALJ found those opinions unpersuasive

because they were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Substantial

evidence supports that conclusion. The two physicians’ assessments, which are not

supported by treatment records, are inconsistent with the treatment notes of

Hudnall’s other medical providers. Further, Hudnall’s own description of his ability

to perform basic tasks contradicts their opinions because, for example, he stated that

he could “help [his] wife and kids with homework and childcare.”

2. Hudnall next asserts that the ALJ erred in finding his testimony inconsistent

3 23-3727 with the medical record. “When a claimant presents objective evidence establishing

an impairment ‘that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which she

complains, an adverse credibility finding must be based on clear and convincing

reasons’” that are supported with “substantial evidence in the record.” Smartt v.

Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497, 500 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ

explained that Hudnall’s statements were inconsistent with the record because he

had a gap in medical treatment and his allegations are not supported by his treating

sources’ mental status examinations. The ALJ discussed Hudnall’s treatment

history, including the fact that he improved after he received treatment following his

hospitalization in 2015 and that he improved again in 2020, when he resumed

treatment. The records showed that Hudnall displayed improving symptoms and

normal mental assessments. The ALJ also noted Hudnall’s record of dishonesty.

See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the

claimant’s subjective testimony.”). Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s

decision to reject Hudnall’s testimony.

3. Lastly, Hudnall contests the ALJ’s conclusion that he could perform the

occupations at “reasoning level 2” even though the ALJ found he “is precluded from

performing complex and detailed tasks but remains capable of performing short,

simple, repetitive tasks in a routine work environment.” Level two reasoning

4 23-3727 requires an individual to be able “to carry out detailed but

uninvolved . . . instructions.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App. C. § III, 1991

WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991). The ALJ’s conclusion is consistent with this level of

reasoning. The ALJ found that Hudnall could not perform “complex and detailed

instructions,” which means that he could perform complex tasks that are not detailed

or detailed tasks that are not complex. This finding does not conflict with following

“detailed but uninvolved . . . instructions” as reasoning level 2 requires. See id. So

we discern no error here.1

AFFIRMED.

1 Hudnall explicitly disclaimed any argument that “short, simple, repetitive tasks” cannot be reconciled with reasoning level 2.

5 23-3727

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