Hudgens ex rel. Hudgens v. Goins

189 S.E.2d 633, 15 N.C. App. 203, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1864
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedJune 28, 1972
DocketNo. 7219DC215
StatusPublished

This text of 189 S.E.2d 633 (Hudgens ex rel. Hudgens v. Goins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hudgens ex rel. Hudgens v. Goins, 189 S.E.2d 633, 15 N.C. App. 203, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

GRAHAM, Judge.

Plaintiff’s only contention on appeal is that the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of defendants’ negligence. Thus the question becomes: Does defendants’ evidence, taken in the light most favorable to them, so clearly establish their negligence as a proximate cause of their injury and damage that no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom? Galloway v. Hartman, 271 N.C. 372, 156 S.E. 2d 727; Bledsoe v. Gaddy, 10 N.C. App. 470, 179 S.E. 2d 167.

Defendants’ evidence would certainly support a finding by the jury that Mrs. Goins turned from a direct line without first seeing that the movement could be made in safety. G.S. 20-154(a). It would not, however, compel such a finding. A reasonable inference could also be drawn that when Mrs. Goins was 100 feet from the intersection she looked and saw plaintiff’s car one or two car lengths behind her; that she signaled her intention to turn as required by statutes; and that plaintiff pulled into the left lane and started to pass only after Mrs. Goins started her turn and moved into the left lane. Under such circumstances, it could not be said, as a matter of law, that in the exercise of reasonable care Mrs. Goins could or should have foreseen the movement of plaintiff’s car before she started turning to the left. “A motorist is not required to ascertain that a turning motion is absolutely free from danger.” Cowan v. Transfer Co. and Carr v. Transfer Co., 262 N.C. 550, 553, 138 S.E. 2d 228, 230. See also McNamara v. Outlaw, 262 N.C. 612, 138 S.E. 2d 287; Odell v. Lipscomb, 12 N.C. App. 318, 183 S.E. 2d 299.

We hold that the question of defendants’ negligence was for the jury.

No error.

Judges Morris and Vaughn concur.

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Related

McNamara v. Outlaw
138 S.E.2d 287 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1964)
Cowan v. Murrows Transfer, Inc.
138 S.E.2d 228 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1964)
Odell v. Lipscomb
183 S.E.2d 299 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1971)
Galloway v. Hartman
156 S.E.2d 727 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1967)
Bledsoe v. Gaddy
179 S.E.2d 167 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
189 S.E.2d 633, 15 N.C. App. 203, 1972 N.C. App. LEXIS 1864, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hudgens-ex-rel-hudgens-v-goins-ncctapp-1972.