Hudeihed v. Ammi

Opinion

No. 826 September 2, 2026 631

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

Ibtihal HUDEIHED, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Azzdine Yahya AMMI, Defendant-Appellant.

Washington County Circuit Court 24CN05018; A187254

D. Charles Bailey, Jr., Judge. Submitted June 12, 2026. Azzdine Yahya Ammi filed the brief pro se. No appearance for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* LAGESEN, C. J. Provision requiring husband to pay all costs associated with maintaining, preparing, and selling the marital property reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.

_____________

* Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b).

632 Hudeihed v. Ammi

LAGESEN, C. J. This is a domestic relations case in which the trial court found husband in contempt for failing to comply with two requirements of a dissolution judgment: (1) the obligation to obtain a life insurance policy; and (2) the obligation to cooperate in the sale of the marital home. Husband appeals, raising nine assignments of error. Wife has not appeared on appeal. For the reasons provided below, we conclude that the trial court erred in the context of this contempt proceeding when it ordered husband to pay all costs associated with maintaining, preparing, and selling the marital property, but we otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

We begin with a brief overview of the facts giving rise to this appeal. After the parties’ marriage was dissolved, wife moved to hold husband in contempt for failing to comply with two provisions of the dissolution judgment. The first provided that husband was to obtain and carry a $100,000 life insurance policy for as long as he was ordered to pay spousal or child support. The second required the sale of the marital home. Under the terms of the dissolution judgment, wife was to receive 60 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the house, and husband was to receive 40 percent. The judgment allocated associated costs the same way, with wife responsible for 60 percent and husband responsible for 40 percent.

The trial court granted the motion, finding husband in contempt and imposing various sanctions. Those sanctions included an order that husband pay “all costs associated with maintaining, preparing, and selling the property—including but not limited to utilities, garbage removal, yard maintenance , debris removal, property taxes, homeowner’s insurance , staging costs, repairs, and any similar expenses”; and, to address husband’s failure to obtain life insurance, “a penalty of $500, beginning on the 1st day of the following month after the non-compliance, and continuing to accrue on the 1st day of each subsequent month thereafter until [husband] complies fully with this provision.” Husband appeals. As noted, he raises nine assignments of error. We address each.

Modification of the dissolution judgment. Husband assigns error to the order that he pay all costs associated

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 631 (2026) 633

with the sale of the home, contending that it constituted an impermissible modification of the dissolution judgment. Whether a trial court had authority to impose a contempt sanction is a matter that we review for legal error. See Lamm and Lamm, 290 Or App 351, 354, 416 P3d 310 (2018) (so reviewing).

ORS 33.105(1) allows a trial court to impose remedial sanctions “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute.” In a dissolution case, a trial court’s authority to modify a dissolution judgment is limited by ORS 107.135. Except as provided in ORS 107.135, a trial court may not modify the property division award in a dissolution judgment. Bidwell v. Baker, 193 Or App 657, 662, 91 P3d 793, rev den, 337 Or 547 (2004). As we have held, that means that a trial court lacks the authority to enter a contempt sanction that effectively alters the property division award of a dissolution judgment. Lamm, 290 Or App at 356 (holding that trial court lacks authority to impose a contempt sanction that is contrary to the property division provisions of a dissolution judgment). Here, by requiring husband to bear all the costs associated with selling the property, the trial court effectively altered the disposition of the marital home set forth in the judgment . Under Lamm, the court lacked the authority to do so. We therefore reverse that portion of the contempt judgment and remand for further proceedings if needed.

Contempt Findings. Husband contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that husband willfully failed to comply with the dissolution judgment and that the trial court therefore erred in finding him in contempt. See State v. Guzman-Vera, 305 Or App 161, 166, 469 P3d 842, rev den, 367 Or 115 (2020) (contempt requires a finding of willful noncompliance); Chang v. Chun, 305 Or App 144, 152, 470 P3d 410 (2020) (same). Husband admits that his argument is unpreserved and asks the court to consider it as plain error. An error is “plain” when it is an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record without having to choose among competing inferences. State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). We have reviewed the record and are not persuaded that it is “plain” that the evidence 634 Hudeihed v. Ammi

is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that husband ’s noncompliance was willful.

Imposition of sanctions. Husband contends that the trial court erred in four ways when it imposed contempt sanctions: (1) by imposing “punitive sanctions” in a remedial contempt case; (2) by dismissing his affirmative defense; (3) by imposing a sanction for the life insurance policy when the dissolution judgment outlined a remedy for failure to comply; and (4) by imposing sanctions that were not originally stated in the oral ruling. Our review is for legal error, Sergeyev v. Vasylenko, 351 Or App 106, 110, ___ P3d ___ (2026), and for the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding, Keller and Holdner, 232 Or App 341, 344, 222 P3d 1111 (2009).

We start with the question whether the $500 per month sanction is, as husband contends, impermissibly punitive. A trial court may impose remedial sanctions under ORS 33.105(1) but it may not impose punitive sanctions in a remedial contempt proceeding. Miller v. Miller, 204 Or App 82, 85, 129 P3d 211 (2006). Husband contends that the sanction imposing “a penalty of $500, beginning on the 1st day of the following month after the non-compliance, and continuing to accrue on the 1st day of each subsequent month thereafter until [husband] complies fully” with the insurance obligation is punitive and not remedial. Husband notes that the court’s use of the word penalty suggests that the requirement, by its terms, is punitive.

Although husband’s reading of the provision is not unreasonable—the word “penalty” does connote punishment —what ultimately determines whether a sanction is punitive or remedial is not the trial court’s word choice but how the fine operates. ORS 33.045(3) states that a fine is:

“(a) Punitive if it is for a past contempt. “(b) Remedial if it is for continuing contempt and the fine accumulates until the defendant complies with the court’s judgment or order or if the fine may be partially or entirely forgiven when the defendant complies with the court’s judgment or order.” By that legal definition, the fine is remedial because it is structured to end upon husband’s compliance. For that

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 631 (2026) 635

reason, the court permissibly imposed the fine within the context of a remedial contempt proceeding.

Husband also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his affirmative defense of inability to pay. The inability to comply with a court order is an affirmative defense for contempt that the asserting party has the burden to prove. See State ex rel Fry v. Fry, 28 Or App 403, 406, 559 P2d 1293 (1977). Husband’s argument on appeal is essentially that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor on his affirmative defense. The trial court’s rejection of husband’s affirmative defense thus is reversible error only if all reasonable factfinders would have found on this record that husband lacked the ability to purchase life insurance. See Ortega v. Martin, 293 Or App 180, 194, 427 P3d 1103 (2018), vac’d on other grounds, 366 Or 760, 468 P3d 945 (2020) (trial court erroneously denies a directed verdict on an affirmative defense only if “all reasonable factfinders would have to find in the [asserting party’s] favor on that defense”). Having reviewed the record, we are persuaded that, on this record, not all reasonable factfinders would have to be convinced that husband lacked the ability to pay for a life insurance policy.

Husband next contends that the court lacked the authority to impose the $500 per month sanction for an additional reason. Husband notes that the dissolution judgment already specified a remedy for noncompliance: the formation of a constructive trust upon his death. Husband argues that the judgment should be construed to make the constructive trust the exclusive remedy. If construed in that way, husband contends, the imposition of the additional $500 per month sanction is an impermissible modification of the dissolution judgment.

Husband’s argument is not persuasive. For one, the terms of the dissolution judgment do not make the constructive trust the exclusive remedy; rather, they appear designed to address the practical problem that would arise if husband died without obtaining the required life insurance policy. Second, although husband cites McIntire v. Lang and Tupper v. Roan for the proposition that the court could not impose a remedy in addition to the constructive trust, 636 Hudeihed v. Ammi

neither case addresses whether a constructive trust must be the sole remedy for a failure to obtain an insurance policy. McIntire, 241 Or App 518, 526, 254 P3d 745 (2011) (constructive trust in a dissolution judgment created a valid property interest for ex-husband); Tupper, 349 Or 211, 229, 243 P3d 50 (2010) (denying summary judgment because there was a genuine dispute as to whether a deceased person’s ex-wife or girlfriend was the beneficiary to a life insurance policy). Further, neither case involved a contempt proceeding and both arose after the obligator had died and the constructive trust remedy was therefore available.

Beyond that, and more significantly, ORS 107.820, which provides statutory authority for a trial court to require a party to obtain a life insurance policy in a dissolution , affirmatively counters husband’s argument. Under ORS 107.820(5), a “default in the payment of premiums by the party obligated by the judgment or order is a contempt of the court.” Because the statute directly states that a failure to make payments constitutes contempt of court, there is no reason to believe that the contempt sanctions and statutory rules governing contempt would not apply when a party fails to obtain a policy at all.

Next, husband contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by issuing provisions in the written judgment that were not stated during the trial court’s oral ruling. To support his legal assertion, husband points to State v. McDonnell, 343 Or 557, 176 P3d 1236 (2007), cert den, 555 US 904 (2008). McDonnell does not support husband’s claim because it is a criminal case (unlike husband’s civil appeal) that has significantly different facts and governing statutes . Husband has not identified any other support for his argument, and we are aware of none. We therefore reject it as grounds for reversal.

Sufficiency of Service. Husband contends that wife’s proposed contempt judgment was not properly served on husband. He contends that that alleged service defect requires reversal. That argument is not preserved in this appeal because it was not presented to the trial court before it entered the contempt judgment. Although husband later moved to set aside the judgment based on the alleged lack

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 631 (2026) 637

of service, the court’s ruling on the motion to set aside is not before us in this appeal. For those reasons, husband’s arguments regarding service provide no basis for reversal.

Attorney Fees. Husband argues that the trial court erred by granting wife leave to file for attorney fees under ORCP 68. Husband asserts that wife failed to properly allege entitlement to attorney fees under ORS 33.105(e). A careful review of the record contradicts husband’s claim and demonstrates that wife did in fact properly allege entitlement to recover attorney fees in connection with the contempt proceeding.

Judicial Bias. Finally, husband contends that the trial court “committed plain error and violated [his] due process rights by demonstrating prejudicial bias and prejudgment of the facts before the defense rested its case.” Even if husband had articulated a legal theory under which this court could reverse, after reviewing the record, we find no support for his claim.

Provision requiring husband to pay all costs associated with maintaining, preparing, and selling the marital property reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.