Huddleston v. Doe

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided December 11, 2023·No. 3:23-cv-01222·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEFFREY D. HUDDLESTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-1222-MAB

JOHN DOE FIELD SERVICE SUPERVISOR and JANE DOE CLINICAL SERVICES SUPERVISOR,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER BEATTY, Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Jeffrey D. Huddleston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Big Muddy Correctional Center. Huddleston alleges that Defendants improperly denied his host sites and held him in prison beyond his release date. This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memoranda of Understanding between this Court and these two entities. relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint In his Complaint, Huddleston makes the following allegations: On March 1, 2013, Huddleston was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Pursuant to the sentencing order, Huddleston was to be released on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) on March 1, 2019 (Doc. 1, p. 6). Although Huddleston does not specify the nature of his conviction, he maintains that it did not require registry on the Illinois Sex Offender Registry (Id.).

Huddleston was housed at Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”) at the time of his scheduled March 1, 2019 MSR date (Id.). Big Muddy’s field services supervisor and clinical services supervisor, however, denied all of Huddleston’s proposed host sites, claiming that the sites did not meet the guidelines for release of sex offenders (Id.). Despite Huddleston’s sentencing order not including sex offender

registry, Huddleston alleges that John Doe field services supervisor and Jane Doe clinical services supervisor improperly precluded Huddleston’s host sites because they believed his conviction and sentence should qualify for registry (Id.). As a result, Huddleston alleges that he was housed in IDOC custody 15 months past his release date, until his release on June 22, 2020 (Id. at p. 7). He alleges that the failure to release him caused him

stress and anxiety. He also alleges that his liberty was improperly restricted. Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the following count: Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe Field Services Supervisor and Jane Doe Clinical Services Supervisor for subjecting Huddleston to cruel and unusual punishment by improperly denying his host sites and prohibiting his release.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.2 At this stage, the Court finds that Huddleston states a claim for improperly being held beyond his release date. See Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (incarcerating a person beyond the term of his sentence without penological justification violates the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment). See also Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, Count 1 shall proceed against John Doe Field Services Supervisor and Jane Doe Clinical Services Supervisor. To help Huddleston identify the unknown defendants, the Court ADDS

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). warden Kimberly Hvarre, in her official capacity, to respond to discovery aimed at identifying the unknown defendants.

Pending Motions As to Huddleston’s motion for counsel (Doc. 3), he fails to demonstrate that he sought counsel on his own. Because Huddleston has not sought to obtain counsel on his own, his motion is DENIED. Should he choose to move for recruitment of counsel at a later date, the Court directs Huddleston to (1) contact at least three attorneys regarding representation in this case prior to filing another motion, (2) include in the motion the

name and addresses of at least three attorneys he has contacted, and (3) if available, attach the letters from the attorneys who declined representation. If he is unable to contact an attorney, he should include a statement explaining why he cannot meet this threshold requirement. Huddleston should also include in his motion a specific statement as to why he believes recruitment of counsel is necessary in his case. Huddleston’s motion for status

(Doc. 19) is DENIED as moot. Disposition For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against John Doe Field Services Supervisor and Jane Doe Clinical Services Supervisor. In order to help identify the unknown defendants, the Court ADDS Kimberly Hvarre, in her official capacity.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant Kimberly Hvarre: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Craig Childress v. Roger Walker, Jr.
787 F.3d 433 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
David Armato v. Randy Grounds
766 F.3d 713 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)