Huckaba v. Johnson

573 P.2d 305, 281 Or. 23
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 3, 1978
Docket1089, SC 25171
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 573 P.2d 305 (Huckaba v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huckaba v. Johnson, 573 P.2d 305, 281 Or. 23 (Or. 1978).

Opinion

*25 RICHARDSON, J., Pro Tempore.

This is a suit for declaratory judgment brought before the Oregon Tax Court pursuant to ORS chapter 28. The suit challenges the constitutionality of ORS 316.067 (3) of the Personal Income Tax Act. ORS 316.067 (1) (c) allows a deduction from taxable income of payments received under a retirement system established by the United States; including military retirement systems. The challenged statute, ORS 316.067 (3), denies this exclusion in the case of a military retiree until age 65. The question presented to the court for determination is whether the exclusion from taxable income provided in ORS 316.067 (1) (c) of funds received from a retirement system established by the United States may be denied in the case of military retirees until age 65 without violating the equal protection and uniformity requirements of the state and federal constitutions. The tax court held the statute was constitutional and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The facts are relatively simple and were presented to the tax court by stipulation. Taxpayer retired after 20 years of service in the Armed Forces. He is presently under 65 years of age and receives a military pension. In addition he has earned income in excess of $2,400 per year. Under ORS 316.067 (3) he is denied exclusion from taxable income of retirement benefits until he reaches age 65. The exclusion after 65 is offset dollar for dollar against other earned income.

In Dutton Lbr. Corp. v. Tax Com., 228 Or 525, 365 P2d 867 (1961), we set forth the applicable principles:

"The equal protection of the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from resorting to classifications for the purposes of legislation and they have a wide range of discretion in that regard (Safeway Stores v. Portland, 149 Or 581, 595, 42 P2d 162; Wittenberg v. Mutton, 203 Or 438, 446, 280 P2d 359) if the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary and rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and *26 substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that persons similarly situated shall be treated alike. This latitude is notably wide in classifications for purposes of taxation. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 US 412, 64 L ed 989, 990, 40 S Ct 560. * * *” 228 Or at 539.

What is required in assessing a constitutional challenge to classification for tax benefit is a review of the grounds for the classification to determine if it rests upon a rational basis. The legislature may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 57 S Ct 868, 81 L Ed 1245, 109 ALR 1327 (1937); Smith et al v. Columbia County et al, 216 Or 662, 341 P2d 540 (1959). It, however, is not sufficient to merely point out differences between the groups of taxpayers for divergent treatment. The differences justifying the attempted classification must bear a reasonable relationship to the legislative purpose. The legislative power to create a classification implies the authority to subclassify persons included in the general class if there is a rational basis for making this further distinction. Smith et al v. Columbia County et al, supra; State v. Kozer, 116 Or 581, 242 P 621 (1926).

ORS 316.067 provides in pertinent part:

"(1) There shall be subtracted from federal taxable income:
* * * *
"(c) Amounts received in the taxable year in compensation for personal services rendered in prior years, from a pension, annuity, retirement or similar fund under a public retirement system established by the United States, including the retirement system for the performance of service in the Armed Forces of the United States * * *. In the case of a public retirement system established by the United States, including the retirement system for the performance of service in the Armed Forces of the United States, the maximum amount *27 excludable from taxable income from such pensions or annuities shall be in the amount of $2,40Q.” 1
sfc
"(3) In the case of amounts received from the retirement system for performance of service in the Armed Forces of the United States as described in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section the $2,400 exclusion shall be granted only to retirees age 65 or older and such exclusion is further reduced dollar for dollar to the extent of any earned income received during the taxable year. * * *”

The statutory language quoted above is the result of amendment to the Income Tax Act in 1971. As it read in 1971 prior to amendment, ORS 316.067 (1) (c) allowed subtraction from taxable income of amounts received from a United States retirement system but specifically excluded military retirement income from the tax benefit regardless of the age of the retiree. Consequently, the taxpayer would not have been entitled to an exclusion even after reaching age 65.

The 1971 amendment which created the taxpayer’s constitutional challenge began with the introduction of House Bill 1283 which, in its original form, would have amended ORS 316.067 (1) to subtract from federal taxable income

******
"(f) [t]he first $2,400 of any payments received as pension or retirement pay received for the performance of active service in the Armed Forces of the United States.”

The language of ORS 316.067 (1) (c) and (3) quoted above in the body of this opinion and as it read at the *28 commencement of this proceeding was adopted as an amendment to House Bill 1283 in the Senate Committee on Taxation. The committee’s deliberations provide some insight into the motives for the amendment. A senator, proposing adoption of the amendment said:

"* * * Now this amendment makes sense.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.
374 Or. 58 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2025)
Dept. of Rev. v. Wakefield
25 Or. Tax 1 (Oregon Tax Court, 2022)
Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego
446 P.3d 1 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2019)
Boly v. Dept. of Rev.
Oregon Tax Court, 2015
Haynie v. Dept. of Rev.
19 Or. Tax 488 (Oregon Tax Court, 2008)
Knapp v. City of Jacksonville
151 P.3d 143 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2007)
Gall v. Department of Revenue
19 Or. Tax 188 (Oregon Tax Court, 2006)
Knapp I v. City of Jacksonville
18 Or. Tax 22 (Oregon Tax Court, 2004)
Fisher v. Department of Revenue
16 Or. Tax 323 (Oregon Tax Court, 2001)
Lee v. Department of Revenue
16 Or. Tax 215 (Oregon Tax Court, 2000)
Irwin v. Oregon Department of Revenue
15 Or. Tax 24 (Oregon Tax Court, 1999)
Savage v. Munn
856 P.2d 298 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1993)
Simpson v. Department of Revenue
12 Or. Tax 455 (Oregon Tax Court, 1993)
City of Eugene v. Miller
851 P.2d 1142 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
Pendell v. Department of Revenue
847 P.2d 846 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
573 P.2d 305, 281 Or. 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huckaba-v-johnson-or-1978.