IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-09-00274-CV
HUBERT WARREN, Appellant v.
MCLENNAN COUNTY JUDICIARY, REX D. DAVIS, BILL VANCE, TOM GRAY, ET AL., Appellees
From the 414th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2009-1280-5
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Hubert Warren filed suit against several public officials connected with his
prosecution and conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant.1 Following a
hearing, the trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction premised on judicial immunity.
Warren contends in his sole point that the court abused its discretion by granting the
1 Warren named as defendants the former and current district attorneys of Ellis County, the Ellis County district judge who presided over his trial, the justices of this Court who participated in the opinion affirming his conviction, the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and an assistant attorney general. plea to the jurisdiction because he established at the hearing that the defendants “acted
in clear absence of all jurisdiction” with regard to his trial and appeal. We will affirm.
Background
In an opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Rex D. Davis,2 this Court affirmed
Warren’s conviction. See Warren v. State, 98 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet.
ref’d). In the current lawsuit, Warren alleges several theories of liability all premised on
his assertion that he suffered injuries “due to the defendants negligent use of the State
indictment.”3 His underlying complaint is that the prosecuting attorney improperly
amended the indictment on the eve of trial to correct the enhancement allegations by
identifying the specific prior convictions that would be used for enhancement purposes.
Chief Justice Tom Gray, Justice Rex D. Davis, and former justice Bill Vance
responded to the suit by filing an answer and a plea to the jurisdiction premised on
judicial immunity.4 After a hearing, the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction.
2 Davis resigned as chief justice in August 2003 and returned to private practice. He was subsequently elected as a justice of the Court and took office in January 2009.
3 This allegation appears to be an effort on Warren’s part to allege a waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act for personal injury proximately caused by use of tangible personal property. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 2005). However, the Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for “a claim based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this state acting in his official capacity.” Id. § 101.053(a) (Vernon 2005).
4 These are the only defendants who appeared. The other defendants were not served, and their failure to appear raises the question of whether the judgment is final and appealable. The judgment will be considered final and appealable if nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff expected to obtain service on the other defendants. See Sondock v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 231 S.W.3d 65, 67 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962)). Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Warren expected to obtain service on the remaining defendants. See Nabelek v. City of Houston, No. 01-06-01097-CV, 2008 WL 5003737, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, the judgment is final and appealable.
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 2 Plea to the Jurisdiction
Warren contends in his sole point that the court abused its discretion by granting
the plea to the jurisdiction because he established at the hearing that the defendants
“acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction” with regard to his trial and appeal. Appellees
respond that they have absolute judicial immunity.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the
plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to
hear the cause. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to
his intent. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009).
“A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v.
Tarrant County, 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 624, 175 L.
Ed. 2d 478 (2009); accord In re Lincoln, 114 S.W.3d 724, 727 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003,
orig. proceeding) (per curiam). This immunity applies to judges acting in their official
capacity for judicial acts performed within the scope of their jurisdiction. Twilligear v.
Carrell, 148 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); see
Davis, 565 F.3d at 221-22.
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject
to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872)); see Twilligear, 148
S.W.3d at 504. Thus, Appellees have absolute judicial immunity unless the conduct for
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 3 which Warren seeks to hold them liable was: “(1) nonjudicial, i.e., not taken in the
judge’s official capacity; or (2) taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Twilligear, 148 S.W.3d at 504 (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288,
116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curiam)).
Warren contends that Appellees “acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction” in
deciding his appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See It’s the Berrys, LLC v.
Edom Corner, LLC, 271 S.W.3d 765, 772 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (“When a
trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment, the proper procedure
on appeal is for the appellate court to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause.”)
(citing Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Dallas
County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1994, writ denied)). He argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it
proceeded to trial on an indictment which had been improperly amended.
“Where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient
jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Ballard v. Wall,
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-09-00274-CV
HUBERT WARREN, Appellant v.
MCLENNAN COUNTY JUDICIARY, REX D. DAVIS, BILL VANCE, TOM GRAY, ET AL., Appellees
From the 414th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2009-1280-5
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Hubert Warren filed suit against several public officials connected with his
prosecution and conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant.1 Following a
hearing, the trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction premised on judicial immunity.
Warren contends in his sole point that the court abused its discretion by granting the
1 Warren named as defendants the former and current district attorneys of Ellis County, the Ellis County district judge who presided over his trial, the justices of this Court who participated in the opinion affirming his conviction, the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and an assistant attorney general. plea to the jurisdiction because he established at the hearing that the defendants “acted
in clear absence of all jurisdiction” with regard to his trial and appeal. We will affirm.
Background
In an opinion authored by then-Chief Justice Rex D. Davis,2 this Court affirmed
Warren’s conviction. See Warren v. State, 98 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet.
ref’d). In the current lawsuit, Warren alleges several theories of liability all premised on
his assertion that he suffered injuries “due to the defendants negligent use of the State
indictment.”3 His underlying complaint is that the prosecuting attorney improperly
amended the indictment on the eve of trial to correct the enhancement allegations by
identifying the specific prior convictions that would be used for enhancement purposes.
Chief Justice Tom Gray, Justice Rex D. Davis, and former justice Bill Vance
responded to the suit by filing an answer and a plea to the jurisdiction premised on
judicial immunity.4 After a hearing, the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction.
2 Davis resigned as chief justice in August 2003 and returned to private practice. He was subsequently elected as a justice of the Court and took office in January 2009.
3 This allegation appears to be an effort on Warren’s part to allege a waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act for personal injury proximately caused by use of tangible personal property. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 2005). However, the Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for “a claim based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this state acting in his official capacity.” Id. § 101.053(a) (Vernon 2005).
4 These are the only defendants who appeared. The other defendants were not served, and their failure to appear raises the question of whether the judgment is final and appealable. The judgment will be considered final and appealable if nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff expected to obtain service on the other defendants. See Sondock v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 231 S.W.3d 65, 67 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962)). Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Warren expected to obtain service on the remaining defendants. See Nabelek v. City of Houston, No. 01-06-01097-CV, 2008 WL 5003737, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, the judgment is final and appealable.
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 2 Plea to the Jurisdiction
Warren contends in his sole point that the court abused its discretion by granting
the plea to the jurisdiction because he established at the hearing that the defendants
“acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction” with regard to his trial and appeal. Appellees
respond that they have absolute judicial immunity.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the
plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to
hear the cause. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to
his intent. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009).
“A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v.
Tarrant County, 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 624, 175 L.
Ed. 2d 478 (2009); accord In re Lincoln, 114 S.W.3d 724, 727 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003,
orig. proceeding) (per curiam). This immunity applies to judges acting in their official
capacity for judicial acts performed within the scope of their jurisdiction. Twilligear v.
Carrell, 148 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); see
Davis, 565 F.3d at 221-22.
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject
to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872)); see Twilligear, 148
S.W.3d at 504. Thus, Appellees have absolute judicial immunity unless the conduct for
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 3 which Warren seeks to hold them liable was: “(1) nonjudicial, i.e., not taken in the
judge’s official capacity; or (2) taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Twilligear, 148 S.W.3d at 504 (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288,
116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curiam)).
Warren contends that Appellees “acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction” in
deciding his appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See It’s the Berrys, LLC v.
Edom Corner, LLC, 271 S.W.3d 765, 772 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (“When a
trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment, the proper procedure
on appeal is for the appellate court to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause.”)
(citing Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Dallas
County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1994, writ denied)). He argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it
proceeded to trial on an indictment which had been improperly amended.
“Where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient
jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993)); Bradt v. West, 892
S.W.2d 56, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). If the district judge
“merely acted in excess of [his] authority,” he is still protected by judicial immunity.
Ballard, 413 F.3d at 517 (quoting Malina, 994 F.2d at 1125).
“The presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court
with jurisdiction of the cause.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b). “[A] written instrument is an
indictment or information under the Constitution if it accuses someone of a crime with
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 4 enough clarity and specificity to identify the penal statute under which the State intends
to prosecute, even if the instrument is otherwise defective.” Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d
172, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)). In addition, “the indictment, despite whatever substantive defects it
contains, must be capable of being construed as intending to charge a felony.” Id.
Here, Warren’s indictment alleged that he committed the offense of aggravated
assault of a public servant. See Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, sec.
22.02(b)(2), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3619-20 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2009)). Regardless of the propriety of
the enhancement allegations in the indictment, this was (and remains) a first degree
felony offense. Id. Warren does not contend that the allegations regarding the primary
charge of aggravated assault were insufficient to have vested the district court with
jurisdiction. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 181.
Even if the district court had improperly permitted the State to proceed to trial
on the amended indictment (which we do not hold), the amended enhancement
allegations affected only Warren’s punishment. If successfully challenged on appeal,
Warren would have obtained only a new punishment hearing, and his conviction
would have remained intact.5 See, e.g., Throneberry v. State, 109 S.W.3d 52, 59-61 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Any defect in the enhancement allegations or any
5 But Warren’s success on such an issue is highly doubtful because he pleaded “true” to the enhancement allegations of the amended indictment. See Villescas v. State, 189 S.W.3d 290, 294-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (notice of enhancement allegation at beginning of punishment phase is constitutionally adequate if defendant stipulates to allegation); Fugate v. State, 200 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (Dauphinot, J., concurring) (“Stipulating to the conviction named in an enhancement allegation or pleading true thereto demonstrates that there is no harm from late notice”).
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 5 impropriety in the State’s amendment thereof, did not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction to try Warren for aggravated assault of a public servant.
The indictment vested the district court with jurisdiction to try Warren for
aggravated assault of a public servant. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b); Teal, 230 S.W.3d
at 176. Any improprieties in the State’s amendment of the enhancement allegations of
the indictment did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. And because the district court
had subject matter jurisdiction, so too did the court of appeals. Cf. It’s the Berrys, 271
S.W.3d at 772. Therefore, Appellees have judicial immunity. See Ballard, 413 F.3d at
517; Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 68.
We overrule Warren’s sole point and affirm the judgment.
FELIPE REYNA Justice Before Justice Reyna, Judge Willis,6 and Judge Stanton7 Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed July 14, 2010 [CV06]
6 The Honorable Jill R. Willis, Judge of the 429th District Court of Collin County, sitting by appointment of the Governor of Texas pursuant to article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
7 The Honorable James M. Stanton, Judge of the 134th District Court of Dallas County, sitting by appointment of the Governor of Texas pursuant to article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
Warren v. McLennan County Judiciary Page 6