Hubert-Toussaint v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corp

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 2, 2020
• Docket: 448, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NATHALIE HUBERT- § TOUSSAINT, § Defendant Below, § No. 448, 2019 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. K19L-03-014 ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE § SERVICING CORPORATION, § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: March 27, 2020 Decided: April 2, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the notice to show cause and the responses, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) The defendant below-appellant, Nathalie Hubert-Toussaint, filed this

notice of appeal from a Superior Court order, dated September 26, 2019, dismissing

her counterclaims to a scire facias sur mortgage complaint filed by the plaintiff

below-appellee, RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation. The Superior Court

docket reflects that RoundPoint filed a motion for summary judgment that is

currently pending. (2) The Clerk issued a notice directing Hubert-Toussaint to show cause

why her appeal should not be dismissed for her failure to comply with Supreme

Court 42 in taking an appeal from an interlocutory order. In her response to the

notice to show cause, Hubert-Toussaint argues that the September 26, 2019 Order is

appealable under the collateral order doctrine or Rule 42. RoundPoint disagrees,

and argues that the appeal should be dismissed.

(3) “An order is deemed final when the trial court has declared its intention

that the order is the court’s final act in a case.”1 It is plain from the text of the

September 26, 2019 Order and a review of the docket that the Superior Court did not

intend the September 26, 2019 Order to be its final act in the case. As previously

noted, a motion for summary judgment is currently pending in the Superior Court.

(4) Contrary to Hubert-Touissant’s contentions, the September 26, 2019

Order is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order

doctrine “only applies to ‘that small class [of decisions] which finally determine

claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too

important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that

appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’”2 The

Superior Court’s dismissal of Hubert-Toussaint’s counterclaims, which were based

1 Pollard v. The Placers, Inc., 692 A.2d 879, 880 (Del. Mar. 21, 1997). 2 Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, 652 A.2d 574, 576 (Del.1995) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan, 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 2 on her sending of a so-called “equitable remittance coupon” for $450,000 to

RoundPoint, does not finally determine rights separable from the mortgage

complaint and does not have a substantial, continuing effect on important rights.

(5) Finally, absent compliance with Supreme Court Rule 42, this Court’s

appellate jurisdiction is limited to the review of final orders.3 Hubert-Toussaint did

not file an application for certification in the Superior Court within ten days of the

September 26, 2019 Order as required by Rule 42(c)(i). Hubert-Toussaint’s failure

to comply with Supreme Court Rule 42 leaves this Court without jurisdiction to hear

this interlocutory appeal.4

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rules 29(b)

and 42, that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

3 Julian v. State, 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982). 4 See, e.g., McLeod v. McLeod, 2014 WL 2568545 (Del. June 5, 2014), at *1 (dismissing appeal of interlocutory order where the appellant failed to file a timely application for certification in the trial court).