Hubbard v. County of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-4038
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRYAN HUBBARD, individually and on No. 24-4038 behalf of all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-03541-PA-RAO Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; ANTHONY C. MARRONE, Chief of Los Angeles County Fire Department; DOES, 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 18, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: BERZON, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs in this collective action (“Hubbard”) appeal the district court’s order

granting summary judgment for Defendants (“the County”) on the basis that

Hubbard’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim was untimely. We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 1. The district court correctly held that the applicable statute of limitations is

two years, not three. The statute of limitations for an FLSA claim is two years, unless

the violation was “willful,” in which case the limitations period is extended to three

years. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Hubbard has not shown that there is a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether the County’s alleged FLSA violation was willful.

A violation is willful if “the employer either knew or showed reckless

disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.”

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). “[M]erely negligent”

conduct does not suggest a willful violation. Id. “[W]e will not presume that conduct

was willful in the absence of evidence.” Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 909 (9th

Cir. 2003).

Hubbard asserts that “the County engaged in ‘willful’ failure to pay

[Hubbard’s] wages as it unilaterally changed the pay structure . . . in direct violation

of the collective bargaining agreement.” But the relevant question is not whether the

County unilaterally adopted a certain pay scheme or whether that pay structure

violated the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Rather, Hubbard must

identify evidence suggesting that the County knew or showed reckless disregard for

the possibility that that pay scheme violated the FLSA. He has not done so. The

CBA’s prohibition on unilaterally modifying pay and the FLSA’s overtime

conditions are distinct requirements. Hubbard provides no reason why a violation of

2 the CBA constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA.

2. Hubbard contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled.

“Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by

wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances

beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Stoll v.

Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).

Hubbard relies on the first equitable tolling ground. He maintains that the

County wrongfully withheld information about a meeting between County officials

and Hubbard’s union that resulted in an “implied understanding” that the recruits

would not be paid for the time spent in the hotel outside of training. Even assuming

that the County wrongfully withheld information about the meeting, Hubbard

provides no explanation as to how that conduct prevented him from filing a claim

on time. Hubbard suggests that the meeting is relevant to whether the County

violated the CBA and therefore relates to willfulness. But, as explained above, the

alleged CBA violation has no connection to willfulness, and so had no bearing on

Hubbard’s ability to bring his FLSA claim on time. Equitable tolling is therefore not

warranted.

3. Because this action commenced more than two years after the last day a

cause of action could have accrued for any of the plaintiffs, their FLSA claims are

time-barred. The County’s pending motion to supplement the record, Dkt. 29, is

3 denied as moot.

4. We do not reach Hubbard’s argument for equitable tolling after the

complaint was filed based on Guy v. Absopure Water Co., LLC, 703 F. Supp. 3d 813,

819-21 (E.D. Mich. 2023), and Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68

F.4th 1003, 1012 (6th Cir. 2023) (Bush, J., concurring). Even if the limitations period

was tolled when the complaint was filed, the action would still be untimely, as the

complaint was filed more than two years after the last day a cause of action could

have accrued for any of the plaintiffs. We also do not address Hubbard’s argument

that the district court improperly reached the merits, as the district court’s grant of

summary judgment is independently supported by its correct determination that his

FLSA claim is time-barred.

AFFIRMED.