Hubbard Subdivision

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedAugust 26, 2008
Docket207-08-06 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Hubbard Subdivision (Hubbard Subdivision) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hubbard Subdivision, (Vt. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} In re: Hubbard Subdivision } Docket No. 207-8-06 Vtec (Appeal of Cook, et al.) } }

Decision and Order

Appellants Constance Cook and her brother and sister-in-law Edward Dumas and

Rosita Dumas appealed from a decision of the Planning Commission of the Town of

Rutland, approving a final plat for a two-lot subdivision proposed by Appellee-Applicants

Tracy and Nancy Hubbard. Appellants are represented by Kevin Candon, Esq.; Appellee-

Applicants are represented by Matthew Branchaud, Esq.

Questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Statement of Questions were dismissed in pretrial

rulings, and the trial proceeded on Questions 3 and 6. Question 3 asks whether the Court

should deny subdivision approval under § 185-5 of the Subdivision Regulations

(specifically Subsection D) on the basis that the keeping of deer on the property “adversely

affects the wells and drinking water of Appellants.” Question 6 asks whether the Court

should deny subdivision approval on that basis that the subdivision proposal “does not

take into account protection for the wells and water supply for Appellant[s’] homes.”

As the Court noted in its earlier motion decisions, this Court does not have

jurisdiction over litigation of any property law or nuisance claims as among the parties

regarding their wells or water supply, including any filed under the groundwater private

right of action under 10 V.S.A. § 1410, so that all that is before the Court as to Questions 3

and 6 is whether the proposed subdivision meets the standards in the Subdivision

Regulations with respect to the protection of shallow wells serving neighboring property

from being affected by drainage from Applicants’ property.

1 An evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before Merideth Wright,

Environmental Judge. A site visit was taken on a date prior to trial with the parties and

their representatives. The parties were given the opportunity to submit written

memoranda and requests for findings but chose instead to submit oral argument by

telephone shortly after trial. Upon consideration of the evidence as illustrated by the site

visit, and of the oral argument presented by the parties, the Court finds and concludes as

follows.

The undisputed facts as to the orientation of the parties= respective parcels was

established in the first summary judgment decision and will not be repeated here except as

necessary to establish the relative locations of the parties= properties.

All of the parties own land in the Town of Rutland accessed from Perkins Road.

Appellee-Applicants own a 13.1-acre parcel of land containing their house, which they

purchased in 2000 from Jeffery and Kimberly (daughter of Appellants Dumas) Elnicki.

Appellant Cook=s property adjoins the Hubbard property to the west. The property of

Edward II and Shelley A. Dumas (son and daughter-in-law of Appellants Dumas, not

involved in this litigation) adjoins the Hubbard property to the southeast. Other property

of the Hubbard family, owned by a family trust and occupied by Appellee-Applicant Tracy

Hubbard=s father (not involved in this litigation) adjoins the Hubbard property to the

southwest. The property of Appellants Dumas adjoins the Hubbard property to the north

and east. Access to Perkins Road from Appellant Cook=s property is via a separate private

road not at issue in this litigation.

Access to Perkins Road for the remainder of the litigants is via a private road now

known as Dailey Place, which runs from Perkins Road across other property owned by

Appellants Dumas and across land now or formerly of the Rutland Fire Clay Company,

and serves lands south of and uphill from that property. There appear to be three

2 residences now using the Dailey Place easement: the then-“present-residence” of

Appellants Dumas referred to in the deed, that of the Hubbards, and that of Edward II and

Shelley A. Dumas, to the south and uphill of the Hubbard Lot. Adjoining Appellee-

Applicants’ property uphill and to the south are other lands of the Hubbard family, owned

by a trust and occupied by Appellee-Applicant Tracy Hubbard=s father.

The land at issue in the present case is located essentially on the side of a mountain.

The Hubbard property slopes steeply down from the south towards the north, and also

slopes somewhat from the east towards the west at the northerly end of the property. The

topography of the property is not depicted on the subdivision plan.

The private roadway serving the Hubbard property and continuing uphill to

properties to the south is a steep gravel roadway with soils susceptible to erosion. The

Hubbard house is located in the southeast (uphill) corner of the property, easterly of the

roadway. The Hubbard house, its driveway, its septic system, primary leach field, and

replacement leach field are depicted on the subdivision plan. A ”couple of sheds” referred

to in testimony as being located on the Hubbard house property are not shown on the

subdivision plan. The garage serving the Hubbard house is not depicted on the

subdivision plan. The topography of alterations to the roadway as it extends southerly and

uphill of the Hubbard house is not shown on the subdivision plan. An additional

earthwork or excavated roadway constructed above the Hubbard house is not shown on

the subdivision plan. Some runoff has increased due to the construction of this roadway.

A separate earth and stone ramp constructed above the Hubbard house by the Dumas for

access to the upper Dumas property has changed the drainage patterns on the upper

portion of the Hubbard property and caused Applicants to install an additional culvert to

divert water from their driveway and house. Neither the ramp nor any upper culverts are

shown on the subdivision plan, nor is the location of an existing spring behind the Hubbard

house shown on the subdivision plan. Additional natural springs are located on Dumas

3 land above the Hubbard land.

The Hubbard property is wooded easterly of the roadway, and also near the

westerly boundary of the property, and otherwise consists of meadows or pasture. The

edges of the wooded areas are not shown on the subdivision plan. A barn is located on the

property westerly of the roadway and is not shown on the subdivision plan.

A swampy area exists on neighboring property to the north (downhill) of the

easterly side of the Hubbard property. A small watercourse extends along the

northwesterly boundary of the Hubbard property and onto the neighboring property to the

north of the westerly side of the Hubbard property; it is not shown on the subdivision plan

A portion of the property easterly of the roadway is fenced and houses New

Zealand Red Deer. A feeding station is located on the easterly side of the roadway, uphill

and across the roadway from the shallow wells.

Other areas accessible to livestock are located to the north of the barn, very near and

uphill of the shallow well serving the Dumas property. Appellee-Applicants also keep

deer, horses, chickens, ducks, geese, and dogs on the westerly side of the roadway; portions

of the areas on the westerly side of the roadway are also fenced to enclose animals.

Appellee-Applicants propose to subdivide their 13.1 acre property into two lots,

shown on the subdivision plat as Lots 2A and 2B. Lot 2A is a 9.7-acre parcel containing at

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

§ 1410
Vermont § 1410
§ 8504
Vermont § 8504(h)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Hubbard Subdivision, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hubbard-subdivision-vtsuperct-2008.