Hubbard Manning v. United States
This text of 371 F.2d 353 (Hubbard Manning v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellant, on strong evidence, was convicted of housebreaking in violation of D.C.Code § 22-1801. He asserts error in the instructions, urging that under Levine v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 261 F.2d 747, a special instruction on his theory of the case was required. The factual situation is sufficiently different to remove the case from any controlling effect of Levine. As to other aspects of the instructions, defense counsel, in response to inquiry by the court, expressed satisfaction with those given, in view of which, considering the case over-all, appellant may not require us to exercise the discretion available under Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.
As to the long delay in the availábility to counsel of the trial transcript in preparing the appeal our affirmance cannot be attributed to this delay; and we are not called upon to consider, were we to reverse for a new trial, the effect *354 of such delay on the right to a speedy trial.
We have considered other assigned errors and also find there no cause for reversal.
Affirmed.
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371 F.2d 353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hubbard-manning-v-united-states-cadc-1967.