[Cite as HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Bonner, 2025-Ohio-2228.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114612 v. :
RAY BONNER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 26, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No. CVG-24-03701
Appearances:
Reisenfeld & Associates, LLC, and William Purtell, for appellee.
Ray Bonner, pro se.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Pro se defendant-appellant Ray Bonner (“Bonner”) appeals the trial
court’s judgment in this forcible entry and detainer action and the grant of a writ of
restitution of the premises in favor of owner/plaintiff-appellee HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC”) issued by the Bedford Municipal Court. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. Background and Facts
In 2015, mortgagee HSBC initiated a foreclosure action against
mortgagor Anderson Banks (“Banks”) in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas for defaulting on a modified mortgage loan for residential property governed
by a Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) agreement. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. v. Banks, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-15-856169, filed December 12, 2015
(“HSBC I”). The other named defendants were Banks’s unknown spouse, if any, and
CIT Bank.
On January 31, 2017, the trial court issued a final decree of foreclosure
that was not appealed. The confirmation of sale decree was issued on February 1,
2022, and the case was timely appealed to this court in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.
Banks, 2022-Ohio-3044 (8th Dist.) (“HSBC II”).1
In HSBC II, Banks contended that
(1) despite him providing a “complete loss mitigation request via email on September 15, 2021,” the trial court granted appellee’s motion for default judgment “without a notice, warning or hearing”; (2) appellee failed to abide by the regulations set forth in 12 C.F.R. 1024.41 [governing loss mitigation procedures]; (3) appellee was barred under the doctrine of promissory estoppel from executing the sheriff’s sale and confirming same; (4) appellee had unclean hands in this case; (5) appellant “was not given proper and reasonable opportunity to object to the appraisal”; and (6) the appraisal was not conducted according to law.
1 A portion of the facts has been extracted from HSBC II for purposes of judicial
economy. Id. at ¶ 6.
This court stated Banks’s failure to appeal from the foreclosure
judgment waived issues relative to the foreclosure decree but afforded brief
consideration to the claims. The errors were found to be without merit, and the trial
court’s judgment was affirmed.
In the instant forcible detainer action, on April 5, 2024, HSBC served
Bonner with a 90-day notice to leave premises pursuant to R.C. 1923.04 due to
expiration of tenancy as of August 9, 2024. On August 26, 2024, HSBC filed for
possession of the property against Bonner as a holdover tenant of prior owner
Anderson Banks (“Banks”) in the Bedford Municipal Court.
Bonner contended, and maintains on appeal, that he is the assignee
of a confidential settlement agreement between former owner Banks and HSBC to
purchase the Property from HSBC for $280,000 but that HSBC breached the
agreement by adding terms after the agreement was final. A review of the agreement
reveals references to the HSBC I foreclosure case and the appeal after confirmation
of the sale in HSBC II. The stated sum was due to be paid on or before 3:00 p.m.
on July 15, 2022. Upon payment, the appeal in HSBC II would be dismissed without
prejudice and the parties would seek to dismiss the judgment of foreclosure and
confirmation of sale.
The agreement contains a signature line for “Borrower: Anderson
Banks,” a line for the date, and a signature line for approval by counsel for the borrower. The next page contains similar information for HSBC and its counsel.
None of the items are executed by the parties.
Following the signature pages are two pages entitled “Assignment of
Contract” that contain a printed effective date of May 26, 2022, by and between
Banks as assignor and Bonner as assignee. The signature lines were purportedly
signed by Banks and Bonner, and each is accompanied by the printed date of
“May 26, 2022.” The font and margins of the assignment pages differ from those of
the settlement agreement and lack the footer that appears on the settlement
agreement pages that list the document title and page numbers: “Page 1 of 9”
through “Page 9 of 9.”
The trial court granted possession of the property to HSBC.
This cause came on for hearing on September 27, 2024, before the Judge, upon the complaint and evidence, the defendant(s) being in default of an answer or other pleadings, although duly served with process and advised of trial date according to law and appearing in Court to defend the claim. The Judge, being fully advised in the premises, finds that the plaintiff(s) is entitled to immediate possession of the premises described in the complaint.
Bedford Mun. Ct., Journal Entry (Sept. 27, 2024), Journal Book/ p. 656-470.
Bonner appeals. The trial court initially denied Bonner’s motion to
stay execution of the writ of restitution pending appeal, but on November 5, 2024,
Bonner was granted a stay upon posting a bond with the trial court. II. Assignments of Error
Bonner initially assigned two errors on appeal; however, the second
assignment of error regarding the trial court’s failure to grant a stay pending appeal
is now moot. The sole remaining error is:
The trial court erred in granting an eviction judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee despite defendant-appellant’s valid contract claim, demonstrating a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
R.C. Chapter 1923 governs forcible entry and detainer actions. A
forcible entry and detainer action “is a civil remedy provided by statute and intended
to affect only the question of the present right to possess real property.” Cuyahoga
Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 67 Ohio St.2d 129, 131, (1981). “‘The purpose of the
forcible entry and detainer statutes is to provide a summary, extraordinary, and
speedy method for the recovery of possession of real estate in the cases especially
enumerated by statute.’” Id., quoting 24 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 455, Forcible Entry
and Detainer, Section 2.
The trial court held a hearing on the right to possession of the
property. ‘“[O]n appeal from a bench trial[,] we review the trial court’s factual
findings under the manifest weight standard of review, while the trial court’s legal
findings are reviewed de novo.”’ Sood v. Rivers, 2024-Ohio-3064, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.),
quoting Ultimate Salon & Spa, Inc. v. Legends Constr. Grp., 2019-Ohio-2506, ¶ 30
(11th Dist.). ‘“Accordingly, following a bench trial, a reviewing court will generally uphold a trial court’s judgment as long as the manifest weight of the evidence
supports it — that is, as long as ‘‘some’’ competent and credible evidence supports
it.”’ Patel v. Strategic Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-4990, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting
MRI Software, L.L.C. v. W. Oaks Mall FL, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-2190, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.),
citing Hamilton v.
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[Cite as HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Bonner, 2025-Ohio-2228.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114612 v. :
RAY BONNER, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 26, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No. CVG-24-03701
Appearances:
Reisenfeld & Associates, LLC, and William Purtell, for appellee.
Ray Bonner, pro se.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Pro se defendant-appellant Ray Bonner (“Bonner”) appeals the trial
court’s judgment in this forcible entry and detainer action and the grant of a writ of
restitution of the premises in favor of owner/plaintiff-appellee HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC”) issued by the Bedford Municipal Court. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. Background and Facts
In 2015, mortgagee HSBC initiated a foreclosure action against
mortgagor Anderson Banks (“Banks”) in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas for defaulting on a modified mortgage loan for residential property governed
by a Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) agreement. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. v. Banks, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-15-856169, filed December 12, 2015
(“HSBC I”). The other named defendants were Banks’s unknown spouse, if any, and
CIT Bank.
On January 31, 2017, the trial court issued a final decree of foreclosure
that was not appealed. The confirmation of sale decree was issued on February 1,
2022, and the case was timely appealed to this court in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.
Banks, 2022-Ohio-3044 (8th Dist.) (“HSBC II”).1
In HSBC II, Banks contended that
(1) despite him providing a “complete loss mitigation request via email on September 15, 2021,” the trial court granted appellee’s motion for default judgment “without a notice, warning or hearing”; (2) appellee failed to abide by the regulations set forth in 12 C.F.R. 1024.41 [governing loss mitigation procedures]; (3) appellee was barred under the doctrine of promissory estoppel from executing the sheriff’s sale and confirming same; (4) appellee had unclean hands in this case; (5) appellant “was not given proper and reasonable opportunity to object to the appraisal”; and (6) the appraisal was not conducted according to law.
1 A portion of the facts has been extracted from HSBC II for purposes of judicial
economy. Id. at ¶ 6.
This court stated Banks’s failure to appeal from the foreclosure
judgment waived issues relative to the foreclosure decree but afforded brief
consideration to the claims. The errors were found to be without merit, and the trial
court’s judgment was affirmed.
In the instant forcible detainer action, on April 5, 2024, HSBC served
Bonner with a 90-day notice to leave premises pursuant to R.C. 1923.04 due to
expiration of tenancy as of August 9, 2024. On August 26, 2024, HSBC filed for
possession of the property against Bonner as a holdover tenant of prior owner
Anderson Banks (“Banks”) in the Bedford Municipal Court.
Bonner contended, and maintains on appeal, that he is the assignee
of a confidential settlement agreement between former owner Banks and HSBC to
purchase the Property from HSBC for $280,000 but that HSBC breached the
agreement by adding terms after the agreement was final. A review of the agreement
reveals references to the HSBC I foreclosure case and the appeal after confirmation
of the sale in HSBC II. The stated sum was due to be paid on or before 3:00 p.m.
on July 15, 2022. Upon payment, the appeal in HSBC II would be dismissed without
prejudice and the parties would seek to dismiss the judgment of foreclosure and
confirmation of sale.
The agreement contains a signature line for “Borrower: Anderson
Banks,” a line for the date, and a signature line for approval by counsel for the borrower. The next page contains similar information for HSBC and its counsel.
None of the items are executed by the parties.
Following the signature pages are two pages entitled “Assignment of
Contract” that contain a printed effective date of May 26, 2022, by and between
Banks as assignor and Bonner as assignee. The signature lines were purportedly
signed by Banks and Bonner, and each is accompanied by the printed date of
“May 26, 2022.” The font and margins of the assignment pages differ from those of
the settlement agreement and lack the footer that appears on the settlement
agreement pages that list the document title and page numbers: “Page 1 of 9”
through “Page 9 of 9.”
The trial court granted possession of the property to HSBC.
This cause came on for hearing on September 27, 2024, before the Judge, upon the complaint and evidence, the defendant(s) being in default of an answer or other pleadings, although duly served with process and advised of trial date according to law and appearing in Court to defend the claim. The Judge, being fully advised in the premises, finds that the plaintiff(s) is entitled to immediate possession of the premises described in the complaint.
Bedford Mun. Ct., Journal Entry (Sept. 27, 2024), Journal Book/ p. 656-470.
Bonner appeals. The trial court initially denied Bonner’s motion to
stay execution of the writ of restitution pending appeal, but on November 5, 2024,
Bonner was granted a stay upon posting a bond with the trial court. II. Assignments of Error
Bonner initially assigned two errors on appeal; however, the second
assignment of error regarding the trial court’s failure to grant a stay pending appeal
is now moot. The sole remaining error is:
The trial court erred in granting an eviction judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee despite defendant-appellant’s valid contract claim, demonstrating a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
R.C. Chapter 1923 governs forcible entry and detainer actions. A
forcible entry and detainer action “is a civil remedy provided by statute and intended
to affect only the question of the present right to possess real property.” Cuyahoga
Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 67 Ohio St.2d 129, 131, (1981). “‘The purpose of the
forcible entry and detainer statutes is to provide a summary, extraordinary, and
speedy method for the recovery of possession of real estate in the cases especially
enumerated by statute.’” Id., quoting 24 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 455, Forcible Entry
and Detainer, Section 2.
The trial court held a hearing on the right to possession of the
property. ‘“[O]n appeal from a bench trial[,] we review the trial court’s factual
findings under the manifest weight standard of review, while the trial court’s legal
findings are reviewed de novo.”’ Sood v. Rivers, 2024-Ohio-3064, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.),
quoting Ultimate Salon & Spa, Inc. v. Legends Constr. Grp., 2019-Ohio-2506, ¶ 30
(11th Dist.). ‘“Accordingly, following a bench trial, a reviewing court will generally uphold a trial court’s judgment as long as the manifest weight of the evidence
supports it — that is, as long as ‘‘some’’ competent and credible evidence supports
it.”’ Patel v. Strategic Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-4990, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting
MRI Software, L.L.C. v. W. Oaks Mall FL, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-2190, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.),
citing Hamilton v. Ball, 2014-Ohio-1118, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). “The reviewing court views
the trial court’s credibility determinations with due deference.” Patel at ¶ 20, citing
MRI Software at ¶ 12.
B. Analysis
Bonner contends the trial court failed to consider Bonner’s evidence
supporting his claim of entitlement to enforce the settlement agreement rendering
the eviction contrary to law. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Settlement agreements are contractual in nature, and as such, basic
principles of contract law apply. Rulli v. Fan Co., 1997-Ohio-380. “[A] valid
settlement agreement is a contract between parties, requiring a meeting of the
minds as well as an offer and an acceptance thereof.” Id. at 376, citing Noroski v.
Fallet, 2 Ohio St.3d 77, 79 (1982). Additionally, “the terms of the settlement
agreement must be reasonably certain and clear.” Id.
HSBC counters that Bonner failed to prove that he has a valid contract
that is enforceable against HSBC, that HSBC has no relationship with Bonner, and
that the only settlement agreement provided by Bonner as evidence in the case is
unexecuted, undated, and contains a payment deadline of June 15, 2022. HSBC adds that the settlement agreement does not require that HSBC assist assignor
Banks or assignee Bonner with raising funds for the payment as Bonner contends.
Bonner provides several references to what appears to be page
numbers of the hearing transcript before the trial court but did not submit a
transcript pursuant to App.R. 9(A) nor did he include quotes, summaries, or
explanations to support his position. Without the filing of a transcript, an appellate
court presumes regularity in the proceedings and accepts the factual findings of the
trial court as true. Bailey v. Bailey, 2012-Ohio-5073, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Snider
v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2012-Ohio-1665, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). Our review is
limited to the legal conclusions of the trial court. Id.
This court also observes that an appellate court is required by
App.R. 12(B) to decide an appeal “on its merits on the assignments of error set forth
in the briefs under App.R. 16.” It is incumbent upon the appellant to include in their
briefs “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the
contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on
which appellant relies.” App.R. 16(A)(3) and (7). This court finds the requisite
arguments, supporting cases, and evidentiary references to be lacking in this case.
Appellate courts will not address underdeveloped arguments because
““‘[i]t is not this Court’s job to search the record in an effort to ferret out the basis
for Appellant’s claims.””’ State v. Franco, 2023-Ohio-4653, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), quoting
Halliday v. Halliday, 2010-Ohio-2597, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Lewis, 2002-Ohio-5025, ¶ 79 (7th Dist.). For this reason alone, this court could summarily
overrule the assignment of error.
In the interest of justice, this court states that based on the record
before it, the trial court’s judgment that Bonner has failed to prove, by competent,
credible evidence, the existence of a colorable claim to possession of the Property
under the settlement agreement is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The proffered agreement is unexecuted, undated, and lacks consideration. There is
no evidence that a valid contract exists between HSBC and Bonner.
The sole remaining assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR