Hricenak v. Mickey Truck Bodies

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania·Decided September 22, 2022·No. 4:21-cv-00694·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CYNTHIA HRICENAK, No. 4:21-CV-00694 Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v. MICKEY TRUCK BODIES, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEPTEMBER 22, 2022 Presently before the Court is Mickey Truck Bodies (“Mickey Truck”) and Kevin Turpin’s (collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss1 Count 3 of Cynthia

Hricenak’s amended complaint2 as against Turpin. This motion, having been fully briefed,3 is ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion. I. BACKGROUND

In October 2017, North Carolina-based manufacturer Mickey Truck opened a production facility in Berwick, Pennsylvania.4 In the two years that followed, Hricenak held senior positions at the Berwick facility, and often functioned as the

1 Doc. 17. 2 Doc. 16. 3 Docs. 18, 20, 22. facility’s plant manager.5 However, during this period, Hricenak was consistently paid less than similarly situated male employees, denied promotions or demoted

because of her sex, and verbally harassed.6 Mickey Truck also refused Hricenak’s requests for a performance review and company laptop despite offering both to similarly situated male employees.7

There is no indication that Turpin, who became the Berwick facility plant manager in July 2019, was involved in Mickey Truck’s adverse employment actions against Hricenak.8 However, after Turpin assumed authority over the Berwick facility, he repeatedly “snapped at” Hricenak in front of other Mickey Truck

employees, verbally harassed her, and blamed Hricenak “for failing to do various jobs that were not her responsibility.”9 Turpin also forced Hricenak to do some work that was traditionally assigned to individuals in a lower position—that of “lead

man”—and informed Hricenak that she would need to work on Saturdays if Mickey Truck did not meet its goals, although neither Turpin nor Hricenak’s lead man would be required to work on Saturdays.10 Turpin further informed Hricenak that she could no longer meet directly with her lead man, once walked down the hall stating

“support, support, support”—thereby implying that any problems that occurred at

5 Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 21–25. 6 Id. ¶¶ 17–26. 7 Id. ¶¶ 22, 26, 29. 8 See id. ¶¶ 17–26. 9 Id. ¶¶ 30–39, 48. the facility were Hricenak’s fault—and once failed to ask Hricenak how to fix a problem with a truck, despite the fact that she “had always handled problems with

trucks and transportation as part of her job.”11 On September 10, 2019, Mickey Truck fired Hricenak—the final act of discrimination alleged.12 Hricenak thereafter filed suit against Mickey Truck and

Turpin, alleging sex discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 186113 and sex discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (“PHRA”).14 The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in August 2021,15 and this Court granted in part and denied in part that motion.16

As relevant here, the Court determined that Title VII claims of sex discrimination and a hostile work environment against Turpin failed as a matter of law, as those claims may not be brought against employees in their individual capacities.17 The Court further concluded that Hricenak’s claim for sex

discrimination under the PHRA against Turpin failed, since employees may not be held individually liable for discrimination but, instead, may only be held liable for aiding and abetting their employer’s action, and there were no allegations contained

11 Id. ¶¶ 47-51. 12 Id. ¶ 26. 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. 14 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(a). 15 Doc. 8. 16 Docs. 14, 15. in the complaint that demonstrated Turpin aided and abetted Mickey Truck.18 To the contrary, this Court noted that “nearly all the adverse employment decisions alleged

occurred before Mickey Truck hired Turpin” and the only two acts that occurred after Turpin was hired did not mention Turpin.19 The Court therefore dismissed all claims against Turpin, but permitted Hricenak to amend her complaint to attempt to remedy the defects in her PHRA claim against Turpin.20

II. LAW Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly21 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,22 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”23 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption

18 Id. at 8-10. 19 Id. at 9. 20 Doc. 15. 21 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 22 556 U.S. 662 (2009). of truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”24

III. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Dismiss Defendants seek dismissal of Hricenak’s PHRA claim against Turpin on the

ground that she has again failed to adequately plead any facts that would establish Turpin aided and abetted Mickey Truck in its gender discrimination against Hricenak.25 Hricenak responds that she has adequately pled that Turpin engaged in numerous acts of harassment against her and that “it may be inferred that he

intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because of her sex and failed to take steps to remedy the disparate treatment Plaintiff was subjected to at” Mickey Truck.26

As this Court discussed in its Memorandum Opinion granting in part Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, under § 955(e) of the PHRA, an individual supervisor may be held liable for “aiding and abetting the unlawful discriminatory practices of [his] employer.”27 However, the Third Circuit has held that § 955(e)

24 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 25 Doc. 18. 26 Doc. at 7; see id. at 5-7. 27 Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 43 Pa. Stat. does not impose liability on individuals for “direct incidents of [their] harassment,” explaining that “[s]uch incidents are not covered by the terms of § 955(e).”28

Hricenak’s allegations again fail to demonstrate that Turpin aided and abetted Mickey Truck’s alleged sex discrimination. In her amended complaint, Hricenak again alleges that during her employment with Mickey Truck, she was subjected to “disparate treatment and adverse employment actions . . . on the basis of her sex.”29

Specifically, Hricenak asserts that she was not given performance reviews, was repeatedly passed over for a promotion to Plant Manager, and that, even when she performed the duties of Plant Manager, she received less pay than the various men

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