Hozay Royal v. Macys Retail Holdings LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-1207
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-1207 __________

HOZAY ROYAL, Appellant

v.

*MACY’S RETAIL HOLDINGS, LLC; JAY NAKAHARA

(*Amended Pursuant to Clerk Order Dated 03/01/23) ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-21-cv-04439) District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 27, 2024

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 4, 2024 ) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Hozay Royal filed a Complaint against Defendants Macy’s Retail

Holdings LLC (“Macy’s”) and Jay Nakahara, a police detective. According to Royal’s

operative second amended complaint and the attached affidavit of probable cause, an

employee of Macy’s Loss Prevention team apprehended Royal after he had passed all

points of sale without paying for merchandise. Then, using its loss-prevention

technology, Macy’s compiled photographic and video evidence of Royal’s leaving the

store with merchandise on six other occasions without paying. Nakahara obtained an

arrest warrant, and Royal was arrested.

Royal was charged with six counts of retail theft. Before trial, the Commonwealth

dropped one count—concerning an incident that occurred on February 21, 2019—and

replaced it with a count concerning an incident that occurred on another day. Royal was

convicted of those six counts.

In Royal’s federal complaint, he raised a variety of claims concerning the

withdrawn February 21, 2019 count, including false arrest and imprisonment, fabrication

of evidence, negligent supervision, and malicious prosecution. The District Court

dismissed some claims on screening, and Royal filed an Amended Complaint. On the

Defendants’ motions, the District Court dismissed all but a malicious prosecution claim

against Macy’s, though it allowed Royal to amend a malicious prosecution claim against

Nakahara and a negligent supervision claim against Macy’s. Royal filed a Second

Amended Complaint, covering much of the same ground as his earlier Amended

Complaint. The Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. The District Court

granted the motions and dismissed Royal’s claims with prejudice. Royal filed a motion

2 for reconsideration. The District Court denied this motion. Royal filed a notice of

appeal, which is timely because the District Court granted his motion under Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(6). 1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a district court’s

decision to dismiss a complaint is de novo. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181,

188 (3d Cir. 2010). We must “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the

complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d

223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order

denying a motion for reconsideration. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

In his opening brief, Royal presents just one argument: that the District Court

erred in concluding that Nakahara had probable cause to arrest him, which was fatal to

Royal’s malicious-prosecution claim. See generally Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–

82 (3d Cir. 2007). 2 In sum, Royal alleges that Nakahara and the Macy’s employee

fabricated the incident, and that Nakahara lacked probable cause to arrest him.

“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the

arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person

to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”

1 The appellees’ motions to dismiss the appeal are therefore denied. 2 Royal has forfeited any other potential issue. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). 3 Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Orsatti v.

N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). When a plaintiff is challenging the

validity of a warrant “by asserting that law enforcement agents submitted a false

affidavit,” the plaintiff must show “(1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or

with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a

falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are

material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113

F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Where the reasons for seeking a warrant are provided in an

affidavit and a magistrate has found probable cause, “the courts should not invalidate the

warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,

manner,” and “the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely

determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” United States v. Ventresca,

380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).

We concur with the District Court’s finding of probable cause. As the District

Court explained, the information referenced in the Affidavit included a photo of Royal

leaving Macy’s on the date in question with specified stolen property, details about an

earlier incident in which Royal was arrested for stealing from Macy’s, and evidence that

Royal had stolen from Macy’s multiple times; these facts support a finding of probable

cause. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818–19 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.

Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009).

Royal argues that eyewitness testimony is necessary for finding probable cause,

but he is mistaken, in that officers have probable cause when they receive information

4 from a person whom they would reasonably believe to be telling the truth. See Sharrar,

128 F.3d at 818–19. While this is normally an eyewitness or victim, it need not be, and

courts have utilized images when making a finding of probable cause. See, e.g.,

Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Scheets, 188

F.3d 829, 839 (7th Cir. 1999). Further, as to Royal’s claim regarding the validity of the

Affidavit, we conclude that he has failed to show that there were any material false

statements or omissions in the Affidavit. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Royal’s claims and

the denial of his motion for reconsideration. 3

3 Macy’s motion to supplement the appendix is granted. 5