Hoyt v. Hull

677 N.E.2d 377, 111 Ohio App. 3d 784
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 20, 1996
DocketNo. 655.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 677 N.E.2d 377 (Hoyt v. Hull) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoyt v. Hull, 677 N.E.2d 377, 111 Ohio App. 3d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

Cox, Judge.

This matter presents a timely appeal from a decision rendered by the Carroll County Common Pleas Court, dismissing the complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed by plaintiffs-appellants, Delores Hoyt et al.,' and granting the counterclaim/cross-claim filed by one of the defendants-appellees, namely Randy Hull.

On March 18, 1957, a petition was presented to defendant-appellee Carroll County Board of Commissioners requesting that approximately one mile of road, which was referred to as “Carroll County Road 21A” and which was located in both Center and Washington Townships, Carroll County, Ohio, be closed. The board of commissioners set a viewing date, along with a hearing date, and *786 purportedly published a legal notice. Nothing appeared in the board of commissioners’ records to indicate that a viewing was made or that a hearing was held. On April 15, 1957, the board of commissioners granted the petition and closed the requested portion of County Road 21A.

On July 26, 1971, the Carroll County Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution to vacate the entire length of County Road 21A from State Route 39 eastward to County Road 21. Nothing appears in the board of commissioners’ records to indicate that said vacation was done in response to a petition, that a viewing was made, that a hearing was held, or that any report was received from the Carroll County Engineer.

In October 1976, appellant, Delores Hoyt, and her husband purchased real property in Center Township, Carroll County, Ohio, to the north side of where County Road 21A formerly existed and intersected with State Route 39. Mr. Hoyt then transformed a portion of the former County Road 21A that was impassable, unused, and generally washed out into a driveway. The rest of the former County Road 21A remained unmaintained, eroded, unused, and otherwise in very poor condition.

In October 1985, the Carroll County Board of Commissioners rescinded the 1971 resolution vacating County Road 21A. However, since approximately 1972, County Road 21A was never maintained or used by the public, except for the portion that was used and maintained by the Hoyts for their driveway.

In December 1985, defendant-appellee Charles W. Hooper bought a tract of real property that apparently was originally accessed by County Road 21A and that adjoined the real property owned by the Hoyts. The only way for Mr. Hooper to reach his property was by going down County Road 21A, either by using the Hoyts’ driveway or by coming in from the opposite end of County Road 21A. Mr. Hooper used the driveway only with permission from the Hoyts approximately once per year to inspect his property.

Appellant, Delores Hoyt, purchased an additional four acres of real property adjacent to that which she already owned in March 1994. Shortly after this purchase, she transferred it to her daughter, appellant, Ginger Brown. In April 1994, appellee, Randy Hull, an assistant to the Carroll County Engineer, purchased at sheriffs sale a tract of real property abutting County Road 21A. Defendants-appellees, Ronald McLaughlin, Michael K. McLaughlin, and Kenneth M. Scheel, purchased a tract of real property that adjoined the real property owned by appellee, Randy Hull, at sheriffs sale approximately one month later. Appellee, Randy Hull, testified at trial that appellee Ronald McLaughlin had offered him a key to the gate located at the intersection of County Road 21A and Avon Road so that he could get to his property, but he refused the key, since he had begun using the Hoyt driveway as an ingress and egress to his property.

*787 On September 20, 1994, appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with the Carroll County Common Pleas Court, requesting that the trial court declare that County Road 21A was and remain closed and vacated, and that appellee, Randy Hull, had no right to an easement of necessity over their real properties.

Defendant-appellee Charles W. Hooper filed his answer pro se to appellants’ complaint on September 26, 1994 and, on October 6, 1994, defendants-appellees, Carroll County Board of Commissioners and Carroll County Engineer, filed their joint answer.

On October 17, 1994, appellee, Randy Hull, filed his answer, accompanied by a counterclaim/cross-claim. Appellants filed a response to the answer on November 16, 1994. Appellants thereafter filed a request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment, which was opposed by appellee, Randy Hull, and ultimately overruled by the trial court. The parties subsequently filed pretrial briefs outlining the issues herein. This matter proceeded to bench trial on April 28, 1995.

After due consideration of the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court filed its opinion and judgment entry on May 11, 1995, dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice, denying injunctive relief to all parties, granting appellee Randy Hull’s counterclaim/cross-claim, and declaring that County Road 21A was an established public road that was part of the county’s highway system under the control of the Carroll County Board of Commissioners and the Carroll County Engineer. Appellants promptly filed their notice of appeal from this decision.

Appellee Randy Hull thereafter sought a clarification of one portion of the trial court’s opinion and judgment entry. The trial court filed its judgment entry clarifying its intent and meaning on June 23,1995, to which appellee, Randy Hull, responded by filing a notice of appeal on July 24, 1995.

Appellants set forth four assignments of error on appeal.

Appellants’ first assignment of error alleges:

“The lower court erred in determining that Carroll County Road 21A is an established public road [and that] the appellees were estopped from asserting that 21A was an established and open public road.”

Appellants argue that Carroll County stopped maintaining County Road 21A as an open road nearly forty years ago and therefore should be estopped from denying that said road was vacated and closed for public use. Likewise, appellants state that the doctrine of estoppel applies to appellee, Randy Hull, since he knew said County Road 21A was abandoned, impassable, and no longer *788 appeared on any county maps when he purchased the real property that abutted same.

R.C. 5553.04 sets forth the procedure for vacating a road and provides:

“When the board of county commissioners is of the opinion that it will be for the public convenience or welfare to * * * vacate * * * a public road, it shall so declare by resolution, which resolution shall set forth the general route and termini of the road, or part thereof, to be * * * vacated * * *.
“When a petition, signed by at least twelve freeholders of the county residing in the vicinity of the proposed improvement, * * * is presented to the board requesting the board to * * * vacate * * * a public road, such board shall view the location * * *, and, if it is of the opinion that it will be for the public convenience or welfare * * *, it may proceed * * * as provided in sections 5553.04 to 5553.16, inclusive, of the Revised Code. * * *.”

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Bluebook (online)
677 N.E.2d 377, 111 Ohio App. 3d 784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hoyt-v-hull-ohioctapp-1996.