Howell v. Kinney

27 S.E. 204, 99 Ga. 544
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedNovember 2, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 27 S.E. 204 (Howell v. Kinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howell v. Kinney, 27 S.E. 204, 99 Ga. 544 (Ga. 1896).

Opinion

Lumpkin, Justice.

A number of citizens of Floyd county filed an equitable petition against certain justices of the peace of that county, and others. The allegations of the petition now material may be briefly summarized as follows: Petitioners are all farmers residing in the Ridge Valley district of the county named, the same being a "stock law” district, the land lines of which are lawful fences. All of their farms are in that part of the district which lies west of the Oostanaula river. The defendants have entered into a conspiracy to harass and annoy the plaintiffs, and deprive them of the benefits of the stock law. Under the advice of the defendant Sea-born Wright, an attorney at law, the defendants who own cattle, or other live stock, are to turn their animals out, and allow them to trespass upon the plaintiffs’ farms; and whenever one of the plaintiffs impounds stock trespassing upon his crops, -the conspirator to whom such stock belongs is to go before one of the justices of the peace above referred to and sue out a possessory warrant. The cases thus originating are to be tried in districts other than those in which petitioners reside, thus subjecting them to great expense, annoyance and delay; and the scheme of the conspiracy contemplates that these justices of the- peace — ■ who are parties to the conspiracy — will invariably award the possession of the stock in controversy to their coconspirators, the plaintiffs in the possessory warrants. The petition then proceeds to enumerate various alleged griev[546]*546■anees originating in the unlawful conduct of the defendants; and prays that the justices of the peace named therein be enjoined from issuing and trying any more possessory warrants against the petitioners for stock impounded by them; that Seaborn Wright be enjoined from further advising or talcing part in or prosecuting such warrants; that certain named defendants, alleged to be insolvent, be enjoined from allowing their stock to run at large upon any of the farms of petitioners, and that all the other defendants be enjoined from suing out such warrants against petitioners before any justices of the peace of the county.

At the hearing the judge passed an order enjoining the magistrates named in the petition from issuing or trying any possessory warrants against the petitioners to recover stock legally impounded in that part of Ridge Valley district west of the Oostanaula river — “the holding of the-court being that all territory added to the said Ridg-e Valley -district by order heretofore granted by the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Floyd Co., which is described by number of lot, by metes and bounds, or in any other way whereby the boundary line may be traced or made certain, became and is now a part of the Ridge Valley district, and subject to stock law.” All the other' defendants were enjoined from suing out possessory- warrants to recover stock impounded “in the above described territory.” The defendants affected by the injunction bring the case here for review.

If the petitioners had proved .all the material allegations, of their petition, the case would have presented for adjudication a number of -difficult and important questions; but, in our judgment, the plaintiffs failed to establish the cardinal fact upon which -all their alleged rights in the premises depend, viz: that -their farms are in fact situated in the Ridge Valley district. It may be assumed that this district, -as originally laid out, was lawfully under the operation -of the “stock law,” and consequently, if the plaintiffs’' [547]*547farms are within its boundaries they are entitled to all the benefits and protection which that law affords. If, on the other hand, their farms are not in this district, their entire case falls to the ground. It clearly appears from the record that none of these farms were originally embraced in the Ridge Valley district, but petitioners claim that their lands have been added to the territory of that district by reason of certain alleged changes in the militia district lines. They offered evidence as to proceedings had by the board of commissioners of roads and revenue of Floyd county under which they assert the changes in question were effected. We will presently state, in a general way, the nature of these proceedings, and endeavor to show that they were absolutely void, and therefore utterly ineffectual. Before doing so, we will, however, briefly notice a preliminary question presented by the record.

1. It has frequently been held by this court that the determination by an ordinary, or board of co-un'ty commissioners, in proceedings to change militia district lines cannot be directly reviewed by certiorari or otherwise. While we are not in the least degree disposed to call in question the correctness of this proposition, we are at the same time quite sure that it is within -the power of the superior court, or of this court, to declare such proceedings and the final action taken therein absolutely void whenever it becomes apparent that 'there was no law authorizing the same, or is manifest that no attempt was made to conduct them in conformity with valid existing regulations governing such proceedings, or that the action taken was in utter disregard thereof. For instance, if .an ordinary or county board, acting upon a private letter signed by an individual, should peremptorily issue a proclamation declaring that a designated change was thereby made in the lines of two militia districts, no one would for a moment contend that the proclamation amounted to anything. Again, if, upon proceedings entirely lawful and regular [548]*548down to the time when the final action was to he had, an order should he passed undertaking to define a change in district lines, and which described the new line so imperfectly that its location could not by any possibility be ascertained, it is obvious that the order would be a mere nullity. These illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely, but those given will suffice to indicate the distinction to be drawn between that class of cases which merely involve the question whether or not the discretion vested in the ccunty authorities designated by law to deal with the matter has been wisely and judiciously exercised, and such cases as collaterally present the question whether the action taken by tire county authorities in a given proceeding of this kind can properly be deemed to have any legal effect, when the same is so indefinite or repugnant to the provisions of law upon which it was based that it could in no event have any lawful or practical operation.

• 2. Various persons owning lands lying outside of the Ridge Valley district filed petitions, -addressed to the board of commissioners of roads and revenue of Floyd county, praying that the lines of the districts in which their farms were respectively situated be so changed as to- place their lands within the Ridge Valley district. Quite a number of these petitions were presented, each being filed in behalf of two or more persons. Not one of these petitions, however, undertook to define the location of the militia district lines as then existing, nor attempted to set forth and describe the precise change or changes sought to be made therein, so as to even vaguely -indicate what would be the location of the new lines desired. The petitioners merely prayed, in a loose and general way, that their farms, then lying in specified districts, “be changed or cut off into Ridge Valley.” Nor, in many of the petitions, were the lands thus to be affected otherwise described than by giving the numbers of the land lots by which they were origi[549]

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Bluebook (online)
27 S.E. 204, 99 Ga. 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howell-v-kinney-ga-1896.