Howell v. Howell

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 27, 1999
Docket01A01-9806-CV-00301
StatusPublished

This text of Howell v. Howell (Howell v. Howell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howell v. Howell, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE ______________________________________________ FILED REECE HOWELL, III, July 27, 1999 RICHARD HOWELL and wife, MITZI S. HOWELL, Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk Plaintiffs-Appellees, Lincoln Circuit No. 219-94 Vs. C.A. No. 01A01-9806-CV-00301

C. WELDON HOWELL and wife, LILLY L. HOWELL,

Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT THE HONORABLE LEE RUSSELL, JUDGE

John J. Archer of Nashville For Appellees

Henry, Henry & Speer, P.C., of Pulaski For Appellants

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED

Opinion filed:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JUDGE

This appeal involves a dispute among landowners over two small parcels of property.

Defendants/appellants, C. Weldon and Lilly Howell (collectively hereinafter “Weldon”), appeal

the trial court’s order partially granting judgment in favor of plaintiff/appellee, C. Reece Howell, III (Reece).

The parties to this appeal are closely related as Reece and Weldon are nephew and uncle

respectively. Reece owns approximately seventy (70) acres known as the North and South

Patrick tracts (Patrick tracts) contiguous on the north and east with Weldon’s land of

approximately twenty (20) acres known as the UCL tract. A plat of the properties is attached as

an addendum to this Opinion.

A brief history of the subject land is warranted. In 1936, C. R. Howell, Sr. (C.R., Sr.)

purchased a tract of land of approximately twenty (20) acres from the Union Central Life

Insurance Company. This property became known as the UCL tract. That same year C.R., Sr.

sold the UCL tract but retained a strip of land approximately sixteen and one-half (16.5) feet

wide and one thousand feet (1000) long that ran along the western border of the UCL tract. This

strip of land became known as the Passway Parcel. C.R., Sr. also retained a small portion of land

on the eastern boundary of the UCL tract which contained a spring and was known as the Springs

Parcel or West Waterworks Parcel (Springs Parcel). In 1950, C.R., Sr. conveyed the Springs

Parcel to Norman who subsequently conveyed it to Farrar.

C.R., Sr. died a widower in 1958. His will directed his executors, C.R. Howell, Jr. (C.R.,

Jr.) and Weldon, to sell all his real estate and distribute the proceeds equally among his nine

children. At the time of his death, C.R., Sr. owned the Passway Parcel, yet his executors failed

to sell it.

C.R., Jr., Reece’s father, acquired title to the UCL tract and later sold it to his brother

Don Stanley Howell (Stanley), Weldon’s brother and Reece’s uncle, in 1966. The deed

transferring the UCL to Stanley specifically excluded both the Passway Parcel and the Springs

Parcel.

C.R., Jr. died in 1988 leaving all of his real property including the Patrick tracts and the

Passway Parcel to his wife, Reece’s mother1. She in turn conveyed the Patrick tracts and the

Passway Parcel to Reece by quitclaim deed in 1989.

In 1991, Stanley sold the UCL tract to his brother Weldon. The deed specifically

excludes the Passway Parcel and the Springs Parcel. In 1996, Reece purchased the Springs

1 C.R., Jr. apparently believed he owned the Passway Parcel in fee simple at the time of his death.

2 Parcel from the record owner Mary Alice Farrar Shideler.

No one disputed the use of the Passway Parcel until 1994. At a birthday party for one

of the older members of the family, Reece told Weldon that he planned to put a mobile home for

his mother and grandmother on part of the Patrick tracts.2 Reece also told Weldon that he

wanted to use the Passway Parcel as it was the easiest means of ingress and egress from the

proposed area. The parties disputed the ownership of the Passway Parcel and discussion took

place over the use of the strip of land.

The parties did not reach an agreement; however, Reece placed the mobile home on his

property and began the placement of a waterline across the Passway Parcel. In retaliation,

Weldon locked a gate from the road into the Passway which denied Reece access to the Patrick

tracts by way of the Passway.

Reece, along with his son and daughter-in-law, filed suit for damages and to enjoin

Weldon from interfering with their means of ingress and egress along the Passway Parcel. At

this point both parties apparently believed that each owned the Passway Parcel outright by

express deed. However, after checking the chain of title, Reece learned that the Passway Parcel

should have been sold by the executors of C.R., Sr. estate in 1958. The failure of the executors

to sell the property made all nine children co-tenants in the property. The trial court ordered

Reece to join all the other co-tenants in the suit, but before he could do so, the owners of the

other seven-ninths conveyed their interests to Weldon. Also, Reece’s son and daughter-in-law

conveyed their interests in their lot back to Reece, and the litigation involved a dispute between

Reece and Weldon and his wife.

Subsequently, Reece amended his complaint to include a claim that he and Weldon

owned the Passway Parcel as tenants in common. However, Reece also claimed that the

Passway Parcel was an apparent, visible, recognized and necessary means of access to the Patrick

tracts and thus he had an easement by implication. Further, he claimed that for at least thirty (30)

years owners of the Patrick tracts have made open, notorious and actual use of the Passway

Parcel, and thus a prescriptive easement existed. Finally, Reece claimed that Weldon had denied

him access to the Springs Parcel by erecting a fence. Reece requested the court to order Weldon

2 Reece sold a small portion of the Patrick tracts to his son, Richard and his daughter-in- law. It was upon this small piece of land that the mobile home was placed.

3 to remove the locked gate denying access to the Passway Parcel, to grant him an easement across

the Passway Parcel, and to enjoin Weldon from trespassing on the Springs Parcel.

Weldon answered Reece’s complaint and filed a counterclaim which asserted ownership

of the Passway Parcel by adverse possession, asked for damages in the amount of $25,000, and

in the alternative, asked that if the easement is granted by the court that the easement be one for

ingress and egress only and forbidding the placement of a water line. In Weldon’s answer to the

amended complaint, a claim was made for all property located within the fenced boundaries of

the UCL tract including the Springs Parcel.

After a trial on the merits with testimony of numerous witnesses, the trial court issued

an order which stated in pertinent part:

ORDER

This cause came to be heard on the 19th day of March, 1997 before the Honorable Lee Russell, Judge, 17th Judicial District (Part II), upon the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs, the responses of the Defendants thereto, the counter-claim filed by the Defendants, the response of the Plaintiffs thereto, the opening statements by counsel of record, the testimony of witnesses for all parties in open court, the deposition testimony of various witnesses, and upon the entire record from all of which the Court finds as follows:

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6.

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