Howe v. Underwood

12 F. Cas. 678, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 160
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedFebruary 15, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 12 F. Cas. 678 (Howe v. Underwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howe v. Underwood, 12 F. Cas. 678, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 160 (circtdma 1854).

Opinion

SPRAGUE, District Judge.

This is an application for a preliminary injunction, by Elias Howe, Jr., and another, to restrain the defendants, Orison Underwood and others, from using a sewing machine, which, the complainants allege, is an infringement of their patent This subject has been before the court on two former occasions; in a trial at law, in 1S52, when the same person, Howe, was plaintiff, and in a bill in equity, in 1853, by the same plaintiffs as in this case, against other defendants. The same questions were made in both of those cases that are presented to the court in this case: first, as to the validity of the patent; and second, as to the infringement. As to the last question, however, in the suit at law, the machine complained of was that of Lerow & Blodgett, and was different from that which is now on trial, which is the Singer machine. But in the suit in equity tried last year, the Singer machine was tne subject of complaint — a machine similar to that against which an injunction is now sought. The earnestness and zeal with which the contestation has been carried on, as well as the nature of the machine, its effect on the industry of the country, if it prove to be successful to so great an extent as is hoped — show the importance which is attached to the questions involved, and to the rights which are claimed, on the one side or the other. There is no doubt that, if the machine be a successful one, it must be of great importance to the community, and to the individual inventor whose rights are now sought to be enforced. And, on the other hand, if the defendants have a machine which they can use without an infringement of the plaintiff’s patent, it must be of great value and importance to them. The parties, therefore, will naturally, so long as there is any ground of hope, carry on a legal contestation. It is the duty of the court to hear everything that may be presented in every new case, especially all the new evidence that may bear upon the questions at issue; to form an unbiased opinion, and announce it clearly and unequivocally, that the parties, at least, may understand [680]*680what is the opinion of the court, for their guidance in the future, as well as for the decision of the case now before the court; for, as it has been intimated by the respondents, the court may readily suppose that there are other cases which are dependent, directly or indirectly, upon the decision of this.

There are certain great features in this case, which are settled by the evidence, and about which there really can be no controversy, and which are of great importance in weighing the evidence upon minute questions, where there is controversy as to what took place many years ago, depending solely, in many instances, upon the memory of individuals called upon to give testimony.

This patent of Mr. Howe was obtained in 1846. Up to that time, the public was in possession of no similar machine for sewing. So far. as the evidence is presented to the court in this case, such an instrumentality for the saving of labor was not then known. Such an invention had never been practically used — I mean it was not known to the public for any practical or useful purpose. Whether it was known, within the meaning of the law, in the case of Mr. Hunt’s machine, the court will consider hereafter. The first machine for practical use was made upon Mr. Howe’s patent; and since he obtained that patent, numerous machines have been put in operation — those of Lerow & Blodgett, and those of Singer, which have been before the court on a former and on tne present occasion; and, as it has been stated, these machines have entered largely into the industry of tiie country, and with great benefit, for the purpose of saving labor previously performed by hand-service.

Now to whom is the public indebted for the present useful inprovement or useful existence of the sewing-machine? Upon that, there is no question. There is no evidence in this case, that leaves a shadow of doubt, that, for all the benefit conferred upon the public by the introduction of a sewing machine, the public are indebtéd- to Mr. Howe. The constitution of the United States contains a provision which is the source whence congress derives the power to give to inventors an exclusive right, as against the community; and all the legislation of congress is founded upon that .provision, and intended to carry it out. Wnat is that provision? That congress shall have power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Now, who has promoted this useful art? Who is it, in this case, that comes within the meaning of the constitution, that to promote the useful arts, congress shall have power to secure to inventors their inventions? Unquestionably, Mr. Howe, and no other person. I mean no other person has given to the public this invention, from the evidence before the court. Therefore, if the legislation of congress has carried out the provision of the constitution, which had for its object -the promotion of the useful arts, by securing to inventors their inventions, that legislation would naturally give the benefit to Mr. Howe. Still, it may not have done so. The acts of congress may be so framed, that they may fail of carrying out that purpose and that intent of the constitution in this instance, and in other instances; and the court is then called upon to say whether, under the law as enacted by congress, Mr. Howe is entitled to his patent; for the constitution gives him no right; it has only given a power to congress, if congress sees fit, by legislation, to secure to him, for a term of years, the exclusive right to his invention.

Then we look at the legislation of congress, to see what are the requisites to entitle him to a patent, and we find that he must be the first and original inventor; and that the thing which he invents must not be known or used, before he has obtained his patent or made his invention. That has often received a judicial construction; and if there has preceded the invention, for which a patent has been obtained, another invention of the same kind, and that has been perfected within the meaning of the patent law, so as to be of practical utility, and not to end in mere experiment-then it has anticipated the subsequent discovery, or invention, and such invention can not be entitled to the monopoly or-exclusive privilege that is claimed by the patent.

The first inquiry here is, whether Hunt’s machine, which is alone relied upon as having preceded Mr. Howe’s, was ever perfected, within the meaning of the law; and a second is, whether it had not been abandoned and forgotten before Mr. Howe’s invention. These are the two questions to which I shall give my attention; because I do not think it necessary to go into the question of the similarity of the Hunt machine to Mr. Howe’s. But I go directly to the question whether Mr. Hunt’s machine, as ho made it, was perfected; or, in the second place, if perfected, whether it was forgotten or abandoned?

The evidence, tending to show that the machine of Hunt was perfected, may be divided into three classes. There is the evidence of its product — what work the old machine did. In the second place, there is the evidence of the recollection of witnesses of what the machine was. And in the third place, there is the evidence derived from the remains of the old machine, produced here, and the opinion of experts, founded upon those remains, of what the machine originally was.

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Related

Carter & Co. v. Wollschlaeger
53 F. 573 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern New York, 1892)
Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Julien Electric Co.
38 F. 117 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York, 1889)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 F. Cas. 678, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howe-v-underwood-circtdma-1854.