Howard Wilson v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: A-1804-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1804-23

HOWARD WILSON,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. __________________________

Submitted October 8, 2025 – Decided October 28, 2025

Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Howard Wilson, appellant pro se.

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Petitioner Howard Wilson, who is currently incarcerated at a New Jersey

State Prison, appeals from a New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) final

agency decision finding him guilty of prohibited act *.002/*.803, attempting to

assault any person, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a) and imposing

sanctions. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we affirm.

I.

While housed in his cell at Northern State Prison, petitioner was directed

by an officer collecting garbage to move his arm away from his cell's food port.

Petitioner refused to comply despite the officer's numerous orders. Petitioner

ultimately threw a food container in what the officer described as "in [the

officer's] direction." Petitioner admitted to throwing the container but claimed

he tossed it to the side, away from the officer. In response, the officer sprayed

a chemical agent into the cell, closed the food port, and called for assistance.

The responding officers removed petitioner and his cellmate from the room and

provided medical attention to both.

The DOC charged petitioner with prohibited act *.002/*.803, attempting

to assault any person, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(1)(ii), (xxiv). He was served with

the charges. After a hearing was set, petitioner requested and was assigned

counsel substitute and pleaded not guilty. The original hearing date was

A-1804-23 2 adjourned because petitioner requested video footage he contends was taken of

the incident from the officer's body worn camera. In response to the request,

the DOC determined there was no video of the incident available.

At the hearing, the hearing officer provided petitioner with an opportunity

to make a statement. Petitioner indicated he "threw [his] tray [sideways]."

Counsel substitute argued "[petitioner] didn't throw [the tray] near the officer

[but] threw it sideways to avoid hitting [the] officer." Petitioner declined to

present any additional witnesses or testimony. The hearing officer did not rely

on nor did the officer identify any video of the incident. The hearing officer

considered the investigating and responding officers' reports and found

petitioner guilty of the offense. The hearing officer recommended the DOC

impose one-hundred days in the restorative housing unit (RHU); one-hundred

days' loss of commutation time (LOCT); and loss of recreational and phone

privileges for thirty days. The Assistant Superintendent affirmed the guilty

finding but modified the one-hundred days RHU and LOCT penalties to sixty

days.

On appeal, petitioner raises the following arguments:

POINT 1

THE HEARING OFFICER WAS NOT IMPARTIAL AND VIOLATED APPELLANT'S EQUAL

A-1804-23 3 PROTECTION RIGHTS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILT.

POINT II

THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER'S FINDING OF GUILT IN THIS CASE WAS ARBITRARY AND BASED ON PREJUDICE RATHER THAN FACT.

II.

Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,

208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "[P]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must

afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage

this volatile environment." Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super.

231, 238 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super.

576, 584 (App. Div. 1999)). Therefore, "[w]e defer to an agency decision and

do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable or not

supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't

of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010).

"A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's,

even though the court might have reached a different result.'" Blanchard, 461

N.J. Super. at 238-39 (quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). "This is particularly

true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's 'special expertise

A-1804-23 4 and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 195

(quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). However, "our review is not

'perfunctory,' nor is 'our function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's

decision.'" Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at 239 (alteration in original) (quoting

Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010)).

Instead, "[w]e are constrained to engage in a 'careful and principled

consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Ibid. (quoting Williams v.

Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)).

A hearing officer's findings are required to be ". . . sufficiently specific

under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the reviewing court to

intelligently review an administrative decision and ascertain if the facts upon

which the order is based afford a reasonable basis for such order." Blackwell v.

Dep't of Corr., 348 N.J. Super. 117, 122 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting N.J. Bell Tel.

Co. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 5 N.J. 354, 377 (1950)). We review a DOC

decision in a prisoner disciplinary proceeding to determine whether the record

contains substantial evidence that the inmate has committed the prohibited act,

and whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed the regulations adopted

to afford inmates' procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J.

188, 194-96 (1995).

A-1804-23 5 III.

Petitioner contends his adjudication for his attempted assault on the

officer must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence to support that

finding. Essentially, petitioner maintains he could not have attempted to assault

the officer because he intended to throw his food tray in a direction to "avoid

contact with anyone" and not with any "actual plan or intentional act to assault."

After our review of the record, we are satisfied the hearing officer's decision

regarding petitioner's guilt is supported by substantial credible evidence in the

record.

"A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial

evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

9.15(a). "Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as 'such evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' and

'evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action.'" Blanchard, 461

N.J. Super. at 238 (quoting Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 192). The substantial

evidence standard permits an agency to apply its expertise where the evidence

supports more than one conclusion. Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J.

Super. 284, 302 (App. Div. 2022).

A-1804-23 6 Here, the hearing officer reviewed the preliminary incident report, special

custody reports, and use-of-force reports prepared by the officers involved. The

reports noted petitioner's lack of compliance with the officer's orders and

reflected the fact that he threw the food container at the officer. Petitioner

declined the hearing officer's opportunity to call the involved officer, to present

additional witness statements, or confront to adverse witnesses. Notably, while

petitioner referenced unit video footage and requested its production, the record

neither confirms the existence of any video footage of the incident nor does it

reflect the hearing officer reviewed any video evidence. The evidence presented

against petitioner was therefore largely uncontested, with petitioner offering

only a brief assertion, through his substitute counsel, that he lacked any intent

to assault the officer. The record supports the hearing officer's determination

and the Assistant Superintendent's decision to uphold the finding that petitioner

was guilty of the charged prohibited act *.002/*.803.

Affirmed.

A-1804-23 7