Howard v. Peabody Coal Co.

185 S.W.3d 165, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 48, 2006 WL 435388
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 23, 2006
Docket2005-SC-0327-WC
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 185 S.W.3d 165 (Howard v. Peabody Coal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. Peabody Coal Co., 185 S.W.3d 165, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 48, 2006 WL 435388 (Ky. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the claimant’s attorney a fee for services rendered in obtaining a Retraining Incentive Benefits (RIB) award on the ground that that 803 KAR 25:125 did not authorize an attorney fee until such time as the claimant received payments under the award pursuant to KRS 342.732(l)(a)2 or 3. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This appeal by the claimant’s attorney asserts that 803 KAR 25:125 violates public policy by discouraging attorneys from taking RIB cases and also that it violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution by unfairly discriminating against attorneys who represent injured workers. We affirm.

The claimant was born in 1952. He testified that he earned a high school diploma in 1970, after which he spent his entire work history in underground coal mining. His last exposure to coal dust occurred on December 6, 2002, when he was laid off. The record indicates that he entered into a subsequent contract with counsel for representation on a workers’ compensation claim. He and counsel agreed that any attorney’s fee would be paid in a lump sum and deducted from his weekly benefits until the defendants recouped the amount of the fee, that the fee “shall be paid by the employee from the proceeds of the Award [sic] or settlement,” and that “If there is no recovery of past or future benefits, there shall be no attorney’s fee payable .... ”

Based on x-ray reports from his medical experts, an ALJ determined that he suffered from category 1 coal workers’ pneu-moconiosis and that there was no evidence of pulmonary impairment. In addition to all other benefits payable under KRS 342.732(l)(a), the claimant received a RIB award, in the amount of $103.25 per week, for a period not to exceed 104 weeks, provided that he was “enrolled and actively and successfully participating” as a student in compliance with KRS 342.732(l)(a)2 or 3. No appeal was taken from the decision.

It is undisputed that the claimant was not enrolled or participating as a student at the time of his award or the subsequent motion requesting an attorney’s fee. In denying the motion, the ALJ explained that counsel was not entitled to a fee under 803 KAR 25:125 until such time as the claimant enrolled in a bona fide training or GED program and received payments un *167 der the award. Shortly after the motion was denied, the claimant filed a “Notice of Deferral” in which he stated that he suffered from an illness unrelated to his pneumoconiosis and elected to defer the commencement of his award for a period of 365 days.

Counsel asserts that 803 KAR 25:125 unlawfully discriminates against plaintiffs’ attorneys, that there is no substantial and justifiable reason for the classifications it creates, and that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. He argues that although the regulation permits an employer’s attorney to receive a fee without regard to the outcome, it requires the worker’s attorney fee to be contingent not only on obtaining an award for the client but also on the client’s subsequent enrollment and participation as a student if the client is less than 57 years old. Counsel acknowledges that discrepancies in the financial resources of workers and employers provide a rational basis for KRS 342.320 to require the fee of a worker’s attorney to be contingent on obtaining a RIB award for the client. His complaint is that 803 KAR 25:125 exceeds the scope of KRS 342.320 by also requiring the attorney’s fee to be contingent on the worker’s subsequent enrollment and participation as a student. He asserts that this violates equal protection by discriminating against attorneys who represent workers in RIB claims. He also asserts that it violates the public policy embodied in Chapter 342 and, more specifically, in KRS 342.732(l)(a) by discouraging attorneys from undertaking such representation. He concludes that KRS 342.320(2)(a) should govern the payment of attorney fees in RIB claims and that it entitles him to a fee. 1

KRS 342.732(l)(a)l provides criteria for awarding a RIB. Relevant presently are KRS 342.732(l)(a)2 and 3, which provide criteria for paying benefits under the award. 2 As amended effective July 15, 2002, they provide as follows:

2. Except as provided in subparagraph 3. of this paragraph, these benefits shall be paid only while the employee is enrolled and actively and successfully participating as a full-time student taking the equivalent of twelve (12) or more credit hours per week in a bona fide training or education program that if successfully completed will qualify the person completing the course for a trade, occupation, or profession and which program can be completed within the period benefits are payable under this subsection. The program must be approved under administrative regulations to be promulgated by the executive director. These benefits shall also be paid to an employee who is a part-time student taking not less than the equivalent of six (6) nor more than eleven (11) credit hours per week, except that benefits shall be an amount equal to thirty-three and one-third percent (33-1/3%) of the employee’s average weekly wage as determined by KRS 342.740, but not more than thirty-seven and one-half percent (37-1/2%) of the state average weekly wage, payable biweekly for a period not to exceed two hundred eight (208) weeks.
*168 3. These benefits shall also be paid biweekly while an employee is actively and successfully pursuing a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) in accordance with administrative regulations promulgated by the executive director. These benefits shall be paid in the amount of sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the employee’s average weekly wage not to exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of the state average weekly wage for a maximum period not to exceed seventeen (17) weeks. These income benefits shall be in addition to the maximum amount of retraining incentive benefits payable under this paragraph.

KRS 342.732

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Bluebook (online)
185 S.W.3d 165, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 48, 2006 WL 435388, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-peabody-coal-co-ky-2006.