Howard v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

2016 Ohio 684
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 14, 2016
Docket2014-00950
StatusPublished

This text of 2016 Ohio 684 (Howard v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2016 Ohio 684 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

[Cite as Howard v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2016-Ohio-684.]

ROBERT K. HOWARD Case No. 2014-00950

Plaintiff Magistrate Gary Peterson

v. DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of liability. {¶2} As an initial matter, at the outset of proceedings, the magistrate GRANTED defendant’s October 15, 2015 motion to quash the subpoena issued to Doctor Kidd. {¶3} At all times relevant, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI). This case arises out of an incident in which plaintiff slipped and fell on an accumulation of snow and ice on a walkway at RCI. {¶4} Plaintiff, who is a diabetic, testified that on the morning of March 21, 2014, he awoke at approximately 5:30 a.m., and prepared to proceed to inmate health services (IHS) to get his blood checked by an Accu-Chek monitor. IHS is located in a different building than plaintiff’s cell block. Plaintiff estimated that it takes him about two minutes to walk from his cell block to IHS. Plaintiff testified that all inmates are required to use one particular walkway to travel between the cell block and IHS. Plaintiff believed that the walkway, which was made of concrete, was approximately 12 feet wide. {¶5} Plaintiff reports that inmates are called by cell block to proceed to IHS. Plaintiff testified that after receiving such a call at about 6:50 a.m., he, along with a Case No. 2014-00950 -2- DECISION

group of inmates from his cell block, proceeded toward IHS on the assigned walkway. According to plaintiff, it had been intermittently snowing the preceding week and it had snowed either late the night before or early that morning, covering the walkway. Plaintiff relates that the walkway between the cell block and IHS had been salted in the days preceding March 21, but it had not been salted that morning. Plaintiff testified that due to the accumulation of snow over the preceding week, the walkway was more narrow than normal. Plaintiff testified that he proceeded approximately 20 yards along the walkway from his cell block to IHS when he stepped on a patch of ice, slipped and fell to the ground striking his ankle, right hip, back shoulder and head. Plaintiff remained on the ground until he was transported to IHS. Plaintiff reports that his ankle was “crushed,” requiring steel plates, bolts and rods to surgically repair the damage. {¶6} Inmate James Day, who is a diabetic, testified that on March 21, 2014, at 6:45 a.m., he was proceeding to IHS. Day reported that plaintiff was walking to IHS with the aid of a cane and had his arm in a sling. Day, who has been at RCI since 2005, testified that plaintiff slipped on a “bad spot” on the walkway where “black ice” had formed. According to Day, the walkway had not been salted that morning. Day testified that the spot where plaintiff fell has been a “bad spot” the entire time that he has been at RCI and that he has also previously fallen in the same spot. Day described the spot as a depression in the ground. According to Day, the area where plaintiff fell is “swampy” during the wintertime. {¶7} Kerry Cramer, the maintenance superintendent at RCI, testified that he has worked at RCI the entire time it has been open. Cramer testified that he supervises a staff of 12 employees within his department and that the maintenance staff is responsible for all the maintenance in the institution. Such maintenance includes plumbing, carpentry, welding, snow removal, general grounds keeping, and grass mowing. Cramer testified that in March 2014, RCI had a policy in place regarding snow and ice removal. Cramer explained that pursuant to the policy, during the hours of Case No. 2014-00950 -3- DECISION

7:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., the maintenance department is responsible for snow and ice removal on the walkways. Cramer reported that rock salt is used on asphalt surfaces and calcium chloride is used on concrete walkways. Cramer testified that only defendant’s maintenance staff employees are allowed to spread rock salt or calcium chloride. According to Cramer, after 3:00 p.m. and before 7:00 a.m., the captain’s office makes the decision whether to call maintenance staff to come in and perform snow and ice removal. Cramer explained that such a call typically occurs when there has been snowfall exceeding one to two inches. Cramer testified that no one was directed to perform any snow or ice removal prior to 7:00 a.m. on March 21, 2014. {¶8} In order for plaintiff to prevail upon his claim of negligence, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant owed him a duty, that defendant’s acts or omissions resulted in a breach of that duty, and that the breach proximately caused him injury. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1984). {¶9} In general, a possessor of land has no duty to protect an invitee from natural accumulations of ice and snow on his property. Brinkman v. Ross, 68 Ohio St.3d 82, 83 (1993). Implicit in this rule is the rationale that such accumulations are so open and obvious that invitees can be expected to protect themselves from the danger they present. Dean v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97API12-1614, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4451 (Sept. 24, 1998). Essentially, “an invitee who chooses to traverse a natural accumulation of ice or snow is generally presumed to have assumed the risk of his or her action to the degree that no duty exists on the premises owner.” Id. However, inmates incarcerated in a state penal institution are not afforded the status of a traditional “invitee” and are not always free, as an invitee would be, to refrain from traversing the accumulation of ice and snow and so they cannot be said to assume the risk of doing so. Id; see also May v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1327, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2859 (recognizing that an inmate who slipped Case No. 2014-00950 -4- DECISION

and fell on a natural accumulation of ice or snow had no opportunity to refrain from using the assigned path); Gerald Fields v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr, Ct. of Cl. No. 2010-12281 (June 7, 2012). Rather, in the context of the custodial relationship between the state and its inmates, the state has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent prisoners in its custody from being injured by dangerous conditions about which the state knows or should know. Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 89 Ohio App.3d 107, 112 (10th Dist.1993); McCoy v. Engle, 42 Ohio App.3d 204, 207-208 (10th Dist.1987); Dean, supra. {¶10} With regard to notice, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive, the distinction being the manner in which the notice is obtained rather than the amount of information obtained.” Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-787, 2013-Ohio-5106, ¶ 12; Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 9. “Whenever the trier of fact is entitled to find from competent evidence that information was personally communicated to or received by the party, the notice is actual. Constructive notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.” Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-1052, 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14. “To support an inference of constructive notice, a plaintiff may submit evidence that the condition existed for such a length of time that the owner or its agent’s failure to warn against it or remove it resulted from their failure to exercise ordinary care.” Jenkins at ¶ 12.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
2013 Ohio 5106 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2013)
Moore v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction
623 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1993)
McCoy v. Engle
537 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1987)
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc.
472 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
Brinkman v. Ross
623 N.E.2d 1175 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1993)
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co.
788 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2016 Ohio 684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-ohio-dept-of-rehab-corr-ohioctcl-2016.